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公孫龍哲學

馮友蘭

本文承金岳霖先生指正數處，謹此致謝。

漢人所謂古代哲學中之名家者流，戰國時人稱曰“辯者”，(見莊子天道篇，天下篇)或曰“刑名之家”(見戰國策趙策)。普通謂辯者之學“，合同異，離堅白”。蓋辯者中實分爲二派。一派“合同異”，一派“離堅白”；前者以惠施爲首領，後者以公孫龍爲首領。

莊子天下篇所述惠施十事，皆以“至大無外”之觀點，指出一切區別之爲相對的，而歸結于“氾愛萬物，天地一體也”。此“合同異”也。莊子之學，如齊物論及秋水篇所說，亦從“道”之觀點，指出一切區別之爲相對的，而歸結于“天地與我並生，而萬物與我爲一”。然莊子又言：“旣已爲一矣，且得有言乎”？此一轉語，實莊子與惠施不同之處。蓋莊子又言“心齋”“坐忘”，使吾人超乎知識之上而實際經驗“萬物與我爲一”之境界。惠施則只以“辯”證明“天地一體也”。此所以天下篇歎其才而又惜其“終以善辯爲名”。蓋依莊學之觀點，惠施可謂一間未達而誤入歧途也。

“合同異”一派之說，皆就物之個體而論。一個體本有許多性質，而其所有之性質，又皆非絕對的。故泰山可謂爲小，而秋毫可謂爲大。一概念則不然。一概念只是一概念，其性質亦是絕對的。如大之概念只是大，小之概念只是小。惠施之觀點，注重于個體的物，故“合同異”而歸結于“氾愛萬物，天地一體也”。公孫龍之觀點，則注重于概念，故“離堅白”

而歸結于"天下皆獨而正"。

公孫龍"所為名者,乃以白馬之論"。(迹府篇)　公孫龍子中白馬論曰:

> "白馬非馬……馬者,所以命形也;白者,所以命色也;命色者,非命形也,故曰白馬非馬。……　求馬,黃黑馬皆可致;求白馬,黃黑馬不可致。……　故黃黑馬一也,而可以應有馬,而不可以應有白馬,是白馬之非馬審矣。……馬固有色,故有白馬。使馬無色,有馬如已耳。安取白馬?　故白者,非馬也。白馬者,馬與白也。馬與白馬也。故曰,白馬非馬也。……　白者不定所白,忘之而可也。白馬者,言白定所白也。定所白者,非白也。馬者,無去取於色,故黃黑皆所以應。白馬者,有去取於色,黃黑馬皆所以色去,故白馬獨可以應耳。無去者,非有去也,故曰白馬非馬"。

馬之名所指只一切馬共有之性質,只一馬 as such, 所謂"有馬如已耳"。(已似當為己,如己即 as such 之意)。其於色皆無所定",而白馬則於色有"所定"。故白馬之名之所指,與馬之名之所指,實不同也。白亦有非此白物亦非彼白物之普通的白。此即所謂"不定所白"之白也。若白馬之白,則只為白馬之白,故曰"白馬者,白定所白也。定所白者非白也"。言已為白馬之白,則即非普通之白。白馬之名之所指,與白之名之所指,亦不同也。

馬,白,及白馬,之名之所指,即指物論所謂之"指"。指與物不同。所謂物者,名實論云:

> "天地與其所產焉,物也。物以物其所物而不過焉

者,實也。實以實其所實而不曠焉者,位也。……… 正其所實者,正其名也"。……… 夫名,實謂也。知此之非此也,知此之不在此也,則不謂也。(原爲"知此之非也明不爲也"依俞樾校改。) 知彼之非彼也,知彼之不在彼也,則不謂也"。

由此段觀之,則物爲佔空間時間中之位置者,即現在哲學中所謂具體的個體也。如此馬,彼馬,此白物,彼白物,是也。指者,名之所指也。就一方面說,名之所指爲個體,所謂"名者,實謂也"。就又一方面說,名之所指爲共相。(註一) 如此馬彼馬之外,尙有"有馬如己耳"之馬。此白物彼白品之外,尙有一"白者不定所白"之白。此"馬"與"白",卽現在哲學中所謂"共相",或"要素"。此亦名之所指也。公孫龍以指物對舉,可知其所謂指,即名之所指之共相也。(註二)

公孫龍之白馬論,指出"馬""白"及"白馬"乃獨立分離的共相。莊子秋水篇稱公孫龍"離堅白"。"離堅白"者,卽指出"堅"及"白"乃兩個分離的共相也。堅白論曰:

"堅,白,石,三,可乎?曰,不可。曰,二,可乎?曰,可。曰,何哉?曰,無堅得白,其舉也二;無白得堅,其舉也二。……視不得其所堅,而得其所白者,無堅也。拊不得其所白,而得其所堅,得其堅也,無白也。……… 得其白,得其堅,見與不見,見(此見字據俞樾校補) 與不見離,一一不相盈,故離。離也者,藏也"。

此所謂"無堅""無白",皆指具體的石中之堅白而言。視石者見白而不見堅,不見堅,則堅離於白矣。拊石者得堅而不得白,不得白,則白離於堅矣。此可見"堅"與"白""不

相盈"。所謂"不相盈"者,即此不在彼中也。此就知識論上證明堅白之爲兩個分離的共相也。堅白論中又設爲難者駁詞云:

"目不能堅,手不能白,不可謂無堅,不可謂無白。其異任也,其無以代也。堅白域于石,惡乎離"?

此謂目乎異任,不能相代,故目見白不見堅,手拊堅不得白。然此自是目不見堅,手不得白而已。其實堅白皆在石內,何能相離也?公孫龍答曰:

"物白焉不定其所白;物堅焉不定其所堅。不定者兼;惡乎其(原作甚,依陳澧校改)。石也?"

謝希深曰:"萬物通有白,是不定白於石也。夫堅白豈惟不定於石乎?亦兼不定於萬物矣。萬物且猶不能定,安能獨與石同體乎?"白"不定其所白",堅"不定其所堅",豈得謂"堅白域於石"?天下之物,有堅而不白者,有白而不堅者;堅白爲兩個分離的共相,更可見矣。此就形上學上證明堅白之"離"也。堅白論又曰:

"堅未與石爲堅而物兼,未與爲堅而堅必堅。其不堅石物而堅,天下未有若堅而堅藏。白固不能自白,惡能白石物乎?若白者必白,則不白物而白焉。黃黑與之然,石其無有,惡取堅白石乎?故離也,離也者因是"。

謝希深曰:"堅者不獨堅於石,而亦堅於萬物。故曰:'未與石爲堅而物兼'也。亦不與萬物爲堅,而固當自堅。故曰:'未與物爲堅而堅必堅'也。天下未有若此獨立之堅可見,然亦不可謂之無堅。故曰:'而堅藏'也"。獨立之白,雖亦不可

見,然白實能自白。蓋假使白而不能自白,即不能使石與物白。若白而能自白,則不借他物而亦自存焉。黃黑各色亦然。石可無白,無白則無堅白石矣。由此可見,堅白可離而獨存也。此就形上學上言"堅"及"白"之共相皆有獨立的存在。"堅"及"白"之共相,雖能獨立的自堅自白,然人之感覺之,則只限於其表現於具體的物者,即人只能感覺其與物為堅,與物為白者。然即其不表現於物,亦非無有,不過不可使人感覺耳。此即所謂"藏"也。其"藏"乃其自藏,非有藏之者。故堅白論曰:

"有自藏也,非藏而藏也"。

柏拉圖謂個體可見而不可思;概念可思而不可見。即此義也。於此更可見"堅""白"之離矣。豈獨"堅""白"離,一切共相皆分離而有獨立的存在。故堅白論曰:

"離也者,天下皆獨而正"。

現代新實在論者,謂個體之物存在 Exist;概念潛存 Subsist。所謂潛存者,即不在時空中佔位置,而亦非無有。如堅雖不與物為堅,然仍不可謂無堅。此即謂堅"藏",即謂堅潛存也。知堅藏之義,則公孫龍子指物論可讀矣。指物論曰:

"物莫非指,而指非指。天下無指,物無可以謂物。非指者,天下無(原作而,據俞樾校改)物,可謂指乎?指也者,天下之所無也;物也者,天下之所有也;以天下之所有,為天下之所無,未可。天下無指,而物不可謂指也;不可謂指者,非指也;非指者,物莫非指也。天下無指而物不可謂指者,非有非指也;非有非指者,物莫非指也;

> 物莫非指者;而指非指也。天下無指者,生於物之各有名不爲指也。不爲指而謂之指,是兼不爲指。以有不爲指之無不爲指,未可。且指者天下之所兼。天下無指者,物不可謂無指也;不可謂無指者,非有非指也;非有非指者,物莫非指,指非非指也,指與物非指也。使天下無物指,誰徑謂非指?天下無物,誰徑謂指?天下有指無物指,誰徑謂非指?徑謂無物非指?且夫指固自爲非指,奚待於物,而乃與爲指"。

天下之物,若將其分析,則惟見其爲若干之共相而已。然概念則不可復分析爲共相。故曰:"物莫非指,而指非指,天下無指,物無可以爲物也"。然共相必"有所定",有所"與",即必表現於物,然後在時空佔位置,而爲吾人所感覺。否則不在時空,不爲吾人所感覺。故曰:'天下無物,可謂指乎"?又曰:"指也者,天下之所無也;物也者,天下之所有也"。蓋共相若無所定,不"與物",則不在時空而藏,故爲天下之所無也。物有在時空中之存在,而爲"天下之所有"。故物雖可分析爲若干共相,而物之自身則非指。故一方面言"物莫非指",一方面又言"物不可爲指"也。謂"天下無指",即謂共相之自身,不在時空之內,然天下之物皆有其名。"名,實謂也"。名所以謂實,實亦爲個體,名則代表共相。然名亦只爲共相之代表,非即共相。天下雖有名,而仍無共相。故曰:"天下無指者,生於物之各有名不爲指也"。名不爲指,則不可謂之爲指。故曰:"以有不爲指之無不爲指,未可"。一共相爲其類之物之所共有,如"馬"之共相,爲馬之類之物所共有。白之共相,爲白物之類之物所共有。故謂天下無指,非謂天下

之物無指也。故曰:"且指者,天下之所兼;天下無指者,物不可謂無指也"。按一方面言,物莫非指,蓋具體的物,皆共相之聚合,而在時空佔位置者也。按又一方面言,則物爲非指,蓋在時空佔位置者乃個體,非共相也。故按一方面言,"不可謂無指者,非有非指也;非有非指者,物莫非指"。按又一方面言,"指非非指,指與物非指也"。"指與物非指"者,若干指聯合現於時空中之"位"而爲物。現於物中之指,即"與物"之指,即所謂"物指"。若使無指,則不能有物。若使無物指,亦不能有物。若使有指無物,則僅有"藏"而不現之共相,而講物指之人,亦無有矣。故曰:'天下無物,誰徑謂非指?天下無物,誰徑謂指?天下有指無物指,誰徑謂非指?徑謂無物非指"?然指之聯合而現於時空之位以爲物,亦係自然的,非有使之者。故曰:"且夫指固自爲非指,奚待於物而乃與爲指"?"非指"即物也。

共相不變者也;個體常變者也。或變或不變,公孫龍子通變論即討論此問題者。通變論曰:

> "曰,二有一乎?曰,二無一。曰,二有右乎?曰,二無右。曰,二有左乎?曰,二無左。曰,右可謂二乎?曰,不可。曰,左可謂二乎?曰,不可。曰,左與右可謂二乎?曰,可"。

二之共相只是二,非他一切。故非一,非左,非右。但左加於右則其數二,故左與右可謂二。通變論曰:

> "曰,謂變非不變可乎?曰,可。曰,右有與,可謂變乎?曰,可。曰,變奚?(原作隻,據俞樾校改)曰,右"。

共相不變;個體常變,變非不變也。"右有與"之"與"即堅白論

"堅未與石爲堅"之"與"。蓋共相之自身雖不變,然若表現於個體,則可謂爲有變矣。故右之共相,若"有與",即"可謂變"也。變爲何?仍變爲右?不過此右乃指具體的事例中之右,(如此物之右)非右之共相而已。通變論曰:

"曰,右苟變,安可謂右?苟不變,安可謂變?曰,二苟無左又無右,二者左與右,奈何"?

問者不達"右有與"即爲俱體的事例中之右,故問:右若變,何以仍爲右?若不變,何以謂之變。問者又不達左與右加,其數爲二,故稱爲二,故又問:二旣非左,又非右,何以謂二者左與右?通變論曰:

"羊合牛非馬,牛合羊非雞。曰,何哉?"

此謂左與右加,其數爲二,故稱爲二。非謂左之共相與右之共相,聚合爲一而成爲二也。左右之共相,不能聚合而爲二,猶羊牛之共相不能聚而爲馬,牛羊之共相不能聚合而爲雞也。通變論曰:

"曰:羊與牛唯異。羊有齒,牛無齒,而牛之非羊也,羊之非牛也,未可;是不俱有,而或類焉。羊有角,牛有角,牛之而羊也,羊之而牛也未可;是俱有,而類之不同也。羊牛有角,馬無角,馬有尾,牛羊無尾,故曰,羊合牛非馬也。非馬者,無馬也。無馬者,羊不二,牛不二,而羊牛二,是而羊而牛非馬可也。若舉而以是,猶類之不同。若左右,猶是舉"。

此歷舉牛,羊,馬,之共相,內容不同,故羊,牛,之共相,不能聚合而馬也。然羊,牛,之共相雖不能合而爲馬,而羊牛之共相相加,其數爲二,故曰"羊不二,牛不二,而牛羊二"也。羊牛雖不一

類,然不害其相加爲二,左右之爲二,亦猶是已。故曰"若舉而以是,猶類之不同,若左右,猶是舉"。通變論曰:

"牛羊有毛,雞有羽。謂雞足一,數足二;二而一,故三。謂牛羊足一,數足四;四而一,故五。羊牛足五,雞足三,故曰:牛合羊非雞,非有以非雞也。與馬以雞,寧馬。材不材,其無以類審矣。舉是謂亂名,是狂舉"。

此謂牛羊與雞更不同。雞足之共相,或"謂雞足"之言,及實際的雞之二足,爲三。若牛足或羊足之共相,或"謂牛羊足"之言,及實際的牛或羊之四足,則數五。故牛羊之共相不能聚合而爲雞。與其謂牛羊之共相可合而爲雞,則尙不如謂其可合而爲馬。蓋馬與雞比,猶與牛羊爲相近也。故曰:"與馬以雞,寧馬"也。若必謂牛羊可爲雞,則是"亂名",是"狂舉"也。此篇下文不甚明了。然其大意,謂靑與白不能爲黃,白與靑不能爲碧,猶"羊合牛非馬,牛合羊非雞"。故曰"黃其馬也,碧其雞也"。蓋另舉例以釋上文之意,所謂"他辯"也。

以上爲公孫龍哲學之大綱。公孫龍所持之論,皆與吾人感覺所見不合。彼用理智觀察世界;理智所見,固可與感覺不合也。吾人之常識,皆以吾人感覺所得之知識爲根據。常人之見皆依常識之觀點;此公孫龍之學,所以爲"然不然,可不可"(莊子秋水篇)也。

(註一)嚴格言之,名有抽象與具體之分。抽象之名專指共相。具體公共之名,指個體而包涵共相。其所指之個體,即其外延 denotation;其所涵之共相,即其內涵 connotation。但中國文字,形式上無此分別;中國古哲學家亦未爲此分別。故指個體之馬之"馬"與指馬之共

相之"馬"謂此白物之"白",與指白之共相之"白",未有區別。即"馬""白"兼指抽象的共相,與具體的個體;即兼有二種功用也。

(註二)余第一次稿云:"共相"或"要素",公孫龍未有專用名詞以名之。"馬""白"在文字語言上之代表,即此名實論所謂名也。吾人對於此白馬彼白馬之知識,謂之"知見" Percept 對於"馬""白"及"白馬"之知識,謂之概念 Concept。公孫龍所謂"指"即概念也。(陳鐘凡先生謂指與旨通。旨訓意,指亦訓意。說詳陳先生所著諸子通誼)公孫龍未爲共相專立名詞,即以"指"名之。猶柏拉圖所說之概念 Idea 即指共相也。此說亦通,但不如以"指"爲名之所指之共相爲更直截耳。

The Meaning of "The Meaning of Meaning."

·by

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When I was an undergraduate at Cambridge I listened for several years to the Lectures of two celebrated philosophers. They spoke at the same hour in the same building, one on the ground floor, the other just above him on the second floor. Each spent much of his time discussing the views of the other. Dr. A, on the ground floor, would say several times an hour, "I cannot imagine what Professor B *means* by saying...." and just as often Professor B would say, "I do not pretend to be able to grasp Dr. A's *meaning.*" The only point upon which they ever seemed to agree was that the other "could not possibly *mean* what he said."

After some years of this, it began to dawn upon me that there must be something radically wrong with their use of language if two very able and acute and distinguished men behaved so strangely. At the same time I noticed that neither of them ever spent any time discussing *meaning* itself; and a little inquiry showed that other philosophers did not behave very differently in this regard, although the word '*meaning*' was as constantly in the months.

A very astute English woman, Lady Welby, who had been Lady in Waiting to Queen Victoria, used to urge our philosophers, psychologists and linguists to look into this matter. She had been struck by the frequency with which serious discussions turned into disputes about words. This convinced her that language often betrayed and misled men who thought deeply, and that a new science, the science, of 'SIGNIFICS' or of 'SYTBOLISM' was badly needed. But few of these upon whom she urged this opinion ever understood 'what she *meant.*' Among the few was Mr. C. K. Ogden, than a young classical scholar of great brilliance and promise at Magdalene College, Cambridge. The war, however, prevented him from

doing much work upon the subject although his position as Editor of the famous English war-time weekly paper, *The Cambridge Magazine* gave him an unrivalled opportunity to study the uses and abuses of works in propaganda and politics.

In 1918 Mr. Ogden and I began a discussion of *Meaning* which went on for more than a year almost continuously. His extraordinary range of learning and wide knowledge of contemporary European thought upon an unusual variety of subjects, coupled with his rooted mistrust of accepted opinions were great advantages. My interest was rather that of the psychologist and literary critic. These different approaches enabled us to cover the subject in a way which a single mind could hardly have done. Further, we soon grew able to collaborate with an unusual degree of ease and enjoyment. Practical experience in collaboration is very desireable for those who wish to work at this subject, since the study of *meaning* is really the study of the instruments by which men understand one another, and nothing tests understanding so much as collaboration in original and constructive work. In addition, this study of *meaning* is apt to be disheartening and two workers can more easily remain cheerful than one.

As we explored the history of the subject we discovered that very many great authorities in the past has deplored the absence of a science of *meaning*. John Locke, one of the three great English Philosophers, wrote a whole volume on the matter, the Third Book of his great *Essay*. This Third Book was devoted to the difficulties which the use of words occasions in discussion and in the study of difficult and abstract matters. This, he said, "cost me more pains to express than all the rest of my Essay," Yet Locke's Third Book is never read and is usually unknown even to professional students of English Philosophy.

We soon learnt not to be surprised by this neglect. Great economists, sociologists, political theorists, logicians, moralists, aestheticians and experts in all the abstract sciences can easily be found agreeing in the prefaces to their works that words are in fact the very Devil, and that all these sciences are being endlessly delayed by the ambiguities and shifting *meanings* of words.

But everyone who has yet attempted to discover exactly what is wrong with language as an instrument for abstract discussion, or who has tried to improve matters, has been treated in the past as a crank, if not as a fool, for his pains. A deep-lying, very strong, resistance is offered by most minds to the suggestion that we do not know what we *mean*. Such a view seems to take away the foundations of our existence and, since a close study of *meaning* usually shows that we are far less clear in our *meaning* than we suppose, this distaste for investigation is easily explained.

The physical science are the great exception to this universal ***verbalism***, as this disease—the use of words without sufficient scrutiny of meanings—may be called. These sciences are free from it because ultimately everything said by physics rests upon something that is done in a laboratory. Physics, though the fact is often hidden by its mathematical complexities, deals in the end with things that can be touched, seen and handled. The misleading influences of words and symbols do not come into physics except, it may be remarked, at those obscure confines of the subject where we do not yet know whether the latest utterances of Einstein, or Schroedinger are physics or mathematics.

By contrast, all the studies which rest, not upon physics but upon psychology, and these include ethics, æthetics, sociology, political theory, economics—in fact all the subjects which are of human interest—are hampered and sometimes nearly paralysed by verbalism. Psychology itself, though full of new life and ready to advance, suffers disastrously from its uncontrolled and misleading vocabularies.

To take one example—the word 'meaning' itself is an important term in psychology. A large part of the task which we set ourselves consisted in a description and classification of the different senses (or ***meanings***) of the word 'meaning.' We found, of course, that it has several meanings, but we were hardly prepared for the degree to which in current discussions these ***meanings*** were confused. We found it necessary to distinguish no less than 16 different

senses of 'meaning,' in order to charify the types of linguistic misunderstandings we encountered.

Tne picture of eternal human misunderstanding thus opened out seems at first sight depressing. But a very encouraging fact soom appeared. In order to check our results ar regards the word 'Meaning' we also examined, in the same fashion, other words which are famous, and should be imfamous, in controversy, among them the word 'Beauty'. Although the question 'What is Meaning?' never has been much discussed, the question 'What is Beauty?' has been the occasion for endless dispute. We found, of course, that 'Beauty' has many senses and also that these senses run parallel to those of the word 'Meaning' in an interesting and suggestive manner.

The result of the two investigations was the beginning of a new technique of study which we hope to develop in the never future. A student who has made himself familiar with the senses of the words 'Meaning' and 'Beauty' at once finds himself in a very advantageous position if he turns to the study of 'Wealth' 'Truth', 'Good', 'Value', 'Progress', 'Life' or any other of the great watchwords of the social sciences. He will know already some of the ways in which these instruments of discussion are likely to mislead him unless critically handled.

But works besides being instruments of intellectual discussion are also powerful agents for swaying our feeling and influencing our attitudes to life. How powerful they can be is shown by Poetry, which in our modern civilization is becoming not less but more important in life. This branch of this subject called for a separate study which I undertook. Mr. Ogden meanwhile continued with the problem of fictions (logical, legal and others)—a problem originally raised by Bentham—and with the considerations pertaining to international and auxiliary languages. The result has been his very remarkable project, Basic English, May own attempt to apply whatever light we seemed to gain from our joint reflections on *meaning* incidentally brought out a fresh mass of evidence to show that words are not to be trusted. Even very well-educated readers, it appears,

only occasionally apprehend the various *meanings* of words in poetry with sufficient accuracy to make critical discussion desireable. A result, this, which only our natural social prejudice, in favour of exaggerating the degree to which we normally understand one another, would make us doubt.

It appears then that history as well as general literature must join the list of subjects urgently requiring a closer study of the modes of *meanings* than has hitherto been thought necessary. More obviously, all comparative treatments of literature require it—especially when translsation is in question. No one who has made any special study of ambiguity can regard translations with anything but suspicion, even in the case of cognate languages; and where languages so different as Chinese and English are concerned, the arguments in favour of a direct comparative study of their resources by the light of modern logical and psychological analysis seem very clear and pressing. Such a comparative survey of Chinese and English would certainly assist the theory of meaning, it would probably make important contributions to psychology and it would help to reduce the great dangers of inaccurate or one-sided translation. No one who considers, for example, the endless trouble that has been caused in the past by hasty and crude translations of the pivotal terms of Greek thought into Western languages will underrate these dangers. A crude translation of an important word produces a strain of bastard thinking which generations of scholars are sometimes not able to overcome.

This comparative survey would need the close collaboration of at least three students—a Chinese scholar with a tast for exploring impartially the subtleties of Chinese thought and especially the systematic ambiguities of Chinese philosophy; a translator with as free and plastic control of the resources of the two languages as possible, with a taste for definitions, and a cultivated distrust of accepted equivalences, thirdly, a student of Meaning whose business it would be to analyse, generalise and classify the linguistic situations which be observed arising in the course of the discussion. It is not likely that these various acqui-

rements aptitudes, and tates will ever be combined in one mind. Yet to explore the real problems that contact between Chinese and Western thought will raise in the future they are ali needed. The only possible plan is organised collaboration.

This project must not be confused with such undertakings as dictionary making or the compiling of a Thesaurus. It stands to them much as algebra stands to arithmetic. It would endeavour to reach a higher degree of generality; the theory of meanings is the attempt to *generalise* on the practice of definitions and of drawing distinctions. The lexicographer is concerned with the practical task of nothing distinctions of meaning. When he has listed the various meanings of a word faithfully as he can, he passes on to another word. It is not his business to reflect upon the relations of these various meaning, or to compare various words in respect of the patterns which their several groups of associated meanings present. He has too much work in hand to attend to these matters; he must leave them to students with a different kind of interest in meanings, and equipment. The relation between them may be compared with that of the man of business to the economist, the engineer to physicist, or the physician to the physiologist or bio-chemist. The parallel will perhaps bear pressing.

More assistance from logico-psychological theory might bring to the linguist as great an increase of power as science has brought and is bringing to medicine. And at this moment the linguist is particularly in need of assistance. The two greatest systems of thought in the world are at last coming into close contact. To mediate between them they have only *words*, which every reflective person accustomed to discussion will recognise to be delicate and untrustworthy instruments. The only way to make them more reliable and to overcome their treacheries is through an improved and more critical discipline, making us more aware of the principles by which they work and better able to control their ambiguities and confusions. This is the case for a comparative theoretical survey of Chinese and English, and, in the practical sense, the 'meaning' of the study of *meaning*.

三國志曹冲華佗傳與佛教故事

陳寅恪

陳承祚著三國志,下筆謹嚴。裴世期爲之註,頗採小說故事以補之,轉失原書去取之意,後人多議之者。實則國志本文往往有佛教故事,雜糅附益於其間,特蹟象隱晦,不易發覺其爲外國輸入者耳。今略舉數事以證明之,或亦審查古代史料眞僞者之一助也。

魏志卷二十鄧哀王沖傳云:

'鄧哀王沖字倉舒,聰察歧嶷,生五六歲,智意所及,有若成人之智。時孫權曾致巨象,太祖欲知其斤重,訪之羣下,咸莫能出其理。沖曰,置巨象大船之上,而刻其水痕所至,稱物以載之,則校可知矣。太祖大悅,即施行焉'。

葉水心習學記言卷二十七論此事曰:'倉舒童孺,而有仁人之心,並舟稱象,爲世開智物理,蓋天稟也'。是直信以爲事實。何義門以倉舒死於建安十三年前,知其事爲妄飾,而疑置水刻舟,算術中或本有此法。邵二雲據能改齋漫錄引苻子所載燕昭王命水官浮大豕而量之,謂其事已在前。(見梁章鉅三國志旁證卷十四)然皆未得其出處也。攷北魏吉迦夜共曇曜譯雜寶藏經卷一棄老國緣云。

'天神又問,此大白象有幾斤? 而羣臣共議,無能知者。亦募國內,復不能知。大臣問父,父言:置象船上,著大池中,畫水齊船,深淺幾許,即以此船量石著中,水沒齊畫,則知斤兩。即以此智以答天神'

案雜寶藏經雖爲北魏時所譯,然其書乃雜採諸經而成,

故其所載諸國緣多見於支那先後譯出之佛典中。如卷八之難陀王與那伽斯那共論緣與那先比丘問經之關係,即其一例。因知卷一之棄老國緣亦當別有同一內容之經典,譯出在先。或雖經譯出,而書籍亡逸,無可徵考。或雖未譯出,而此故事僅憑口述,亦得輾轉流傳至於中土,遂附會爲倉舒之事,以見其智。但象爲南方之獸,非曹氏境內所能有,不得不取其事與孫權貢獻事混成一談,以文飾之,此比較民俗文學之通例也。

又魏志卷二十九華佗傳云:

'華佗字元化,一名旉(裴注'古'敷'字與'旉'相似,寫書者不能別,尋佗字元化其名宜爲'敷'也。案'旉''敷'通用字,不必如裴說以爲寫誤也)。(中略)時人以爲年且百歲,而有壯容。(中略)病若在腸中,便斷腸湔洗,縫腹摩膏,四五日差,不痛,人亦不自寤,一月之間即平復矣。(中略)又有一士大夫不快,佗云病甚,當破腹取。然君壽不過十年,病不能殺君,忍病十歲,壽俱當盡。不足故自刳裂。士大夫不耐痛癢,必欲除之,佗遂下手,所患尋差,十年竟死。(下略)'

後漢書方術傳亦有華佗傳,范蔚宗所記與魏志同出一源,而其書後成,可於此並論之。案杭大宗三國志補注卷四引玉澗雜書曰:'華佗固神醫也,然范曄陳壽記其治疾,皆言若病結積在內,針藥所不能及者云云…………此決無之理。'是昔人固有疑其事者。夫華佗之爲歷史上眞實人物,自不容不信。然斷腸破腹,數日即差,揆以學術進化之史蹟,當時恐難臻此。其有神話色采,似無可疑。檢天竺語'agada'乃藥之義,舊譯爲'阿伽陀'或'阿羯陀',爲內典中所習見之語。'華'

字古音,據瑞典人高本漢字典爲$\gamma^{w}a$日本漢音亦讀'華'爲'カ'。則'華佗'二字古音與'gada'適相應,其渻去'阿'字者,猶'阿羅漢'僅稱'羅漢'之比。蓋元化固華氏子,其本名爲旉而非佗,當時民間比附印度神話故事,因稱爲'華佗',實以'藥神'目之。此魏志後漢書所記元化之字,所以與其一名之旉相應合之故也。考後漢安世高譯㮈女耆域因緣經所載神醫耆域諸奇術,如治拘睒彌長者子病,取利刀破腸,披腸結處。治迦羅越家女病,以金刀披破其頭,悉出諸蟲,封著甖中,以三種神膏塗瘡,七日便愈,乃出蟲示之,女見,大驚怖。及治迦羅越家男兒肝反戾向後病,以金刀破腹,還肝向前:以三種神膏塗之,三日便愈。其斷腸破腹固與元化事不異,而元化壁縣病者所吐之蛇以十數,及治陳登疾,令吐出赤頭蟲三升許,亦與耆域之治迦羅越家女病事不無類似之處。至元化爲魏武療疾致死,耆域亦以醫暴君病,幾爲所殺,賴佛成神,僅而得免。則其遭際符合,尤不能令人無因襲之疑。(敦煌本勾道興搜神記載華佗事有'漢末開腸,洗五藏,劈腦出蟲,乃爲魏武帝所殺'之語,與㮈女耆域因緣經所記尤相似)。然此尚爲外來之神話附益於本國之史實也。若慧皎高僧傳之耆域,則於晉惠帝之末年,經扶南交廣襄陽至於洛陽,復取道流沙而返天竺,(見高僧傳卷九)。然據㮈女耆域因緣等佛典,則耆域爲佛同時人,若其來游中土亦當在春秋之世,而非典午之時,斯蓋直取外國神話之人物,不經比附事實或變易名字之程序,而竟以爲本國歷史之人物,則較華佗傳所記更有不同矣。嘗謂外來之故事名詞比附於本國人物事實,有似通天老狐,醉則見尾。如袁宏竹林名士傳戴逵竹林七賢論孫盛魏氏春秋臧榮緒晉書及唐修晉書等所載

嵇康等七人,固皆支那歷史上之人物也。獨七賢所游之'竹林',則爲假託佛教名詞,即'Veṇu'或'Veḷuvana'之譯語,乃釋迦牟尼說法處(見歷代所譯經典)法顯(佛國記)玄奘(西域記卷九)所親歷之地。此因名詞之沿襲,而推知事實之依託,亦審查史料眞僞之一例也。(聞日本學者有論此事之著作,予未見)。總而言之,三國志曹沖華佗二傳,皆有佛教故事,輾轉因襲雜糅附會於其間,然巨象非中原當日之獸,華佗爲五天外國之音,其變遷之跡象猶未盡亡,故得賴之以推尋史料之源本。夫三國志之成書,上距佛教入中土之時猶不甚久,而印度神話傳播已若是之廣。社會所受之影響已若是之深,遂致以承祚之精識,猶不能別擇眞僞而並筆之於書。則又治史者所當注意之事,固不獨與此二傳之考證有關而已也。

Molière's Tartuffe.

by

Robert Winter

During the reign of Louis XIV a controversy over the theater arose, in which all of the most illustrious writers[1] of the time took part, with Molière at their head. The question under discussion was: Is the theater moral or not? Can it or can it not improve society? Should it be suppressed? a question which dates from Plato, Aristotle, Ovid, Seneca, Pliny, Tacitus, Valerius Maximus, Plutarch, and Cicero. The church had always taken a stand against the theater in these discussions: Tertullian, Minucius Felix, Jerome, Basil, Cyprian, Lactantius, Ambrose, Augustine, Cyril and others had condemned the theater and this attitude had been continued by François de Sales, Vincent de Paul, Ollier (the founder of St. Sulpice), and by the St. Sacrement. Ollier's lieutenant, Du Ferrier, writes that he is astonished that priests confess comedians, gypsies, and such dogs and swine. The Ritual of the Bishopric of Paris[2] contained this significant statement: "All the faithful may be admitted to holy communion except those who for some just reason are forbidden to receive it; and we must exclude those who are obviously unworthy, such as those who are excommunicated, interdicted, and manifestly infamous: to wit, women of bad reputation, concubinaries, comedians, usurers, magicians, sorcerers, blasphemers, and other like sinners, unless they are faithful and have done penance for their sins," etc. Nicole, in his *Traité de la Comédie*,[3] attacks even Corneille, whom we now consider to be the repository of the noblest sentiments of duty. Pascal expressed the same point of view:[4] "All great diversions are dangerous for the Christian life; but of all those that the world has invented, there is none more to be feared than comedy."

1. Corneille, Racine, Pascal, Nicole, Bossuet, Fénelon, Boileau, La Bruyère, Bourdaloue, Massillon. Fléchier, etc.
2. Printed in 1641.
3. 1658.
4. *Pensées*, Art. XVI, LXIII.

Molière became the enemy of these people after the *Ecole des Femmes*. His respect for nature and for the irresistable power of love were attacked even after his death, for the Curé of St. Eustache refused him burial while granting it at the same time to Scaramouche. But of all his plays none aroused such a storm of protest as *Tartuffe*, which became the most important document in the great quarrel over the theater which took place towards the middle of the seventeenth century.[1]

Why did Molière strike such a blow at this time? It is generally admitted that the play is so bold that it could not have been given at any other time in the history of France. Voltaire[2] has described this unique moment in detail; the king of Spain had just been obliged to yield the supremacy to Louis XIV; Cardinal Chigi was at this time at the court to offer the pope's excuses for an offense done to the French ambassador; Dunkerque had been added to France by a glorious bargain, what better time could have been chosen to celebrate the glory of the Roi Soleil by the most magnificent festivities that have ever been conceived. The celebrations were held at Versailles and lasted for a week. They combined the most brilliant conceptions of chivalry from the *Orlando Furioso*, the *Amadis*, and the *Astrée* with the most beautiful myths of antiquity, and to that combination were added three plays[3] by Molière which gave the finest expression to the cultivation of the time, crowned by what is perhaps the boldest work of French classical literature. More than six hundred persons arrived at Versailles on the fifth of May, besides a small army of artisans and other people necessary for the comedies. The weather was perfect. At the first dinner Mlle. de la Vallière sat the sixth from Madame at a crescent shaped table laid in a garden lighted by thousands of torches held by gorgeously costumed masks. On the second day the *Princesse d'Elide* was given, which celebrated[4] the king's love for Mlle. de La Vallière, whose

1. A Lefranc: Lectures on *Tartuffe* at the College de France. Revue des Cours et Conférences, Vol. XV, 1906-7.
2. *Siècle de Louis XIV*.
3. *La Princesse d'Elide, Les Facheux, Le Mariage Forcé.*
4. Act. I, sc. 1, lines 15-32.

first child had been born five months before. Both the *Princesse d'Elide* and the *Mariage Forcé* were suggested to Molière by Rabelais[1] and in general the festivities followed Renaissance traditions. On Saturday a tourney was held, on Sunday the *Facheux* was given, on Monday a lottery was held and on Monday evening the first three acts of *Tartuffe*, but, as the official account of the festivities states, "the king, whose extreme delicacy in matters of religion was shocked at the idea that some might mistake the false devotion painted in the play for the true, although he did not question the author's good intentions, forbade its public presentation, and deprived himself of the pleasure of seeing it played in order to prevent those incapable of making as careful a distinction as he from misunderstanding."[2]

M. Lefranc's comment on the festivities is as follows: "*Tartuffe* marks the apogee of paganism under Louis XIV and is a natural continuation of festivities.... I should like to impress upon you their anti-christian, or at least their profoundly pagan character. In fact they are above all theatrical and symbolical representations given in honor of women, or rather of women in general. We might call them the apotheosis of the feminine sex. But that means radical opposition to the tendencies and ideas of the rigorists! Is it surprising that the latter became Molière's bitter enemies?"[3]

How are we to account for Louis XIV's tolerance in regard to the play? We have no reason to suppose that he appreciated Molière's genius to the full. Louis Racine has related an anecdote in his Mémoires which we may accept as probable, since it does not add to his father's glory. He says: "The king, having asked one day (of Boileau) who was the rarest of the great writers who had honored France during his reign, he (Boileau) named Molière. 'I did not think so', replied the king; 'but you understand these matters better than I'." The explanation lies rather in the fact that the king and Molière had the same enemies. But just who

1. Books III and IV.
2. Gazette, May 17, 1664.
3. In 1663 M. and Mme. de Navailles had locked the doors leading to the apartments of the ladies of honor, an action for which they were later exiled from the court.

were involved in the attack? The literature on the subject is enormous and includes at least six distinct hypotheses, each of which has been defended by critics of some distinction.[1]

1. Hypocrisy (that is, Molière was making a distinction between true and false devotion)................Voltaire, Augier.
2. Jansenists...............................Anatole France
3. Jesuits .... Sainte-Beuve, Coquelin.
4. Illuminés .... Michelet
5. Saint-Sacrement......................... Allier, Rigale
6. All religion.......................Brunetière, Rémy de Gourmont, Abel Lefranc, Lanson, Lemaître, Lavisse, Mesnard.

Some of the critics of the last group have qualified their statements in some way, but they may be fairly grouped under this head. Louis XIV evidently thought that one religion was enough, and he had no intention of allowing even that one to interfere with his private life. Molière felt the same way in regard to the censors of the theater, but being more of a conscious philosopher than the king, he must have seen that he was taking a stand in the age-long battle between the liberty of nature and the morality of constraint, and that his play was in reality an anti-christian pamphlet in its implication. Bossuet realised that a great enemy to the church had appeared in the person of Molière and he wrote:[2] "Posterity will perhaps see the end of this comic poet, who, while playing his *Malade Imaginaire* or his *Médecin par Force*, received the last attack of the malady of which he died a few hours afterwards, and passed from the pleasantries of the theater, among which he took almost his last breath, to the court of Him who has said: 'Woe to ye who laugh, for ye shall weep'." Fénelon cannot pardon Molière for having made "vice graceful and virtue odious," and the sentimental Rousseau calls the theater of Molière a "school of vice".

1. For a good summary of the question see Oscar Hahnel, Die Tendenz von Molière's *Tartuffe* in der französischen Kritik. Dissertation. Mannheim, 1911.
2. *Maximes sur la Comédie.*

Molière's "philosophy" has perhaps been best defined by Ferdinand Brunetiere[1] and Gustav Lanson: confidence in "nature" (in the sense that Rabelais used the word), that is, *wise* nature, reason, common sense, as opposed to deviations, anomalies, social and moral exaggerations. Molière had the lucidity of mind which implies a certain amount of religious, moral and political indifference. The wonder is that in the circumstances he was able to achieve the detachment which he displays, which is so essential to comedy. It would have been so easy to rail. We have some reason to suppose that Molière was acquainted with the philosophy of Gassendi through his friendship with Chapelle at whose house the philosopher stopped when at Paris, and we have anecdotes to the effect that he sometimes discussed this philosophy as well as that of Descartes. It is probable also that he was acquainted with Cyrano de Bergerac, who was first a follower of Gassendi and later attempted a vulgarisation of Descartes in the *Fragment de Physique*. We are also told that Molière translated Lucretius and that his widow was refused publication of the translation because it did not conform to Christian principles. Molière's ideas seem to be in line with Gassendi's *Syntagma philosophicum, pars tertia quae est ethica*, which is divided into three books, *De felicitate*, *De virtutibus* and *De libertate*, and in which the four cardinal virtues are defined: I. Prudence, the art of life, II. Courage, the spirit that neither does nor suffers wrong and enables us to endure evils, III. Temperance, (to be taken in the Greek sense), and IV. Justice, which is divided into four heads: 1, Love of benefactors, 2, If you have time and opportunity, there is no harm in doing good even to others, provided it entails no loss to yourself,[2] 3, Love of life, 4, Love of Society, all of which Molière follows. Gassendi also points out that if we desire finality we labor in vain. The greatest lesson of the past is that we are doomed to be superseded. Nevertheless it is a duty and a joy to attain a knowledge of the world in which we live. Rémy

1. *Etudes Critiques, IVe Série*, p. 179.
2. "ut quisque se amet, plusquam ceteros, seu ut sibi bene quam alteri malit."

de Gourmont[1] thinks that it is from Theophile and Cyrano, rather than from the equivocal Gassendi, that Molière got his philosophy, and quotes Theophile's

"J'approuve qu'un chacun suive en tout la nature."

As for Descartes, we may say that he, like Gassendi, starts from experience and like him is empirical. Descartes, however, begins with a prejudice for rationalism *(cogito ergo sum)* as compared with Gassendi, who works with pure experience. Molière must have been familiar with Epicurus' doctrine of moderation through his translation of Lucretius, and from the latter had learned that the fear of the gods is the source of a good many of our difficulties. We cannot be certain how conscious Molière was of these ideas, but the extraordinary unity of his work seems to indicate that he realized in some fashion that of the two criteria experience or observation on the one hand and belief on the other he chose the former; that an emphasis on belief "put nature under foot"[2]; that restraints curbed the flesh only as "a group of rocks curbs a river in its course, by obtaining falls, cascades, whirlpools, and a great deal of scum"; and that a "sense of humor keen enough to show a man his own absurdities as well as those of other people, will keep him from the commission of all sins, or nearly all, save those that are worth committing."[3] With his great power of observation he must have observed that some of our most cherished institutions are only the legitimate channel for abnormal passions, and that "as the law courts often serve to legitimize revenge and the institution of marriage legitimizes lust, so the church is a channel for cant and hypocrisy."[4]

Molière wishes then to defend the theater against those who had attacked it. Some of these people were hypocrites and some merely victims of the idea that human nature can be forced to conform to an ideal of Christian asceticism. Hypocrisy implies credulity. He is obliged then to use a double-edged sword which will strike at once the two enemies, each of whom is equally offensive. The

1. Essay on Théophile.
2. Emerson, *Nature*.
3,4. Samuel Butler, *Notebooks*.

comedy lies in what Jules de Gaultier calls Bovarysme, that capacity which every human being has for seeing himself other than he is, when under the empire of some enthusiasm, admiration, interest, or vital necessity. In the case of the dupe, Orgon, this assumption of a different character is *explained* by his interest in his own salvation, and the quality of character is *determined* by his admiration for a man who, he thinks, possesses the secret of the other world. He pursues this idea to the point of fanaticism; is even prepared to sacrifice his whole family to it, and he might easily have become the instrument of tragedy, from which dénouement he is saved only by a *deus ex machina*. But in spite of the seriousness of the situation, Orgon is an essentially comic character who descends at times even to farce, as we shall note later. Dorine's position in the family and the attitude of the whole family towards Orgon seems to indicate that he has not always been in the state in which we first see him, but that his hardheartedness dates from his acquaintance with Tartuffe.

The nature of the man on whom Orgon is modelling his life is somewhat more complicated. Molière here goes a step further. Tartuffe through motives of interest—perhaps vital necessity!—consciously assumes a character the notion of which already exists in the mind of the dupe Orgon, and by this method of applied psychology counts on making the dupe identify his person with the ideas which his attitude evokes. Here the explanation lies in a love of ease on the part of Tartuffe which does not necessarily imply hypocrisy, but occurring as it does in an essentially vulgar nature which disdains no instruments in the accomplishment of an end, allows hypocrisy to become the very texture of his being. Molière is careful to show that hypocrisy is not in itself a vice, but rather a necessary instrument to be used with precaution and only when the situation requires it. The sympathetic characters in the play meet Tartuffe with his own weapon. Elmire and the exempt use it to expose Tartuffe, and Dorine in the first scene with Mariane uses the same tactics as those used by Tartuffe when he defends Damis in order to protect himself and incite Orgon to greater ire. Brunetiere has said of certain statements of

Moliere in the prefaces "He lied." Yes, Molière was forced to adopt the enemy's weapons and to fight the devil with fire.

The qualities then that will be first emphasized in Tartuffe are his gluttony and his love of ease, while his sensuality is rather a logical outcome of his mode of living. He hides his love of ease under a Jansenist severity and uses to satisfy his sensuality a Jesuitical casuistry. (But here we are treading on that dangerous ground which crumbled under the feet of so eminent a critic as Sainte-Beuve. Just as casuistry among the Jesuits was the natural result of their attempt to square their theological premise with a certain moral scepticism, so in the case of Tartuffe it is the logical outcome of his attempt to square his assumed character of piety with the situation in which he found himself, and he did not need to go to the Jesuits to learn this. It is true, however, that the rules which Tartuffe laid down for Orgon are the very ones[1] which Pascal applied in his own family, and that the forms of casuistry which he uses and which he has taught Orgon to use had already been practised by the Jesuits and satirised by Pascal in the Provinciales.

Jules Lemaitre has, it seems to me, been excessively logical in separating the character of Tartuffe into two distinct elements—that of the vulgar and physically repulsive beadle and the elegant adventurer of the scenes with Elmire. Yet there is a difficulty here and I believe it to have arisen in a change from the original conception of the character made necessary by Molière's determination to give the play in public. In the original three act form Tartuffe was understood to be a priest, even if the proprieties did not permit him to wear the complete costume of one. In

1. Cf. Mne. Périer's life of her brother in which she says: "Et lorsquéil arrivoit que quelqu'un admirait la bonté de quelque viande en sa présence, il ne le pouvoit souffrir; il appeloit cela etre sensuel......Si je disais quelquefois que j'avois vu une belle femme, il se fachoit, et me disoit qu'il ne falloit jamais tenir ce discours devant des laquais ni des jeunes gens, parceque je ne savois pas quelles pensees je pourrois exciter par là en eux..........Lorsqu'il reçut cette nouvelle (the death of his sister) il ne dit rien, sinon: 'Dieu nous fasse la grace d'aussi bien mourir'..........et il disoit sans cesse: 'Bienheureux ceux qui meurent, pourvu qu'ils meurent au Seigneur!' C'est ainsi qu'il faisoit voir qu'il n'avoit nulle attache pour ceux qu'il aimoit." Cf. *Tartuffe* Act. I, sc. 5, 11. 15–21. and Act III, sc. 2.

1660 he appeared as a man of the world. The comedy of the scenes with Elmire depends on the contrast between the vain and vulgar imposter and the elegant and scornful woman. If he was understood to be a priest, the presence of so vulgar a person in the house of Orgon could be explained on the basis of his authority, but as soon as Tartuffe became a man of the world, it was necessary to give him certain qualities of grace and elegance that would compensate for this lost authority. The essential quality of the man remains however the same, although he uses on different occasions the jargons that he has picked up from various sects that he has encountered. The character holds together amazingly well but is at the same time sufficiently complex to have allowed the audiences of the last two hundred and fifty years to expand it to include all forms of hypocrisy.

From the consideration of these two characters it is evident that Molière was concerned not simply with hypocrisy, but that his satire has a twofold object, hypocrisy and credulity, the one implying the other, and we might say that he wields a two edged sword which strikes in quick succession the two enemies, each of whom is equally dangerous to society. We are not to suppose that Molière, in spite of his statement in the preface, is interested in making a fine distinction between true and false devotion. Of the characters who typify his ideas, the hypocrite is the more offensive, but the fanatic is the more ridiculous, and Molière himself took the part of the latter in the performances of the play.

As a corrective to these two "dévots" (true or false), we have a group of charming people in whom (with the exception of Damis and Mariane, whose lack of measure can be explained by their youth) *le bon sens* rules. Cléante, Elmire, and Dorine represent those people who pin their faith to experience and observation rather than to belief. The reaction of this group to the absurdities of Tartuffe and Orgon is frequently humorous even in the most serious situations; as that in which Elmire takes Orgon humorously to task for remaining so long under the table when she is suffering from a most unpleasant situation. Tartuffe and Orgon have no sense of humor. In fact, this first bourgeois drama in French literature is so

serious that Molière had to use the whole bag of conventional devices to keep it in the realm of comedy. A step further and he would have created the bourgeois tragedy. There are some devices, however, that Molière scorns to use. He presents his characters by means of action and dialogue, using soliloquy and aside only occasionally for comic effect. In this he is very modern. Even Tartuffe never drops his mask to the audience, who know him in spite of himself, as one might know a hypocrite in real life.

Before taking up certain details of technique, I might say that although the superficial form of the play is very carefully worked out, its greatness does not depend so much on this surface quality as on a much deeper one that has been called "a flux and reflux of document". It is on the basis of a drama of character rather than as a comedy of intrigue that it must stand. However the author punctiliously observes the three unities. His experience with the *Ecole des Femmes* had made him more careful about the rules.

The first thing that Molière had to do was to set his story in motion. The exposition had to be long. Orgon had to be made plausible before Tartuffe could be made possible. When the curtain goes up the interest of the audience is instantly secured by a character which though traditional is in this case highly specialized; the managing mother-in-law.[1] If there were nothing else in this scene, Mme. Pernelle and Elmire would interest us, but one after another a housefull of interesting, clever people come into the dialogue, which is pregnant with the seeds of the coming struggle. Before the scene has progressed far we know the essential fact that Tartuffe, the character that we came to hear about and to see, is in the opinion of one party a hypocrite, in the eyes of the other party, a good man (*homme de bien*). Many of the oldest traditions of comedy are here used but with a difference that shows Molière's mastery of characterization by dialogue. Mme. Pernelle's violence as a censor of manners strikes a comic note at the outset, gives the subject of the play, and serves to make Orgon's bigotry more plausible. In the rapid

1. The audience was alrealy familiar with the name as well as the type throngh Sorel's *Polyandre*.

dialogue that follows the character of Tartuffe is brought out by such striking contrasts as these:

Mme. Pernelle

C'est un homme de bien.

Immediately answered by Damis'

un cagot de critique

Dorine

Car il contrôle *tout*, ce critique zelé!

Mme. Pernelle

Et tout ce qu'il contrôle—est fort bien contrôlé!

and so the antiphonal chant goes on until it is crystallized for the audience by Dorine's crisp judgement

Il passe pour un saint dans votre fantaisie—

Tout son fait, croyez-moi, n'est rien qu'hypocrisie.

The details are brought out by longer and longer speeches, in which the original idea is embroidered with a rich network of satire. No comedy can afford to seek only one end and although the main drive is perfectly clear, Molière strikes in turn: the fear of one's neighbors, the attempt to justify one's own manners by criticising others, the lady who is austere because her charms are fading, and so on.

Molière's choice of *scenes à faire* is made very carefully. The pauvre homme scene would not be credible in narration. To be sure Dorine has told us:

Il le choie—il l'embrasse, et POUR UNE MAITRESSE

On ne saurait, je pense, avoir plus de tendresse.

But Orgon's infatuation must be seen to be believed. The method here used is the comedy of absentmindness (Bergson's automatisme). Dorine's remark at the end:

Et je vais à madame annoncer par avance
La part que vous prenez à sa convalescence.

releases the laugh of the audience whose credulity has been somewhat strained, and also serves to carry us behind the scenes, which art Molière possesses as do all great

dramatists. This remark serves also as a link to the serious discussion between Orgon and Cléante, for Orgon's infatuation must be seen to be more than comic, in order that the serious undercurrent of the first scene be adequately explained. In this last mentioned scene (I, 5) Orgon reaffirms all that has been said of his infatuation and even declares that he will sacrifice the whole family in the pursuit of this idea. He so exceeds the limits of good sense, particularly in his description of his meeting with Tartuffe in church, that the audience must see the situation from Cléante's point of view and sympathize with his dry retort:

Les sentiments humains, mon frère, que voilà!

In spite of Cléante's argument Orgon hints that he is going to marry his daughter to Tartuffe This suggestion is followed up by the scene between Orgon and Mariane (II, 1). Dorine's entrance makes argument possible which would have been impossible with Mariane, for Molière is very careful to make the character of the young girl in keeping with a family where *le bon sens* rules. Dorine's absolute self-possession is here put to the test and her position in the family made quite clear. By this time the seriousness of the subject has become rather heavy for comedy, and the last two scenes of the second act are chiefly comic. The comedy arises when Dorine, who has been urging Mariane to resist her father's will, suddenly abandons her argument and takes the side of Orgon. The irony is clear to the andience. Mariane, however, is surprised into taking sides against herself and the spectacle of Mariane pleading with Dorine to help her to do what she had just declared that she would die rather than do, is sufficiently diverting. The situation is again turned when Mariane suddenly falls into despair. Dorine, convinced that Mariane is serious, is obliged to come down from her "high horse", which operation is always amusing. The entrance of Valère brings new comic matter, for a lover's quarrel ensues which descends to pure farce when Dorine is almost pulled in two in her efforts to bring them together and then must resort to physical efforts to separate them. In fact, almost all of Act II serves as a relief to the intensity of Act I, which was itself relieved by many devices, the

managing mother-in-law, the pert servant, age versus youth, the old woman's half jealous contempt of the young girl, fear of God and the neighbors, the woman who can afford to be austere because her charms are fading, the "pauvre homme" scene (comedy of absentmindedness), the exaggeration of Orgon's credulity, (Act II) the old device of the father making his daughter happy in *his* way, Orgon's sentimental mention of Mariane and Tartuffe living together like turtle doves. A good example of the use of physical comedy occurs in Act II, scene 2 in the triangle situation where Dorine interrupts Orgon whenever he speaks to Mariane. A good deal of the verbal humor is supplied by Dorine, as in the lines:

Et que si son Tartuffe est pour lui si charmant
Il le peut épouser sans nul empêchement.

(II, 3)

Tartuffe has been carefully presented in the exposition. Dorine, the personification of frankness, common sense and authority, has characterized him as *gueux, hypocrite, cagot, traître,* and Cléante, *honnête homme par excellence,* calls him *franc charlatan, dévot de place.* His appearance has been sufficiently indicated by Dorine and Mariane. His first speech is a masterpiece. It justifies everything that has been said against and for him.

Laurent, serrez ma haire avec ma discipline,
Et priez que toujours le Ciel vous illumine.
—Si l'on vient pour me voir, je vais au prisonniers
Des aumones que j'ai, partager les deniers.

Tartuffe drops a good deal of his severity when Dorine mentions Elmire, so that Dorine remarks:

Comme il se radoucit!
Ma foi, je suis toujours pour ce que j'en ai dit.

(III, 2, 11 23-4)

We have been carefully prepared for the scene which follows by Dorine's hints and Orgon's innocent statements. The device of the hidden auditor would be unpardo-

nable if the audience were not already enlisted against Tartuffe. The setting had been carefully prepared in Act II where Mariane asks her father:

Que cherchez-vous?

Orgon

(Il regarde dans un petit cabinet) Je voi
Si quelqu'un n'est point là qui pourrait nous entendre;
Car ce petit endroit est propre pour surprendre.

(I, 2)

But we must see Tartuffe put to the proof. Molière is now to bring the charming Elmire, a character delicately *nuancé*, into a bold situation. Elmire has not had much to say for herself but we have seen that it is on her that even the authoritative Dorine relies for a solution to the situation. She is gay, worldly, accustomed to being admired and not easily shocked. The scene is thoroughly comic by reason of the contrast between the nonchalant and charming Elmire and the unctuous Tartuffe, who drops his mask and shows himself for the first time for what he is. He speaks at first like a spiritual director, then like a practised roué, then like a casuist. Elmire's dry humor in answer to Tartuffe's statement that he would give *his* health to establish *hers* recalls the "pauvre homme" scene:

C'est pousser bien avant la charité chrétienne,

(III, 3)

The very ease of Elmire's honesty increases Tartuffe's assurance, and he launches into the mystical and sensual language of a certain type of revivalist, some of whose tactics, in fact, he has. Moliere seems here to anticipate modern psycho-analysis. Tartuffe's suggession that Elmire is safe because it would not be to his advantage to boast of a conquest had been used by Boccaccio and by the author of the Garduña de Sevilla, and Rabelais makes use of a similar tale which he took from Erasmus. It is probably, however, that it was sufficiently practised at the time for Molière to have heard it in anecdote. Tartuffe's parting shot "Que l'on n'est pas aveugle" shows that he had learned something from another type of woman, even if he did not understand Elmire.

In the sixth scene we have the apotheosis of impudent hypocrisy and credulity. It is as incredible as Falstaff's agility. There is a comic motif—affirming guilt to prove innocence, or doubleBovaryisme, which had already been used by Barbadillo —but the situation is so tense that the effect is dramatic rather than comic, in spite of the fact that Stapfer calls this the most comic scene in the literature of the world, where Orgon falls on his knees before the kneeling Tartuffe. (This business did not appear as a stage direction until 1750. It may, however, have been a tradition from the first performance.) The climax follows in the words of Orgon:

Offenser de la sorte une sainte personne!

and in Tartuffe's reply:

O ciel pardonne-lui comme je lui pardonne!

(III, 7)

in which culminates the enormity of Orgon's credulity and of Tartuffe's hypocrisy. Orgon drives his son from the house and regrets that he did not murder him. Here Tartuffe, candidate himself for Dante's nethermost hell, weeps over the ingratitude of Damis. (III, 7).

Le seul penser de cette ingratitude
Fait souffrir à mon âme un supplice si rude......
L'horreur que j'en conçois....J'ai le coeur si serré,
Que je ne puis parler, et crois que j'en mourrai.

Tartuffe's double Bovarysme is done adroitly but not adroitly enough to absolve Orgon of the charge of almost inhuman credulity. Herein I believe lies the offense of the play. In this and in the following scene Molière's double edged sword flashes this way and that, slashing with murderous certainty both the hypocrite and the dupe. The triumph of the hypocrite and the self-satisfaction of his dupe must give deep offense to the church.

It is a fault common to five-act plays that the interest drops out in the fourth act. This is true to a certain extent of Tartuffe. The construction is here not so close. Perhaps the white heat of the unique moment when he conceived and

executed the play for the Fêtes de Versailles had somewhat abated in the three years that followed. However, the happiness of the whole family still hangs in the balance, and after Tartuffe's triumph we look to see how he bears himself. He appears with a new tone of smug certainty in his intrenchments, and is cooly insolent to Cleante, knowing that Cléante sees through him. The marriage intrigue goes on. Tears and entreaties fail to move him. Orgon had said that he would sacrifice his whole family to Tartuffe and after his treatment of Damis we are prepared to believe it. Now Molière has another essential scene to write. He must make Orgon see with his own eyes. Will he even then believe? No one less perfectly poised than Elmire could manage the situation and keep it comic when so much is involved. She plays the coquette, lulls Tartuffe's suspicions and convinces him that she loves him. Here is a masterly bit of comedy arising from the conceit ot an unattractive man played upon by a woman so charming, so honest that she is fearless. Here we have the full revelation of the casuist.

Et ce n'est pas pécher que pécher en silence.

(IV, 5)

Tartuffe reveals himself completely, even to the point of speaking contemptuously of Orgon. Such a scene might easily be grossly improbable; Elmire makes it *possible*. (To make Orgon hide behind Elmire is good theater but hardly plausible). Orgon is as incoherent in his wrath as he was in his infatuation. In scene 7 Tartuffe rises to a height of impudence that almost passes belief,

C'est à vous d'en sortir, vous qui parlez en maître.

and he adds a statement that we are totally unprepared for,

j'ai de quoi confondre et punir l'imposture.

that is, the box, whick has not been motivated, and which furnishes the suspense before the catastrophe. In a comedy of intrigue this would have been carefully motivated. As it is, the mystery serves to tie the two acts together—all of the acts are carefully tied together in this way—but Orgon's explanation in the next scene must be admitted to be pretty poor stage business. Orgon's foolishness is again

insisted upon, and a new comic element in Orgon's character appears; his sentimental trust in gratitude.

Quoi? sous un beau semblant de ferveur si touchante
Cacher un coeur si double, une âme si méchante!

In scene 2 Damis' fury is comic against the background of Tartuffe's power. Cléante's reply motivates the *deus ex machina*.

Nous vivons sous un règne et sommes dans un temps
Où par la violence on fait mal ses affaires.

In the next scene Mme. Pernelle gives occasion for more comedy. She out-Orgons Orgon and his impatience with her credulity is comic in the light of his recent change of heart. Dorine acts as a chorus to bring home this fact.

Le pauvre homme.

Orgon is here seen in the position in which he had placed others.

Dorine

Juste retour, monsieur, des choses d'ici-bas,
Vous ne vouliez point croire, et l'on ne vous croit pas.

The suspense rises through the scene with M. Loyal, is somewhat broken by Dorine's words

Et par charité pure, il veut vous enlever
Tout ce qui vous peut faire obstacle à vous sauver.

With the arrival of Valère the suspense rises again. Will Orgon escape? One wishes his escape more for the sake of the family than for his own. Still a dupe, Orgon is taken in by Loyal's speech in which he uses almost the same words as those already used by Tartuffe. It looks as if Tartuffe were to triumph. This *is* the apotheosis of hypocrisy. The king as a motive is a bit anticlimactic to us,—probably not so to the audience of the time,—certainly not, considering the motive of the play. It is not so serious a matter in a comedy as it would have been in a tragedy. Goethe defends this dénouement, but he somewhat sentimentalises the whole play.[1] On the whole it is difficult to justify this conclusion.

Technically it is bad. We must refer the fact to the necessity of flattering the king, and confine ourselves to the task of seeing how he makes the best of a bad matter. Molière was a practical man of the theater, and it would have been no comfort to him that his play was a perfect bit of techrique if it could not be performed. As a matter of fact the logical catastrophe of the completed play would have been the actual catastrophe of the three act form; the triumph of hypocrisy and the discomfiture of credulity. The changes that Molière made were made on the advice of a *libertin*, the Prince de Condé; the addition of Cléante's long speeches defining true and false devotion, Tartuffe's change of dress, and the blasphemous

O ciel pardonne-lui comme je lui pardonne

changed to

la douleur qu'il me donne.

The marriage was added to tie the play together, and we must admit that it is a weak device. The fact that there is no scene between Tartuffe and Mariane seems to add weight to this hypothesis, for as a priest this proposed marriage would have been impossible. The five act form is certainly less offensive.

At any rate, if the play was only an episode in the quarrel over the theater, it has become and was then in its implication—as a result of Molière's sovereign impartiality and philosophical point of view—one of the important documents in an agelong quarrel of much larger scope. Great works of this sort are seldom the fruit of conscious will. It is also one of the finest examples of that laugh which France alone has been able to produce, "a laugh which," says M. Lefranc, "will on the final judgement day rally the French almost as surely as the trumpet of the angel."

Molière's Tartuffe excites our hatred; he is a criminal who hypocritically feigns piety and morality to bring into a middle class family every sort of ruin. The dènouement by the police is then very natural and well received!

Internal and External Relations.

金岳霖

It is not easy to say what relations are. They are probably too fundamental to be defined. At any rate, we are as yet unable to define them. However we are directly presented with such situations as involve "left and right", "before and after", etc, etc. Relations are all pervasive. The idea of unrelated entities, though in itself logically, free perhaps from contradiction, is as a matter of fact untenable. We do sometimes say with regard to certain things that they are totally unrelated, but what is implied in such a statement is merely a negation of certain specific relation or relations which happens to be the subject of our attention. To be unrelated in any specific way is itself a relation, and from this point of view nothing is unrelated.

Any and every entity can become a relatum, logical propositions and relational complexes included. These latter are simply terms in relation. But relations themselves cannot become relata. Thus, a relational complex such as "I am taller than you" may bear the relation "Therefore" to another relational complex "I am heavier than you". But the relation "Taller than" cannot bear the relation "Therefore" to the relation "Heavier than". Bradley's infinite regress so far as relations are concerned is to us meaningless.

Bradley seems to have entertained another notion that is equally untenable. Not only did he conceive of relations as capable of being related, but also as capable of relating. Without involving ourselves in verbal niceties, we may say that relations do not relate in the sense that relational complexes are created through their activities. They are not active, they simply are; there is no sense in which they can be said to have either succeeded or failed in relating, The question is not whether a certain relation succeeds or fails in relating certain entities, it is rather whether those entities are or are not in a relational complex characterized by that

specific relation. Relations therefore are not relata, nor do they of their own choice relate.

II

We propose for consideration the following three relational complexes to be known as *a*, *b*, *c*, relational complexes embodying *a*, *b*, *c*, relations.

a, This book is on the table."

b, "H_2O" as relational complex.

c, "He knows Physics."

Is *a* relation in the *a* relational complex the same as the *b* relation in the *b* relational complex? If so, are relations all of one kind? If all relations are *b* relations, then the *c* relation in the *c* relational complex is also a *b* relation. If relations are of different kinds, then the *c* relation may be either an *a* or a *b* or something different from both, and it remains for us to ascertain which and what it is.

From the common sense point of view, the above does not present much of a problem, since, at a glance, a good many vague and perhaps obvious differences may be pointed out. But philosophical sophistry has made out of the situation a problem of the first importance. It has been maintained that all relations are "internal", It is difficult to find out what an "internal" relation is, but if it supposed to be anything in the nature of a *b* relation, then we are confronted with very grave problems. For in this latter case the *c* relation subsisting between the knower and the known is also internal and therefore has properties which are the characteristics of the *b* relation. Knowing would then make a difference to the thing known, and no form of knowledge, science included, could claim objectivity. While it is not easy to say exactly what "objectivity" means, it is easy to see that if knowing, being internal, modifies the thing known, then knowledge is not objective at least in the following senses.

a, If all relations are *b* relations, then the relation between the knower and the known is a *b* relation. If so, the known is always a relatum, an entity that is

not its original self, because it is modified by knowing. It follows that we can never know any entity other than as relatum. Hence "Noumenon" emerges. Whatever the differences may be does not matter in the least, the point is that there are differences between an entity as such and an entity as relatum, and what is even more significant, we are never in position to know what these differences are.

b, But under the above assumption we are not in position to say that there are no entities other than relata, for in that case how could they be said to be different from relata? If we admit differences between the two, then they either exist or simply are, and the denial of either or both would be contrary to the premises If entities in any knowledge relation were external objects, then these can not be known as they are, they can only be known as they are known.

c, Since what we know is but knowledge-relata, there can hardly be any standard for the validity of knowledge. What we know is simply "what we know". If "what we know" about a certain thing is again questioned, we can only answer by a further assertion of knowledge possibly in the form: "I know that I know", etc, etc. The question can be asked ad infinitum and any answer other than the first is neither better nor worse than the first.

d, The above may be said just as well about the knower who in any capacity other than a knowing faculty or organism would be just as elusive as any external object.

The impossibility of knowing anything as itself under our assumption may be approached from another angle.

e, If all relations are internal, then such relations as "to the right of", "to the left of", "before" and "after", "above" and "below" are all internal relations. The knower and the known not only bear a specific relation to each other, namely that of knowing, but also involve spatial relations. Here is a table: if all relations are internal in the sense of a *b* relation, then this table to the east of me is different from this very table when it is placed to the west of me. I myself change with a

change of spatial relations. Thus, when I was to the east of the table, my knowledge of it was such as was appropriate to a specific place, a knowledge that should not be confounded with anything I may know of the table when I shifted to the west of it.

Temporal relations would be internal under the same assumption. The relational complex known as knowledge is an event that takes place in finite time But in finite time, however short, both the table and I change our temporal relations. Thus my knowledge of the table at one time must not be confounded with my knowledge of that very table at any other time. Time, it is poetically claimed, flows, and our temporal relations change with it; the only knowledge that can be said to be valid is the knowledge that is appropriate to instants, just as in the previous paragraph the only knowledge that can be said to be valid is the knowledge that is appropriate to points. But since knowledge as a relational complex and an event takes place in finite time and place, no knowledge is valid, if all relations are internal in the sense of a *b* relation.

g. At the same time all entities are related and in no time are they free from relational changes. Under the assumption we are making in the present section, if anything involves any kind of relational changes, then it is impossible for us to know anything about it. My little desk here in my room bears some kind of relation to a twinkling star ten thousand light years away; if that star changes in any way whatsoever, even to the slightest degree, the desk becomes different in some way from what it was Thus, if we want to know this little desk, we have to know that little star as well as the pyramids of Egypt and the trees of Labrador. Since my desk bears relation to anything and everything in this universe, then on the basis of our supposition we have to know the universe in order to know the desk. But we do not know the universe, hence we do not know this desk. And yet with a suitable definition of knowledge corresponding perhaps inadequately to the vague and inarticulate notion of knowledge which we do entertain, we can claim that we know this desk without knowing the universe in any similar sense.

Is our common belief a pious superstition? Or rather is the assumption herein discussed basically untenable?

h, Logic has no content, it need not have any; but if it is useful in any practical way at all, it should be applicable to natural events or entities. In other words, in order that logic may be useful, such statements as "A is A", "A is not-A", must not only be logically significant, but also practically so. They may be true or false, or they may be neither, but we have to recognize their validity in some way before we can speak But if they are known to be invalid to start with, then we can not possibly speak. The only statements that can possibly claim to be true are those that are made at point-instant. At any finite time and in any finite place no proposition concerning matters of fact can be made with any practical significance. Whether pure logic is affected or not need not be considered in the present connection, it is certain that applied logic evaporates into thin air. An ironic situation arises: those who accept the supposition of this section can not say a word in favour of it, while those who argue in favour of it cannot possibly accept it and escape contradiction.

Our supposition, let us recall, is firstly that all relations are internal, and secondly, that an internal relation is a *b* relation. Thus far we have been arguing that under such a supposition knowledge is impossible in the various senses already discussed. In order to free ourselves from such a dismal consequence, it is only necessary to overthrow either the first or the second part of the supposition. There are quite a number of people who believe that all relations are internal, but if what is meant by an internal relation is not a *b* relation, then the specific objections herein set forth are not applicable, whether or not there are other objections. But if an internal relation is conceived as a *b* relation, then we have to show reasons why some relations are external, and a clear distinction between an external and an internal relation is required. It what is meant by an external relation is made clear, then the proposition that there are external relations may be established. In that case it only remains for us to decide as to whether the specific relation between

the knower and the known is an external or internal relation or something totally different from both. What we have been arguing thus far is that that specific relation cannot be conceived as being internal in the sense of a *b* relation.

III

In this section, we shall take up for discussion in the first place the position of Mr. F. H. Bradley, and secondly that of Professor Spaulding. Both may have the misfortune of being misrepresented.

A. a, Mr. Bradley seems to have thought that relations are impossible. If entities are in relation, then the relation between them does not "relate", for somehow they are already related; if on the other hand they are not related, then no relation can possibly relate them. In other words, if entities are in relation, to relate them is superfluous; if entities are not in relation, to relate them is impossible. It is impossible to relate entities not related, because for such a purpose an infinity of relations is required, and an infinity of relations is by definition unattainable. Comparatively detailed criticism will come at a later stage, for the moment, we should like to point out the following:

1, Relations and relational complexes should not be confused with each other. Relations simply are, but relational complexes may begin or end. The question is never whether a certain relation is, but always whether certain entities bear that relation to each other.

2, Relations should not be regarded as being engaged in activities. There is no sense in which they may be said to succeed or fail in their effort to relate, simply because there is no sense in which they can be said to make any effort at all.

3, Relations should not be regarded as possible terms, so that there is no sense in which two terms in relation can be said to have become three terms necessitating a further relation.

b, Bradley seems to have entertained the idea that all relations modify their terms. If A and B are related, then A is not the original A, nor B the original B. Each, being in relation, is directly influenced in some way by the relation and

indirectly influenced by each other. But if A and B were not in relation with each other, then the influence just mentioned would not have been there to affect them. That is to say, relations modify their terms.

c, Since relations modify their terms, some difference is made to them when they are in relation. Terms in relation must be somehow different from those very terms when out of it. If no difference is made to the terms, in what sense could we say that they are modified by their relation? Some differences therefore there must be between terms that are relata and terms that are mere terms. Of what that difference is, very few of us seem to have any clear notion. Bradley has the idea that qualities and relations imply each other, but in so far as I am aware, there is no attempt to regard them in any consistent way as tautological expressions. Later on we shall attempt to show that difference in quality implies difference in relation, but we are not justified in asserting that difference in relation implies difference in quality.

d, Entities in relation form a relational complex which whether or not further analyzable is at any rate not equivalent to the sum total of its parts. Thus, if we are dealing with such a relational complex as "Japan is to the east of China," we can not possibly say that this is equivalent to "Japan," "to the east of," and "China"; for obviously there are a number of possible combinations each of which is distinct from any other. There is therefore something unique about a relational complex, and this uniqueness which is essentially the uniqueness of the whole has been in some obscure way transformed into a uniqueness of the composing parts.

e, For reasons similar to the ones herein stated, some philosophers have come to the conclusion that all relations are internal, and an internal relation is such that the terms in relation are different from those very terms out of relation. Whether the reasoning is correct or not, we shall not examine for the moment, nor shall we concern ourselves with the conclusion as to whether it follows from the different stages of the argument. But if we accept the conclusion and interpret "modification of terms" as qualitative differences being made to them, then the objection

raised in the previous section would apply and would thus make knowledge something of a game of blind man's bluff.

B, It is possibly for this reason that quite a few students of philosophy have come to the conclusion that the proposition that all relations are internal can not be accepted. Perhaps "hasty hands catches frogs for fishes", and in an eager attempt to demolish that proposition, ideas have been put forth that could not stand any close examination. Professor Spaulding might be cited as an example of those whose valour has unfortunately become the better part of discretion.

It should however be pointed out that those who are opposed to the internal-relationists are not opposed to the idea of internal relation; they are merely opposed to the idea that all relations are internal. Hence what the external-relationists want is not to deny that there are internal relations, but merely to affirm that some relations are external.

a, Some relations, according to Spaulding, do not modify their terms. "Above and below," "before and after" are such relations. If I walk around the table, I am not modified by the various positions which I hold in relation to the table. I may be taller or shorter than my friend, but I cannot be said to be thereby either tall or short. Terms related by this kind of relation are such that to say anything beyond their relation is unwarranted and consequently they are related in a way quite different from those that are related for instance by an organic relation.

b, If there are relations that do not modify their terms, it is believed to follow that there are relations by which no difference whatever is made to the terms. Entities that are relata in these relations are the same as those very entities that are not relata in these relations. It is believed, though I have no assurance in saying so, not only that terms before being related by an external relation are the same as they are after it, but also that terms in such a relation are the same as they are out of it. This may seem to be a distinction without a difference, but a difference there is, and in some cases, a very important one.

c, Since terms in any external relation are the same as they are out of it, it

follows that they are each independent of the other, and both independent of the relation. What is meant by independence is merely a lack of mutual modification. Independence is therefore not something which entities possess when they bear no relation to each other, it is rather something that represents the state of affairs in which they bear to each other an external relation. Since entities though related are yet independent of each other, it is thought that the whole in which they are the component parts is not such as to give rise to the idea of uniqueness. Thus, while the internal-relationists seemed to have confounded the uniqueness of the whole with that of the parts, the external-relationists seem to have mistaken a lack of uniqueness in the component parts for the lack of uniqueness in the whole.

d, The conclusion that Professor Spaulding arrived at is not merely that there are external relations, but also that the specific relation between the knower and the known is an example of such a relation. That is to say, though related, the knower and the known are yet independent of each other. The known is not merely relatum. It is that, but it is also something more; it is the original object. The objections raised in the second section of this article are therefore automatically removed.

There are people who are in sympathy with Spaulding's conclusion, but not with his reasoning, and there are perhaps others who are in sympathy to some extent with Bradley's reasoning, but find it by no means easy to swallow his conclusion. If external relation is to be justified, it must be on some basis and in some way other than those adopted by Professor Spaulding. Bertrand Russell has something to say on the subject, but what he has said does not amount to very much. Mr. G. Moore to my knowledge has probably the most adequate apprecia-tion of the problem; in my opinion at any rate, he has certainly made the keenest remarks about it. I do not pretend to understand exactly what his theory is, but I have no doubt that I have been greatly influenced by him. At the same time, I must admit differences of opinion which it would be out of place here for me to discuss.

In this section, two views almost diametrically opposed to each other are presented. Which of the two is to be preferred? Before this question can be answered, there should be a general clarification of terms such as "difference", "modification", "influence", etc., etc. This clarification, I hope, will emerge as we proceed.

IV

We return to the three different relational complexes mentioned in section II. What we want to emphasize is the difference between *a* and *b* relations, and to decide whether the *c* relation belongs to either of them, and if so, which.

A, Points common to all relations.

a, There must be relations such as R and there must be a plurality of entities such as A, B, etc, etc.

b, There must be a possibility of such a relational complex as ARB. Given relations and entities, we need not have relational complexes. In the actual world in which we live we are possibly never confronted with relations that are not involved in relational complexes. But from the point of view of analysis, relations are more primitive than relational complexes, and may be studied prior to and apart from a study of relational complexes.

c, There is something unique about such a relational complex as ARB. It is some kind of whole that is not easily reducible to its parts, since these same parts combined in different ways may result in other and quite different wholes. Is is not the uniqueness of wholes that can be or should be denied, it is rather the attempt to assign a single pattern to the uniqueness that we are unable to follow.

d, Entities in relation are affected by the relation. To use Moore's phrase, they acquire a "relational property" which they would not have received if they had not been related.

Such being the case, there is a definite sense in which entities in relation can be said to be different from these very entities out of relation. A and B are entities out of relation, but in relation, they are also relata. The specific difference

in the case is the relational property each acquires from the other, and both from the relation.

These points conceeded to be common to all relations seem to substantiate the view of the internal-relationists. If what is meant by an internal relation is one that is analyzable into the state of affairs herein mentioned, then all relations are internal. But this state of affairs has been by some at any rate perhaps unwittingly confounded with the specific situation of a *b* relation, and an internal relation has come to mean much more than is conceeded to all relations in the preceding paragraphs. Before we take up the specific situation of a *b* relation, we should clarify a few terms that are needed for the moment.

B, There are different meanings to the term "identity" just as there are different meanings to the term "equality". We are not here concerned with the possible meanings which these term may embody, for our present purpose, the term identity may be used as a characteristic of relations, and the term equality as a characteristic of quality. The first shall be symbolized as "I", and the second as "=", hence "$\bar{I}$" stands for difference in relation and "$\neq$" stands for difference in quality or qualities. Differences in relation are easily graspable. At any finite place and during any finite time I change my relations, and differences of relations may be asserted irrespective of empirical evidence, because they can always be inferred from our knowledge of mathematics, physics and astronomy, with a suitable construction of time and space. Qualities however are quite a different matter. Their difference or equality is sometimes operational and always empirical, but whereas a judgement of qualitative difference is final with respect to certain operations, a judgement of equality in our sense at any rate is always tentative. The latter can not be final, because the equality asserted is a mere lack of empirical or experimental difference with respect to certain operations which may be replaced by others, and when they are so replaced, we may be confronted with qualitative differences formerly not experienced by us.

We are assuming here that there is some definite sense in which qualities are

different and may be detached from relations. As to whether our assumption is justified or not we shall discuss at a later stage. Nor are we concerned here with the specific sense in which qualities and relations are supposed to differ from each other. I can no more define qualities than I can define relations. But common sense considers them different, and in the absence of clear definitions and sharp distinctions we may accept the common sense view for our present purpose.

C, Let us take first the *a* relation in the *a* relational complex, namely, "This book is on the table".

a, The book in this particular relational complex receives a relational property, namely, "on the table". If there were no such relational complex, this specific property would not have been ascribable to the book. We are of course not asking whether or not there is a relation "on"; there always is. Our question is rather whether or not there is a relational complex, namely, "this book is on the table". If there is, "this book" receives the relational property already mentioned.

b, Though this book is on the table, it can not be said that because it is on the table, it has changed its colour or increased its weight. It may change its colour, and it may increase its weight, but if it does either or both of these things, it does so independently of the relational property it has just required. There is a question of inference involved in this connection, but the problem of inference will be dealt with in a separate section.

c, Such being the case, we are justified in saying that the book in such a relation to the table is different from any book not in such a relation. The difference asserted is one of relation. We are also justified in saying that the book in such a relation is equal to this very book out of such a relation. The equality affirmed is one of quality.

The relational complex "this book is on the table" is a kind of whole, but it is difficult to say what kind of whole it is. The relation between the whole and its parts is not symmetrical, there is uniqueness of the whole which is qualitatively different from other wholes composed of the same parts, but there is no uniqueness

of parts which may enter different wholes without becoming themselves qualitatively different. One thing is certain, this relational complex is neither an organic whole, nor such as involves chemical action between its parts. And if "x" stands for either of these kinds of wholes, we can say definitely that the relational complex "this book is on the table" is not "x".

e, We shall employ "$\hat{R}$" to symbolize a relation; "$\hat{R}P$", the relational property of such a relation; and "x", the two kinds of wholes mentioned. The following expression will embody the points herein discussed.

a, $A\hat{R}B$, $A\acute{R}P$, $A\acute{R}P\bar{I}A$, $A\acute{R}P = A$, $A\hat{R}B \neq x$.

D, Let us take up the *b* relation in the *b* relational complex, namely, "H_2O".

a, This is a relational complex in which the entities related are hydrogen and oxygen. Each acquires a relational property which it would not have, were it not so related to the other.

b, But in this case the hydrogen that is a relatum in this relational complex has changed its qualities by reason of its being a relatum. What can be said about it as an entity no longer applies when it has become a relatum.

c, From the above we are justified in saying that entities related in the *b* relational complex are different in relation and also unequal in quality to those very or similar entities not so related.

d, This relational complex is a sort of whole with emergent qualities describable in terms that are not applicable to the component parts separately. It is a kind of a whole that is equivalent to some kind or form of "x".

e, We shall employ "$\underline{\bar{R}}$" to symbolize this kind of relation, and "$\underline{\bar{R}}P$", this kind of relational property. The following expression will embody the points herein discussed.

b, , $A\underline{\bar{R}}B$, $A\underline{\bar{R}}P$, $A\underline{\bar{R}}P\bar{I}A$, $A\underline{\bar{R}}P \neq A$, $A\underline{\bar{R}}B = x$.

V

The topic for discussion in this section is not an easy one. To start with a few prefatory remarks are needed. Both *a* and *b* relations involve $A\acute{R}P\bar{I}A$, but where-

as *a* relation embodies $A\hat{R}P=A$, *b* relation contains just the opposite, $A\underline{\bar{R}}P \neq A$. This seems to be the most important point of difference compared to which the other points mentioned may be ignored. The question is: What sort of relation, if any, subsists between $A\hat{R}P\bar{I}A$ and $A\hat{R}P$ A, and what relation, if any, between $A\underline{\bar{R}}P\bar{I}$ A and $A\hat{R}P \neq A$? If the second part can be inferred from the first in each case, then there is contradiction somewhere. What we want to point out is that the essential difference lies in the nature of $\hat{R}P$ and $\underline{\bar{R}}P$, namely, the two relational properties; that $A\hat{R}P\bar{I}A$ and $A\hat{R}P=A$ are separately inferable from $\hat{R}P$, and $A\hat{R}P\bar{I}A$ and $A\underline{\bar{R}}P \neq A$ are separately inferable from $\underline{\bar{R}}P$; but that in no way is $A\hat{R}P=A$ inferable from $A\hat{R}P\bar{I}A$, or $A\underline{\bar{R}}P \neq A$ from $A\underline{\bar{R}}P\bar{I}A$. It is therefore advisable to take up the problem of implication and inference in so far as it affects our discussion. We shall take up three different kinds of implications to be symbolized as "*", "△" and "∵".

A, A few words on propositions in general are not out of place here. There are propositions which have no existential import and which may be called purely logical propositions. There are others which have existential significance and which would be meaningless if the existence of the subject terms is denied. The relations of opposition between propositions depend upon the interpretation of the existence of their subject terms. Take for instance the A and E forms of propositions. These have no relations of opposition if their subject term is not assumed to exist. They are contrary if their subject term is either assumed or asserted to exist. Where the subject term is exist, its non-existence renders the proposition insignificant, but where the subject term is asserted to exist, its non-existence would mean that the proposition is false.

Aristotelian logic as revealed through text books seems to involve itself in self-contradiction. A, E, I, O are said to be categorical propositions implying an assertion of the existence of their subject terms. If I and O are categorical in the above sense, then they are not sub-contrary, and if they are sub-contrary, as they are declared to be, then they are not categorical in the above sense.

Take for instance the familiar proposition that "All men are mortals", (terms

interpreted as classes). It might be interpreted as a proposition asserting an abstract and unique relation between "Humanity"and "Mortality" conceptualized and defined with such rigidity that the proposition may be translated into the following: "Whether there are men or not, if anything is human, he is mortal", just as one might say of an Euclidean straight line that whether it exists or not, if anything is a straight line, it is the shortest distance between two points. The familiar interpretation however of the above mentioned proposition is that all men are as a matter of fact mortals, or that all men are mortals and there are men. With either the familiar or the unfamiliar interpretation, being a man implies being a mortal, but the implication involved in the one case is quite different from that involved in the other.

B, The kind of implication here symbolized as "*" is the kind involved in the first and non-existential interpretation of propositions. It need not have anything to do with matters of fact. From certain postulates and certain definitions, both of which may be quite arbitrary, a mumber of propositions are said to follow in the sense that they are implied by the given postulates and definitions. To such a process matters of fact are quite irrelevant. Thus, as we have seen, with suitable definitions of humanity and mortality to which the existence of mankind may be considered as irrelevant, a proposition of the form "Whether there are men or not, if anything is human, he is mortal" may be so interpreted that being human "*" being mortal. "p*q" means that the proposition "p" implies the proposition "q", whatever the facts may be. This is still "strict" implication, but it need not involve any empirical evidence.

C. But when the proposition "All men are mortals" is interpreted as asserting at the same time the existence of men, then the implication involved in it is quite different from that of the above. The proposition so interpreted becomes an inductive generalization and can claim no validity apart from experience. If there were no men to start with, or if there were, and they were all or some of them immortals, the proposition would be false, and being a man would not imply

being a mortal. Thus, the implication involved in this case can not be divorced from matters of fact. It is possible for us to say at the present moment at any rate that all the citizens of New York are citizens of The United States of America; hence being a citizen of the former implies being a citizen of the latter. But this need not be so, and in the same way men need not be mortals. However, as a matter of fact, the generalization about men is valid; hence as a matter of fact, being a man does imply being a mortal. "$p \wedge q$" means that facts are such that the proposition p implies the proposition q.

D, a. These two implications are often confused. The way in which their distinction can be made clear leads me to think that the views presented here are somewhat akin to those of Mr. Moore. Take for instance; "A>B, B>C, therefore A>C", where ">" represents "greater than". We may have the expression:

$$A>B \wedge (B>C * A>C).$$

That is to say, if A is in fact greater then B, then the proposition "B is greater then C" implies the proposition "A is greater than C," whether or not there is any C at all. But we can not have the expression:

$$A>B * (B>C \wedge A>C).$$

That is to say, the proposition "A is greater than B" does not imply the fact that B being greater than C, A must have been greater than C also.

b, The relation between "*" and "$\wedge$" should next engage our attention. Whenever there is a possibility of "*", there is a possibility of "$\wedge$", provided a certain condition is fulfilled. If for instance we have the implication "$p*q$" and A comes within the definition of p, and B, q, we may have the implication $A \wedge B$. Hence given $A\bar{p}=0$, and $B\bar{q}=0$, we are justified in saying $(p*q) \wedge (A \wedge B)$. The question as to whether facts will be so good-humoured as to work for our convenience and substantiate our theories is irrelevant, for, in the first place, we do not claim that $(p*q) * (A \wedge B)$, that is, we do not say that there will always be A and B bearing that relation; and secondly, if there are no A and B, or if there are and they can not be subsumed under p and q, the condition is not fulfilled, and the question of implication does not arise.

c, We have seen then that under certain conditions it is possible for us to have (p*q) △ (A∧B), though never (p*q) * (A△B). It remains for us to see whether given A△B, we are ever justified in arriving at p*q, even if the condition $A\bar{p}=0$, $B\bar{q}=0$ is fulfilled. Personally, I see no way of arriving at any such conclusion. This is probably one sense in which empirical generalizations are said to be contingent. So far as we can see, there is no way in which A△B can be transformed into p*q. All that we can claim is that given A△B there is a probability in favour of p*q. It seems impossible to have either (A△B)△(p*q), or (A△B) * (p*q); the uttermost we can assert is that (A△B) ∴ (p*q), and this, only when the condition already mentioned is fulfilled.

E, Let us not take up "∴". To start with, we may point out that this is not an implication in any strict sense; it might be called a sort of practical inference, an inference which was originally probably only physiological, but which has since become highly trained through the influence of civilization. All empirical knowledge when applied to things not yet experienced involves this kind of inference; but from the point of view of logical validity, it is highly problematical. There is in the situation no evidence of any necessity in any strict sense, all that can be claimed for it is a high or low degree of probability. It is something which in human psychology represents expectation, but what is expected need not be realized.

There is generally no confusion between "*" and "∴", but there is confusion between "∧" and "∴", arising chiefly from the view that with regard to matters of fact, there is no necessity. "△" is an implication that is partly logical and partly factual. Empirical knowledge has enabled us to classify men as animals, hence being a man implies being an animal. If we are actually confronted with an ethereal man we are quite justified in calling him either a devil or a god. Empirically so far as we know, it is just as necessary for a man to be an animal as it is for a green book to be coloured. But a man need not remain a man, nor a green book either green or a book. There is however a probability that the status quo

will be maintained, and that probability is the source of the kind of inference which we have symbolized as "∴".

VI.

We shall now apply the above mentioned implications to the *a* and *b* relational complexes.

A, We have already said that entities in relation are affected by the relation, they receive a relational property which they would not have received, if they had not been related. But what is the relation between A and B's being related and the acquiring by them of the relational property? With regard to this question, I confess that I am not sure of my ground. Sometimes I think in terms of a "△" implication, but for the present I am inclined to think in terms of a "✳" implication. Possibly I had in mind sometime ago the notion that the acquisition of a relational property is a characteristic of an existent entity; possibly I had felt that the ascription of a relational property to an entity that may itself be non-existent is meaningless. I am inclined to think at the present that whether or not there are "A"s and "B"s, the very assertion of a relation between them implies their acquiring a relational property of some kind. Our notion of a relation, though vague, contains at least this point: that if a relation is at all significant, it must give the terms related some kind of property which they would not have, had they not been so related. This notion of relation justifies us in saying that the proposition asserting or supposing a relation between A and B implies a proposition to the effect that A and B acquire a relational property of some kind. Hence we may have the following expression:

a, $A_R B * A_R P$.

b, $A\bar{\underline{R}}B * A\bar{\underline{I}}P$.

B, If A receives a relational property by virtue of its relation to B, then it is relationally different from what it was when it had not had that property. There is again an implication involved, and like the one discussed in the preceeding paragraph, it seems to be one that holds between propositions. Only in this case,

it seems to be more obvious. The assertion with regard to any entity that it possesses any kind of property whatever is significant only when some difference is made by the property mentioned to the entity that is asserted to possess it. If the assertion is at all significant as it is meant to be, then some kind of difference is implied; the only question is whether the implied difference is relational. It can not be argued that the difference implied is not relational, for a relational difference in this connection is the minimum implied. And while it may be argued that more than a minimum may be implied, it can not be argued that a minimum is not implied; for the proposition asserting this minimal difference is, when the significance of propositions is borne in mind, tautological with the original proposition asserting a relation between A and B. Hence we have the expression:

a, $A\hat{R}P * A\dot{R}P\bar{I}A$

b, $A\underline{\bar{R}}P * A\underline{\bar{R}}P\bar{I}A$

C, With regard to the qualitative difterence, the question is quite other than the above. We have noted qualitative equality in *a* relational complex, and qualitative difference in *b* relational complex, namely, $A\hat{R}P = A$ in the former, and $A\underline{\bar{R}}P \quad A$ in the latter. These differences may safely be attributed to the inherent differences in the relational properties. But before we take up the question of implication, we have in passing to indulge in a few remarks on qualitative equality and difference. An assertion of qualitative equality as has already been pointed out is tentative; like an assertion of qualittive difference, it is based on empirical knowledge, but unlike the former, it only holds at a certain stage and with certain kinds of experiences or experiments and may therefore be modified, or supplemented, or overthrown by subsequent and more delicate and detailed experiments. If we divide experiments into varying degrees of crudeness and refinement, we may say that an assertion of qualitative equality is final with respect to all the experiments cruder than the one upon which the assertion is based, but tentative with respect to all the experiments that are more refined. A judgement of qualitative difference on the other hand is just the reverse; it is tentative with respect to the

crude, and final with respect to the more refined experiments. Strictly speaking, then, judgements of quality, in so far as their equality and difference are concerned, are empirically both final and tentative in opposite directions, and strictly speaking, we have no ground upon which we can justify our preference for either of them. But we have prejudices; somehow or other we have come to believe that the more refined an experiment is, the better it reveals reality. That being the case, we have greater faith in a judgement of qualitative difference, since it is final with respect to all the experiments more refined than the one upon which the judgement is based.

In the case of the *a* relational complex, we have a judgement of qualitative equality. With the above prejudice in mind, we can not say that our judgement is final. All that can be claimed is that there is a great probability in its favour, especially when repeated experiments confirm it. Psychologically we expect ARP to be qualitatively the same as A. They may be different, and their differences can be and often are attributed to other factors than the mere fact of their being related to each other. But we are not sure that the relation does not bring about some kind of qualitative difference not revealed or not yet revealed through further experience or experiment. We may of course define an *a* relation as one in which no qualitative difference is made to the entities related; hence if any qualitative difference is revealed through further experiment, then the relation involved is simply not an *a* relation. Such a definition is open to the following objections. In the first place, does the phrase "no qualitative difference being made" refer to an experience or experiment of a specific degree of refinement? If so, a more refined experiment may result in an *a* relation ceasing to be such. Does the phrase refer to any kind or degree of experience or experiment? If it does, the definition would be entirely abstract, since it does not refer to a particular kind of experience, and qualitative judgements would cease to be experiential. We may in either case claim that ARP and A should be qualitatively the same, and if as a matter of fact they are not, we may always claim that some factor other than the relation is

responsible for the difference. In such a case we are merely substituting an abstract qualitative equality for an experienced qualitative difference, and while the substitution is justified when such a determining factor is found, it is not justified if such a factor is not ascertained to be there. From all that has been said above, it seems safe to conclude that the qualitative equality between ARP and A is not certain but merely probable. That is to say, given A$\bar{\text{R}}$P, there is very high probababity ARP and A are equal. Hence we have the expression:

$$a, \quad \text{A}\bar{\text{R}}\text{P} \therefore \text{ARP} = \text{A}.$$

We may of course state the case negatively Instead of speaking in terms of equality, we may speak in terms of inequality. Instead of saying that we expect qualitative equality, we may say that we do not expect qualitative inequality. The negative statement is probably stronger than the positive one from the point of view of logic. We may say that if A and B are related by an a relation, it does not follow that ARP and A are qualitatively different. We may have the expression:

$$a, \quad \text{ARP} \ \bar{\wedge} \ \text{ARP} \neq \text{A}.$$

In the b relational complex we have a judgement of inequality, that is, of qualitative difference. Again with our prejudice in mind, we can say that a judgement of qualitative difference is final. This does not mean that qualitative difference in reality is always revealed in experience, it simply means that whenever it is revealed in experience, it is also there in reality. In the b relational complex the inequality of A$\bar{\text{R}}$P and A is invariably found in experience so that a part of the definition of such a relational complex is that entities that are its relata are qualitatively different from those that are not. Empirically a b relation, since it involves a judgement of inequality that is regarded as final, can always be established; whereas an a relation, since it involves a judgement of equality that is tentative, can not be empirically established though the probability in its favour may be such as to make it practically certain. Since this is the case, a b relation can be defined without reference to any tentative element in our judgement, and

the implication in a *b* relational complex may be considered as one of factual necessity. We may therefore have the expression:

b, $A\underline{\hat{r}}p \triangle A\underline{\bar{r}}p \neq A$.

E, We may summarize the above as follows:

a, $A\hat{R}B * A\hat{r}p * Arp\bar{I}A$, $A\hat{r}p \therefore A\underline{\bar{r}}p = A$;

b, $A\underline{\bar{R}}B * A\underline{\bar{r}}p * A\underline{r}p\bar{I}A$, $A\underline{\hat{r}}p \triangle A\underline{\bar{r}}p \neq A$.

So far we have been considering essentially individual relational complexes, at least in so far as *a* relational complex is concerned. We may have the following modifications:

a, A and B may be considered as classes, in which case the relational complex having them as relata would be a class relational complex. The above formulae still hold.

b, So far also we have been comparing Arp with A, either as different stages of one individual, or different individuals of one class. We may compare Arp with anything whatever that has not the relational property which A has. If X represents such a thing or a class of such things, we may transform the above formulae into the following:

a, $A\hat{R}P * Arp * Arp\bar{I}X$, $\overline{Arp\triangle}Arp \neq X$;

b, $A\underline{\bar{R}}B * A\underline{r}p * A\underline{\bar{r}}p\bar{I}X$, $A\underline{r}p \triangle A\underline{r}p \neq X$.

F, The kind of relation that *a* is is what we call an external relation, and the kind of relation that *b* is is what we call an internal relation. The clear distinction between them lies in the different implications or inferences concerning qualitative equality and difference.

Those who maintain that all relations are internal in the above sense seem to have been confused about implications as well as about relational and qualitative differences. With regard to the *a* relation, the internal relationists, without taking notice of the empirical fact $A\hat{r}p = A$, seem to have thought that since $A\hat{r}p\bar{I}A$ is the case, $A\hat{r}p \neq A$ must be true. Their confusion is two-fold. Th y may have inferred in the first place a "△" implication from a "*" implication. But we have seen

that that is possible only under a specific condition which must be satisfied before the inference is valid. In the second place, they may have thought that "Ī" implies "≠" since "≠" does as a matter of fact imply "Ī". We will see in the next section that although "≠" implies "Ī", there is no implication the other way around.

a, Since the internal-relationists seem to have made the above two-fold mistake, their view on internal relation (viz, our *b* relation) also becomes fallacious. It is true that both relational and qualitative differences are involved in a *b* relation; it is also true that both are implied by the internal relational property, but it is not true that the former implies the latter. Qualitative difference between $A_{\underline{R}P}$ and A is an empirical fact, it is not inferred from the relational difference between them.

The internal-relationists seem to have been guilty of the following confusions.

1, "Ī" and "≠" are not clearly distinguished.

2, Since "≠" implies "Ī", it is thought that "Ī" implies "≠".

3, $A_{\underline{R}P}$≠A is considered as being inferred from $A_{\underline{L}P}$ĪA and not as an empirical fact.

4, Since under a certain condition, a "△" can be inferred from a "*", the internal relationists perhaps thought that $A_{\underline{R}P}$∧$A_{\underline{L}P}$≠A can always be inferred from $A_{\underline{L}P}$*$A_{\underline{R}P}$ĪA.

5, Since the latter is true of all relations, the former must also be; hence all relations are internal in the sense defined.

b, Some of the external-relationists seem to have made the following mistakes:

1, "Ī" and "≠" are also confused.

2, Since "≠" implies "Ī", some external relationists probably draw the conclusion that "=" implies "I".

3, Since they recognize the qualitative equality between $A_{\underline{R}P}$ and A, they probably think that they can not help concluding that A_{RP} and A are relationally also the same.

4, Since the above is the case, the somewhat careless conclusion is drawn

that external relations do not result in any difference whatsoever being made to their terms.

VII

From what has been said above, we can easily see that the two sources of confusion are the different implications and the lack of a clear distinction between qualitative and relational differences. The former has already been dealt with at some length, but the latter needs a little more detailed consideration than has been given in the preceeding paragraphs. The whole problem hinges on our view of qualities and relations, and it is to these that we are now again turning our attention.

Bradley said in the third chapter of his "Appearance and Reality". "Qualities are nothing without relations" and further down "relation without quality is nothing." Bradley has always seemed to me to be more literary than lucid, and I can not claim that I understand what he means by these sentences. It seems that the term relation has been used both as relational complexes and as relations pure and simple, and the term qualities has been used both as entities and as qualities pure and simple. It may be that relational complexes are nothing without entities, that Bradley thought that relations are also nothing without qualities; and that, since as a matter of fact entities are related in relational complexes, qualities are always related by relations. It is probably easy to argue from a synthetical dependence of relational complexes upon both relations and entities to the impossibility of an analytical independence between relations and qualities; for it is easy to forget that the whole is related to its parts in a way quite different from that in which parts are related to each other. The whole depends upon the parts for the kind of whole it is, but the parts do not depend upon each other for the kind of parts they are.

Furthermore, even if relations and qualities were mutually dependent upon each other, it does not mean that they are thus identified with each other. However dependent each may be upon the other for the relation that subsists between both,

a husband is not his wife, nor an effect its cause, nor yet a son his father. It is the identification that forms the subject of our discussion, and nothing short of such identification would make any difference to the argument herein set forth. If relations and qualities are identified with each other, then relational equality would mean qualitative equality, and relational difference qualitative difference; but if they are not so identified with each other, no such inference is possible.

A, To start with, we have to admit that qualitative differences involve relational differences. Whenever we experience qualitative difference, we can always experience relational difference of some kind at the same time. This is obvious, since qualitative differences can only be experienced in finite time; and in finite time, a change of temporal relations has already taken place. We may use Venn's notation and say $(\neq)(\bar{I})=0$ is true. Hence the proposition "$\neq$"△"$\bar{I}$" is also true. Does it follow then that our *a* relation, namely, external relation, is impossibie in the sense that it is contradictory? The answer to this question depends on whether or not qualitative equality implies relational equality, when we grant that qualitative dlfference implies relational difference. If qualitative equality implies relational equality, then A$\hat{R}$P=A as an element in our *a* relational complex would imply A$\bar{R}$PIA. But *a* relational complex also involves A$\bar{R}$P$\bar{I}$A; hence *a* relation would be contradictory and thus impossible. The problem then is whether "$\neq$"△ '$\bar{I}$" implies "="△"I".

B, In order to tackle this problem, we may make use of the following eight propositions employing Venn's notation for the sake of convenience.

A,	$(\bar{I})\overline{(\neq)}=0.$	A'	$(\neq)\overline{(\bar{I})}=0$
E,	$(\bar{I})(\neq)=0.$	E'	$(\neq)(\bar{I})=0.$
I,	$(\bar{I})(\neq)>0.$	I'	$(\neq)(\bar{I})>0.$
O,	$(\bar{I})\overline{(\neq)}>0.$	O'	$(\neq)\overline{(\bar{I})}>0.$

a, It is possible that both A and A' are true propositions. If so, qualitative differences and relational differences are identical. Not only does "$\neq$" imply "$\bar{I}$",

but "$\bar{I}$" also implies "$\neq$"; not only does "$=$" imply "I", but "I" also implies "$=$". And external relations in the sense defined would be impossible.

b, It is also possible that both E and E' are true. If so, there is no implication between relational and qualitative differences, and our definition of external and internal relations hold.

C. It is possible that qualitative and relational differences are neither identical with, nor non-implicative of each other. If so, it is possible to have the following possibilities:

a, All relational differences are qualitative differences. The following propositions would then be true: 1, $(\bar{I})\,\overline{(\neq)}=0$, 2, $(\neq)\,\overline{(\bar{I})}>0$, and 3, $(\neq)\,(\bar{I})>0$. Since $(\bar{I})\,\overline{(\neq)}=0$ is true, it follows that " '$\bar{I}$' implies '$\neq$'" is also true. Since " '$\bar{I}$' implies '$\neq$'" is true, it may happen that with a certain condition fulfilled, we can infer from $ARP\bar{I}A$, $ARP\neq A$, and our view of external relations is impossible, since it affirms the former and denies the latter.

b, Relational and qualitative differences overlap, viz, some of the one is some of the other, but neither is entirely the other. In this case the four particular propositions are true, and our definitions of internal and external relations remain unaffected by any ot the propositions.

c, All qualitatative differences are relational differences. If so, the following propositions are true: 1, $(\neq)\,\overline{(\bar{I})}=0$, 2, $(\bar{I})\,\overline{(\neq)}=0$, and 3, $(\bar{I})\,(\neq)=0$. From $(\neq)\,\overline{(\bar{I})}=0$ we can infer that "$\neq$" implies "$\bar{I}$", but from $(\bar{I})\,\overline{(\neq)}>0$ we can not infer that "$\bar{I}$" implies "$\neq$". If "$\bar{I}$" implies "$\neq$" is false, then $ARP\bar{I}A$ does not imply $ARP\neq A$, and there is no contradiction in our view of external relation. At the same time, although "I" implies "$=$" is true, "$=$" implies "$\bar{I}$" is false, so $ARP=A$ does not imply $ARPIA$, and the contention of some extreme external relationists that external relations do not make any difference whatsoever to their terms can not be admitted.

D, That which is fatal to our view of external relations is the proposition that all relational differences either are or always involve qualitative differences.

We have seen that empirically all qualitative differences involve relational differences; hence if we accept the above assertion, we are either identifying quality with relation or asserting that they always involve each other. We are now confronted with the fundamental contention upon which the claim of the internal-relationists is based. In fact the proposition $(\bar{I})\ (\neq)=0$ is tautological with the claim that all relations are internal. Have we then any reason for accepting this proposition?

a, We may try to answer this question from empirical evidence. Qualitative equality or difference is a question of experience. If we refuse to admit this, we may find that science and scientific procedure will be confronted with difficulties. In experience qualitative difference does involve relational difference, but in experience the latter does not involve the former. What experience can prove is the proposition that $(\neq)\ (\bar{I})=0$, it can not prove the proposition $(\bar{I})\ (\neq)=0$. If it is claimed that experience is too crude, we can enlarge the term to include scientific experiments, and the situation would remain the same as it was before. If it is urged that scientific experiments are themselves crude in the sense that infinitesimal differences are not revealed by them, it may be answered that the suggestion is valid only when qualitative equality or difference is abstracted from all its empirical bearings for the purpose of logical construction; but that if it is not so abstracted, if, that is to say, qualitative equality or difference is to be considered as anything that can be affirmed or denied by experience, then the proposition $(\bar{I})\ \overline{(\neq)}=0$ can never claim any empirical evidence whatsoever.

Thus far we have been saying that the above proposition can not be proved empirically. Can it be disproved by experience? This question depends for its answer upon whether or not relational differences are limited to those that are empirical. So far as our present stage of civilization is concerned, even our empirical relational differences are not accompanied by qualitative differences. Relatively therefore to our present scale of experience, the proposition $(\bar{I})\ \overline{(\neq)}=0$ can be disproved empirically. But as we have already pointed out, our present

judgements of qualitative equality are tentative with respect to experiments more delicate than those upon which the judgements are based. It is therefore possible to have a line of demarcation dividing the comparartively crude from the comparatively refined experiments such that our judgements of qualitative equality are final with respect to the former, and tentative with respect to the latter. It is possible for us to wake up some day to find our civilization so far advanced, or experiments so delicately adjusted and reliable, that for every empirical relational difference some qualitative difference can be experienced. Thus if we limit ourselves to relational differences that are empirical, our disproof of the proposition $(\bar{I})\ \overline{(\text{₹})} = O$ can never be final. But fortunately or otherwise relational differences are never so limited; some of them are indeed empirical, others are merely inferred, and in so far as some of them are beyond finite experience, those that are so can never be experienced. At the same time qualitative differences are nothing if not empirical. Since experience is a series of finite events, and experiments, no matter how far advanced, must remain finite operations, not only can we never prove the proposition $(\bar{I})\ (\text{₹}) = O$, but we can also disprove it couclusively from the point of view of our finite experience.

b, We have seen that so far as our experience is concerned there is no reason whatever for accepting the proposition that ali relational differences involve qualitative differences. And what is more there are reasons for rejecting it. But empirical reasons need not be always applicable to the domain of logical contruction. What is empirically rejected need not be barred from entering into a theory or a system as a fundamental postulate to which facts may be considered irrelevant as long as it serves the function for which it is invoked. We hope to point out however that even in this sphere of logical construction, we have no reason for accepting the proposition $(\bar{I})\ (\bar{\text{₹}}) = O$.

I, In the first place, we have no reason for rejecting the proposition $(\text{₹})\ \overline{(\bar{I})} = O$; hence if we accept $(\bar{I})\ \overline{(\text{₹})} = O$, we are either identifying quality with relation, or else asserting that they involve each other to the extent that each is not without the other.

2, If qualities and relations are identified with each other, then, for reasons stated in section II of this article, we should not be able to know anything whatever. Nature would indeed be a passage, but it would be such a passage that no glimpse of it could ever be stolen. Hence pragmatically, from the point of view of convenience, the proposition $(\bar{I})\ \overline{(\neq)} = O$ should not be accepted.

3, Those who accept the proposition $(\bar{I})\ \overline{(\neq)} = O$ can hardly say anything in its favour unless the theory of types takes the arguments supporting it out of the universe of discourse of both relations and qualities. Whether such a defense is possible or not, I have not thought sufficiently to say anything definite. If it is open to the internal-relationists to invoke the aid of the theory of types, then their arguments may be consistent, but what they say can never be true. If, on the other hand, this defense is not open to them, then they can not argue at all, for their arguments, themselves in the universe of discourse of relations and qualities, would contradict the proposition for which these arguments are called forth.

Logically and pragmatically we see no reason for accepting the proposition $(\bar{I})\ \overline{(\neq)} = O$. Since this proposition is rejected, we have no possibility either of "$\bar{I}$" implying "$\neq$" or of "$=$", implying "I", and our definitions of internal and external relation can be established. For the purpose of reminding our readers we repeat the formulae previously given.

a, $A\hat{R}B * A\hat{R}P * A\hat{R}P\bar{I}A,\ A\hat{R}P \therefore A\hat{R}P = A,\ A\hat{R}\overline{P\triangle}A\hat{R}P \neq X.$

b, $A\underline{\bar{R}}B * A\underline{\bar{R}}P * A\underline{\bar{R}}P\bar{I}A,\ A\underline{\bar{R}}P\triangle A\underline{\bar{R}}P \neq A,\ A\underline{\bar{R}}P\triangle A\underline{\bar{R}}P \neq X.$

VIII

We shall now return to the problem of knowledge which may be made easier by the above discussion. Knowledge is a relational complex with terms that are themselves relational complexes thus involving a plurality of relations. Epistemology will have to determine how these entities and relations are to be construed; but for our present purpose, we shall consider the knower and the known as wholes united by a specific relation, namely, that of knowing. Various theories have

been put forth as to what kind of relation this specific one is, and some have concluded that it is an internal relation in the sense defined.

A, Is the knowledge-relation then internal or external? If it is internal in the sense of a *b* relation, then all the arguments set forth in section II would render knowledge very much of a fabrication of our brain. Unfortunately we can not prove empirically what sort of relation our knowledge-relation is; we can not prove that it is either internal or external. At best we can only interpret it either as the one or the other or something quite different from both. The conclusion arrived at in this article is that it has to be interpreted as external.

a, But if all relations are internal, then the knowledge-relation must also be internal, since no other alternative is possible.

b, The purpose of this study is to disprove the proposition that all relations are internal (in the sense of a *b* relation), and to establish at the same time the proposition that some relations are external. If we are successful in this attempt, we have at least two alternatives open to us for the interpretation of the knowledge-relation.

c, We have to stress the point that if we interpret the knowledge-relation as internal or external, we can not prove or disprove it to be either the one or the other.

B, Why do we interpret the knowledge-relation as external?

a, If it is regarded as internal, then we have no way of meeting the objections of section II.

b, If it is regarded as external, then these objections can not be urged against us.

c, We can not prove the knowledge-relation to be external for the simple reason that we can never compare any entity as knowledge-relatum with that entity as an external object.

C, What We want to make use of in an external relation is simply $A\acute{R}P = A$. If A stands for any external object, K stands for the knowing faculty, then $A\bar{R}A$

stands for the knowledge relational complex and ARP stands for a knowledge relatum. If the external object happens to be this book on my desk, then the book in knowledge is relationally different from the book out of it, but that does not prevent us from inferring that the book as an external object and as a knowledge-relatum are qualitatively the same. In a word, this book can be known as an external object.

原书空白页

五德終始說下的政治和歷史

顧頡剛

I 五行說的起源

五行,是中國人的思想律,是中國人對於宇宙系統的信仰;二千餘年來,它有極強固的勢力。它在經典上的根據,爲尙書的甘誓和洪範。這兩篇中,都有"五行"字樣,而洪範講"水,火,木,金,土"的性質尤爲顯明。甘誓說是夏書,洪範說是商書(自有書序之後成爲周書);夏商之書旣稱引它,那麽,它的起源當在夏商之前了。所以史記歷書中就說:

黃帝考定星歷,建立五行,起消息。

自有此記載,而五行遂確定爲黃帝所建立。大家對於這一說,毫不發生問題。直至七年前,梁任公先生作陰陽五行說之來歷(東方雜誌二十卷十號),始對於這個向來信守的五行起源說有所懷疑;但他仍以爲這一個名詞是本來有的,不過到了戰國時被人加上新的解釋而已。所以這文的結論是:

春秋戰國以前,所謂陰陽,所謂五行,其語甚希見,其義極平淡。且此二事從未嘗併爲一談。諸經及孔,老,墨,孟,荀,韓諸大哲皆未嘗齒及。

此論旣出,駁者甚多。四年之後,他的弟子劉節先生又作洪範疏證(東方雜誌二十五卷二號),證明洪範一篇出於戰國之末,其中所載的五行之說即是戰國時騶衍一輩人的學說;比了任公先生承認洪範是箕子的話但無神秘色彩的更進一步。此說出後,不聞駁論。是不是我國的學術界已經把這個結論默認了呢?

我個人對於這個問題的見解,是十分贊成劉先生的。我以爲五行之說如果眞是黃帝傳到夏商,夏商傳到秦漢,則五行思想早已有了強固的基礎,孔孟老莊們著書立說,縱然不積極提倡,也必於無意中流露出一些以五行爲信條的時代色彩。即使他們不但不願提倡,而且有意打破這個社會信條,則更當提出了這個問題而加以攻擊。我們看,漢儒生在以陰陽五行爲信條的社會裏,便沒有不受陰陽五行說的浸潤的,陰陽五行即是他們的思想的規律。到了魏晉,玄學起來了,王弼們就對於這些術數公然攻擊了,把術數的大本營的周易也講成非術數了。可見在一種時代意識之下,無論什麼人對於它都脫離不了關係:普通人無思無慮,只有全盤承受;聰明的人則或把它說得更精密些,或用了自己的見解改變它的面目,或則不滿意它而起作反抗的運動。假使五行之說早從黃帝時傳下來,則到商周時已有久遠的歷史,早該起了鉅大的影響,爲什麼我們在商代的甲骨文字裏找不到它的痕迹呢?爲什麼我們在東西周的文籍(尙書,周易,詩經等)裏,除了甘誓和洪範之外,也找不到它的痕迹呢?爲什麼我們在諸子書(如論語,孟子,老子,莊子等)裏也找不到它的痕迹呢?黃帝傳了下來,經歷夏商周不曾發生影響,而一到秦漢便在社會上大活動起來,這是什麼道理?

如果有人駁我,說:尙書中甘誓和洪範既說到五行,是五行之說在夏商的文籍裏已有徵了。墨子書中有"五行無常勝"及"帝以壬癸殺黑龍於北方"的話,是五行之說在諸子書中又有徵了。爲什麼你說從黃帝至商周不發生影響呢?我說,洪範爲僞書,劉先生文中已講明了。甘誓這一篇,

記與有扈戰於甘的事,但這一件事,墨子以為禹,書序以為啓,呂氏春秋先己篇又以為是夏后相,可見這事在秦漢間還是一種沒有凝固的傳說。至文中所云"威侮五行,怠棄三正,"五行與三正對舉,簡直是漢人的易服色,改正朔的論調。試問夏為寅正,商纔改用丑正,周纔改用子正,無論伐有扈的是誰,總是夏王,那時尚沒有商周二正,他的誓師文中怎麼已說了"三正"呢? 就算照了董仲舒們的曲解,說建寅建丑建子三種歷法是夏以前本來有的,夏商周三代不過順了三統的次序循環沿用,但是夏王用的只是寅正,有扈氏如有不奉正朔之罪也只能討伐他的怠棄寅正,怎能說"怠棄三正"而强迫他連過去及未來的丑正子正也一齊奉守了呢? 所以這種不合理的話實在使人看了好笑,前代的經師無論怎麼樣替它圓謊總是圓不攏的。

甘誓始引於墨子,我們只能把它與墨子看成同時代的東西。墨子這部書是什麼時候著作的呢? 我以為不是在戰國末,便是在西漢初。第一,它裏邊稱"子墨子曰,"足見是墨子後學者所作而非墨子自作。第二,自尚賢,尚同至非樂,非命,皆分上中下三篇,字句小異而大旨無殊,俞樾以為是相里,相夫,鄧陵三家相傳之本,後人合以成書(見墨子閒話序),這個假設很可信,故墨子一書自當在"墨分為三"之後。第三,書有篇題,是很後的事,自詩經以至論語,孟子,皆摘篇首數字為題,直至荀子始立了題目做文章;墨子亦然,足見此書不能出於荀子以前。第四,墨家的衰息由於漢景武時的誅殺游俠,今所傳的墨子書是從七畧著錄的本子傳下來的,是墨家絕了之後的一個本子;章學誠言公篇說古人書無私著,為某

家之學者往往附衍其說於某家的書的後面,這是一個很精確的觀察;今所傳的墨子書出於漢代,其中有些漢代人所附衍的東西也無足怪。有此四個理由,故吾以爲墨子中有幾處說到"五行",並不是在墨子生時已有此說,乃是因爲墨子的書沒有凝固,而戰國之末五行說很風行,至漢更盛,那時的墨學者便把這時代思潮摻入墨子中去了。

綜上所說,甘誓,洪範,墨子們在傳說中的箸作時代與實際的箸作時代俱不相應。它們雖都說到五行,但都不足爲五行起源甚早之證。

五行是什麼時候起來的呢? 荀子的非十二子篇中曾有一個說明。文云:

> 略法先王而不知其統,猶然而材劇志大,聞見雜博,案往舊造說,謂之五行,甚僻違而無類,幽隱而無說,閉約而無解;案飾其辭而祗敬之曰,"此眞先君子之言也!"子思唱之,孟軻和之,世俗之溝猶瞀儒嚾嚾然不知其所非也,遂受而傳之,以爲仲尼子游爲茲厚於後世:是則子思孟軻之罪也!

這段話的是非先不必講,至少它已告給我們幾件事情:(1)在荀子時已有五行之說了;(2)從荀子眼光看來,這五行說是案了往舊之文(或傳聞)杜造出來的,其說甚僻違,甚幽隱,甚閉約;(3)這班人造了五行說之後,騙人道,這是眞正的孔子和子游的話;一般的俗儒就受而傳之了。

所可怪的,他說五行說是子思所倡,孟軻所和。子思書雖不傳,不知其果倡是說與否,但孟子的書具在,哪有一絲一毫的五行氣息? 荀子這樣說,不是錯怪了他嗎? 這個疑案,

我以爲可用史記的孟子荀卿列傳中所記騶衍的事實來解決：

> 騶衍睹有國者益淫侈，不尚德，若大雅整之於身，施及黎庶矣，乃深觀陰陽消息而作怪迂之變，終始大聖之篇，十餘萬言。其語閎大不經，必先驗小物，推而大之至於無垠。先序今以上至黃帝，學者所共術，大並世盛衰，因載其禨祥度制，推而遠之，至天地未生，窈冥不可考而原也。……… 稱引天地剖判以來，五德轉移，治各有宜，而符應若茲。……… 然要其歸，必止乎仁義節儉，君臣上下六親之施；始也濫耳。
>
> 王公大人初見其術，懼然顧化；其後不能行之。

這一段文字也告訴我們幾件事情：(1)騶衍因爲一班王公大人淫侈而不尚德，以致不能施及黎庶，故深觀陰陽消息而作怪迂不經之說，使得他們聽了懼而修德；(2)他的歷史學說有兩種：其一，從黃帝推上去，推到天地未生；其二，從天地剖判以來到當世，用了五德轉移之說，說明各代的符應及其爲治之宜。這兩種學說，如果我們代他定個名目：前者應名爲"寶塔式的歷史觀，"後者應名爲"螺旋式的歷史觀。" 他的書有十餘萬言之多，實爲戰國時一大箸作。

在這一段裏，"陰陽消息"的字樣出現了，"五德轉移"的字樣也出現了。騶衍是荀子以前人，他的學說在當時是很流行的，他的學說是以陰陽五行作基礎的，他的學說是"濫，"是"怪迂，"是"閎大不經，"有類于"僻違，""幽隱，""閉約"的，爲什麼非十二子篇裏不一提他的名字呢？

我很疑騶衍亦儒家。他的學說歸本於"仁義節儉，君臣

上下六親之施,"此其一。史記平原君傳集解引劉向別錄,有騶衍論"辯"一節,適之先生以爲完全是儒家的口吻,與荀子論辯的話相同(中國哲學史大綱卷上,頁三六〇),此其二。史記以他與孟子荀卿合傳,此其三。西漢儒者如董仲舒劉向等的學說與他極相像,此其四。

如果這個推論不錯,我敢作一假設:非十二子中所罵的子思孟軻即是騶衍的傳誤,五行說當即騶衍所造。戰國時,鄒與魯接壤,鄒與魯又並包于齊。鄒魯之間爲儒學中心,故莊子天下篇有"其在於詩書禮樂者,鄒魯之士,搢紳先生多能明之"的話。魯學風被於齊,齊遂成爲儒學大支,故西漢立學,詩有魯詩,又有齊詩,論語有魯論語,又有齊論語。我們研究戰國文化,當把魯鄒齊三國看作一個集團。孟子是騶(鄒)人。騶衍以騶爲氏,當也是騶人(史記上寫他爲齊人,或他由騶遷齊,或他以騶人久居於齊,故有此說,均未可知)。史記言"騶衍後孟子,"或騶衍聞孟子之風而悅之,剌取其說以立自己的主張,觀其言仁義,言六親可知。不過那時的齊國人說話是很浪漫的(孟子上有"齊東野語,"莊子上有"齊諧,"史記上有"燕齊海上之方士"),騶衍是齊彩色的儒家,他把儒家的仁義加上齊國的怪誕,遂成了這一個新學派。給人傳訛,即以騶衍之說爲孟子之說,因以騶衍的五行說爲孟子的五行說。又因孟子受業子思之門人(史記說),遂又以孟子的五行說爲子思的五行說。於是荀子遂有"子思倡之,孟軻和之"的話。此等事情,在現在看來固然荀子太糊塗,或者可說荀子必不至這樣糊塗;但在當時,則口說之力甚强而筆札之用頗弱,孟子與騶衍因地方的接近和思想的一部分類同,因而在傳說中誤合爲一人,

也是很可能的。

以上的話,是本篇的引論,只希望把"五行說起于戰國的後期,""騶衍是始創五行說的人"這兩個意思略略說明。但騶衍的書旣無傳,五行說的材料又太少,我不敢確實斷說五行說必是戰國後期起的。我以爲零碎的五行思想是久已有的,但或少於五數(如秦國有白,靑,黃,赤四帝之祠),或多於五數(如左傳文七年,郤缺引夏書,釋之曰,"水,火,金,木,土,穀,謂之六府"),並不曾有嚴整的五行系統。非十二子中旣說"案往舊造說,"則一方面是"按舊,"一方面是"造說"可知。騶衍按了往舊的五行思想(即古代人把宇宙事物分類的思想),自己造出整整齊齊的一大套五行說,用之於歷史上,說明歷代的符應及其爲治之宜,這是很可能的事。所以五行思想的起源,我們雖不能知道,而五行學說的起源則我們不妨作此假設。

以下的文字,專討論騶衍的五德轉移說及其在政治上和歷史上所發生的影響。

II 騶衍的略史及其時代

騶衍的事實,除了史記之外竟很不易找到,史記記他的事又十分錯亂。孟子荀卿列傳道:

> 騶衍,後孟子。……… 騶子重於齊。適梁,惠王郊迎,執賓主之禮。適趙,平原君側行撇席。如燕,昭王擁彗先驅,請列弟子之座而受業,築碣石宮,身親往師之。

又魏世家云:

> 惠王數被於軍旅,卑禮厚幣以招賢者,鄒衍,淳于髡,

孟軻皆至梁。

又燕召公世家云:

燕昭王於破燕之後即位,卑身厚幣以招賢者。……… 樂毅自魏往,鄒衍自齊往,劇辛自趙往;士爭趨燕。

又平原君虞卿列傳云:

平原君厚待公孫龍,公孫龍善爲堅白之辯。及鄒衍過趙,言至道,乃絀公孫龍。

史記集解於此條下引劉向別錄云:

齊使鄒衍過趙,平原君見公孫龍及其徒綦毋子之屬,論白馬非馬之辨,以問鄒子。鄒子曰,"不可!………" 坐皆稱善。

是鄒衍曾與梁惠王,燕昭王,趙平原君發生過賓主的關係。適之先生駁之,云:

這幾句話很不可靠。平原君死於西曆前二五一年,梁惠王死於前三一九年(此據紀年;若據史記,則在前三三五年),梁惠王死時,平原君還沒有生呢。平原君傳說騶衍過趙,在信陵君破秦存趙之後(前二五七年),那時梁惠王已死六十二年了(若依史記則那時惠王已死了七十八年),燕昭王已死二十二年了。史記集解引劉向別錄也有騶衍過趙見平原君及公孫龍一段,那一段似乎不是假造的。依此看來,騶衍大概與公孫龍同時。(中國哲學史大綱卷上,頁三五六)

讀了這一段話,可知騶衍與燕昭王尚可並世,而與梁惠王則必不能相及。所以致誤之故,我以爲也和荀子書中致誤的

原因一樣:騶衍和孟軻兩個人,因籍貫的相近和學說的一部分相同,給人弄糊塗了,騶衍的五行說可以算做孟軻的,孟軻見梁惠王的故事也就算做騶衍的了。

燕昭王立於西元前三一一年,信陵君破秦存趙在二五七年,兩事相距五十四年,似乎騶衍在社會上活動的時間不會這樣長久。我們姑且假定他游燕的時候不是在昭王初立時吧。如此,他的著書立說的時代當在西元前三世紀的上半世紀。

在這半世紀中,戰國的時勢有沒有重要的變動? 有的,是帝制運動。戰國時的國君,老想升級。晉之三家,齊之田氏,本來是世卿,到西元前四零三——三八六年,先後列爲諸侯了。秦,宋,本來是諸侯,齊,韓,魏,趙,是剛由世卿升作諸侯的,因爲他們的國勢駕於一般諸侯之上,到西元前三三四——三一八年,先後稱王了。在這些國家之中,有的國勢日益發展,又駕於諸王之上了,又想升級了。人世上的位號,到了王已經登峯造極。現在再想升級,有什麼更高的位號呢? 有的,是上帝的帝。於是這特別强盛的國便要自稱爲帝以壓抑諸王而有以下的事情發生:

(一)秦昭王十九年(西元前二八八)十月,秦昭王自爲西帝,而使魏冉至齊,致東帝於齊湣王。不久,蘇代自燕入齊,勸湣王除帝號,使天下愛齊而憎秦。湣王從之,復爲王。十二月,秦亦復爲王。(見戰國策齊策四,及史記秦本紀,田敬仲完世家,六國表)。

(二)燕昭王二十六年(前二八六),齊湣王滅宋。蘇代遺燕昭王書,勸昭王說秦,以秦爲西帝,趙爲中

帝,燕為北帝,立為三帝以令諸侯:韓魏不聽則秦伐之,齊不聽則燕趙伐之。昭王善其書,召蘇代,與謀伐齊。二十八年(前二八四),竟破齊,湣王出走。(見燕策一及六國表)。

(三)趙孝成王九年(前二五七),秦圍趙邯鄲。魏王使辛垣衍因平原君謂趙王曰,"秦所以急圍趙者,前與齊湣王爭强為帝,已而復歸帝,以齊故。今齊,〔視〕湣王已益弱,方今惟秦雄天下。此必非貪邯鄲,其意欲求為帝。趙誠發使尊秦昭王為帝,秦必喜,罷兵去。"魯仲連適遊趙,勸止之。會魏公子無忌救趙擊秦,秦軍引而去。(見趙策三及史記魯仲連列傳)

這三件事相距不過三十一年,都在秦昭王的世裏。當昭王初年,齊國甚强,故昭王自欲為帝,猶必以東帝送給齊湣王。除齊之外,燕趙亦均不弱,故蘇代勸燕伐齊,即以北帝歆動燕王,而欲他以中帝送給趙,以西帝送給秦。到昭王晚年,秦為惟一的强國了,故昭王伐趙,求為帝;而魏王亦勸趙尊秦為帝。在那時,不必把帝分成東西中北了,寰宇之中只能有一個帝了。

在西元前三世紀的上半世紀中,帝制運動是一件最大的事,因為帝制定了,就立刻開展一個新局面了。我很疑心五帝之說,帝典之文,都是在這個時代中應時而生的;此事說來話長,暫且按下。

騶衍的時代,正是帝制運動的時代。騶衍的居地,正是東帝(齊)和擬議中的北帝(燕)的國家。騶衍的思想,則是講仁

義禮樂的魯文化和夸誕不經的齊文化的混合物。有了這三種環境,於是五德終始說就產生了! 五德終始說沒有別的作用,只在說明如何纔可有眞命天子出來,眞命天子的根據是些什麽。至騶衍創立此種學說的用意,或在警誡當時國君,以爲如果沒有眞命天子的根據時切不可存着干求天位的非分妄想,也未可知。

III 騶衍的五德終始說

史記騶衍傳說:

> 稱引天地剖判以來,五德轉移,治各有宜,而符應若茲。
> ………作主運。

這是記載五德轉移說(這裏稱做"轉移",封禪書及始皇本紀則稱做"終始")的起點。在那條上,已說明五德轉移說是騶衍創造的。他作的書有主運。這篇書已失傳,幸史記集解引有如淳的註:

> 今其書有主運,五行相次轉用事,隨方面爲服。

讀此,可知主運即是說明五德轉移之說的。五德,爲得到五行中的某行而成天子者的所據之德。五行以次循環,以次用事,終而復始,得到五德的天子也跟着它循環,跟着它用事,終而復始。哪一行用事,那時的人所穿的衣服也當跟着這一行的顏色而改變。

史記封禪書又說:

> 自齊威宣之時,騶子之徒論著終始五德之運。及秦帝而齊人奏之,故始皇采用之。……… 騶衍以陰陽主運顯於諸侯,而燕齊海上之方士傳其術(按,上言燕有

宋毋忌等爲方僊道，故此與齊之騶衍合言之）不能通，然則怪迂阿諛苟合之徒自此興，不可勝數也。

讀了這一段，可知他的學說的結果是很壞的。他的目的原在警誡有國者的淫侈及其對于天之位的希冀，但反使一般方士可以利用了他的學說以爲阿諛苟合的資料。這是他想不到的。他"論著五德終始之運"，集解又引如淳曰：

今其書有五德終始，五德各以所勝爲行。

又文選魏都賦注引七略曰：

鄒子有終始五德，從所不勝：土德後木德繼之，金德次之，火德次之，水德次之。

則他的五德說是以"土，木，金，火，水"相次轉移的，其轉移的次序是照着五行相勝的原理規定的。因爲木克土，故木繼土後；金克木，故金繼木後………。換言之，新朝之起必因前朝之德衰，新朝所據之德必爲前朝所不勝之德。這是他的中心思想。

戰國時的人本來常在豫備新王的出世。墨家鼓吹尚賢和尚同，就是希望天下道德最好的人作地位最高的人。孟子汲汲勸時王行仁義，施王政，就是要時王實現孟子的理想去取得天下。現在騶衍有這個新學說發表，使得時君知道，如要做成天子，定要在五德中得到符應，纔可確實表示其受有天命。這個學說的意義最簡單，最能吸收智識薄弱的人的信仰，所以它的勢力便一日千里了。

騶衍的著作，漢書藝文志上著錄了兩部：

1 鄒子四十九篇；

2 鄒子終始五十六篇。

他的書共有一百零五篇之多,關於這個五德問題的議論必極詳細。可惜從隋書經籍志以下就不著錄了。失傳的緣故,當由讖緯的禁絕。因爲讖緯是導源於騶衍一派的思想的,末流既不勝其弊,遂連這位老祖師的遺書也連根拔去了。

他的書雖失傳,猶幸呂氏春秋的應同篇中有類似的記載,我們還可以窺見他的學說的一斑。文云:

> 凡帝王者之將興也,天必先見祥乎下民。
>
> 黃帝之時,天先見大螾大螻。黃帝曰,"土氣勝!"土氣勝,故其色尚黃,其事則土。
>
> 及禹之時,天先見草木秋冬不殺。禹曰,"木氣勝!"木氣勝,故其色尚青,其事則木。
>
> 及湯之時,天先見金刃生於水。湯曰,"金氣勝!"金氣勝,故其色尚白,其事則金。
>
> 及文王之時,天先見火,赤烏銜丹書集於周社。文王曰,"火氣勝!"火氣勝,故其色尚赤,其事則火。

這一段話,與史記所謂"五德轉移,符應若茲,"如淳注所謂"五行相次轉用事,隨方面爲服,"七略所謂"終始五德,從所不勝:土德後木德繼之………"的話完全符合。故雖錄入呂氏春秋,仍可信其爲騶衍的學說。在這一段話裏,我們可以知道:騶衍的兩種歷史論,第一種是從黃帝推上去的,第二種是從黃帝推下來的;這兩種歷史論雖都爲他所創造,實際上乃不發生關係,他沒有把天地未生至黃帝的前一代加入這五德的組合裏。又他的五德終始說所支配的時代是很短的,夏以上只有黃帝一德(五帝當已盡數納入黃帝的德中),自從黃帝到周,也僅有四代,占了四德。他雖說"五德終始,"但第

一次的終始中還缺了一德,哪裏說得到"終而復始。"

這缺着的一德是什麼呢? 應同篇又說:

代火者必將水,天且先見水氣勝。水氣勝,故其色尚黑,其事則水。

這是推測未來的天子所據的德運的。因爲周是火德,滅火者水,故代周者必爲水德。他說,水德的符應現在雖尚未顯現,但因代火者必爲水,故天"且"先見水氣勝了;得着這水德的人,其服色是應當尚黑的,其政治是應當照着水德的方式做的。可惜他所定的五德的政治的方式,現在已看不到了。

騶衍是後於孟子而作燕昭王師的,史記中說他在燕作主運,此說如信,他倡此說時約當西元前二九〇至二八〇間。那時周室尚存,他自當有這般推測。但呂氏春秋作於秦始皇八年(西元前二三九),那時東西周都亡了,火德已銷盡了,滅火者(秦)之爲水德已可確定了,爲什麼這部書裏還只說"代火者必將水"呢? 爲什麼水德的符應還不肯出來呢?

這個問題,以我猜測,或有下列的情形。一,呂氏春秋鈔錄鄒子終始之文,未加潤色。二,那時六國未滅,秦雖滅周,尚未成一統之功,那時人對於天子的觀念和商周人不同,一定要統一了所有的土地纔算具備了天子的資格,看禹貢的分列九州五服可知,故呂氏春秋不即以滅周的秦爲水德,亦不爲秦尋出水德的符應。

IV 秦的符應及始皇的改制

秦始皇二十六年(西元前二二一),秦初幷天下,令丞相御史道:

> 寡人以眇眇之身,賴宗廟之靈,六王咸伏其辜,天下大定。今名號不更,無以稱成功,傳後世。其議帝號!

於是定帝號爲皇帝,天子自稱曰朕,命爲制,令爲詔,除謚法。

秦始皇初做皇帝,高興得很,一切制度都要改變,以建立開國的盛大規模。騶衍的爲眞命天子作鼓吹的學說創造了六十餘年,到這時逢着應用的機會了。所以史記封禪書說:

> 騶子之徒論著終始五德之運,及秦帝而齊人奏之,故始皇采用之。

又說:

> 秦始皇旣幷天下而帝,或曰,"黃帝得土德,黃龍地螾見。夏得木德,青龍止於郊,草木暢茂。殷得金德,銀自山溢。周得火德,有赤烏之符。今秦變周,水德之時。昔秦文公出獵獲黑龍,此其水德之瑞。

把這兩段文字合看,可見所謂'或曰''即是"齊人''的說話。他的話與呂氏春秋所記載的符應大略相同,試作一比較表如下:

五德	呂氏春秋		封禪書	
	帝王	符瑞	帝王	符瑞
土	黃帝	大螾大螻見	黃帝	黃龍地螾見
木	禹	草木秋冬不殺	夏	青龍止於郊,草木暢茂
	湯	金刃生於水	殷	銀自山溢
	文王	赤烏銜丹書集於周社	周	赤烏之符

在這個表裏,四代的符應有半數相同。差異得最顯著的,是商的符應,一方面說刃自水生,一方面說銀自山溢。但這沒有什麼大關係。有關係的,乃是黃帝多了一個黃龍,夏多了一個青龍,頗有以龍爲君象,以君之德爲龍之色的樣子。說起了這事,使我們廻憶到易文言傳上的話:

見龍在田,利見大人,君德也。

飛龍在天,乃位乎天德。

它也以龍爲君象,和這些符應當有些關係。又始皇本紀云:

三十六年,………秋,使者從關東夜過華陰平舒道,有人持璧遮使者曰,"爲我遺滈池君,"因言曰,"今年祖龍死。"使者問其故,因忽不見。

這個豫言是以"祖龍"暗射"始皇"的,祖等於始,龍等於皇,其以龍爲君象的意義也很顯明。至於五色之龍,墨子貴義篇上也有:

帝以甲乙殺青龍於東方;以丙丁殺赤龍於南方;以庚辛殺白龍於西方;以壬癸殺黑龍於北方。

可見封禪書中齊人所言之符瑞雖和呂氏春秋不同,但在五行的方式上原是應當如此,也沒有什麼奇怪。

最可注意的,乃是說秦的水德之瑞爲秦文公獲黑龍。呂氏春秋裏僅說將來的天子應爲水德,在他出世的時候,天必先見水德之瑞。到秦始皇即天子位時,說者根據了這一義而推秦爲水德,又根據了"水色黑"及"龍爲君象"而說其所獲水德之瑞爲黑龍,這都在意想之內。所不可解者,這個水德之瑞乃不爲秦始皇所得而爲秦文公所得。呂氏春秋記的得着符瑞的人是黃帝,禹,湯,文王,足見五德之瑞即

受命之王的本身。封禪書這段話除了黃帝之外,說夏,說殷,說周,不實指其人,已屬模棱;而於秦乃實指了秦文公,既不舉初封的秦仲,又不舉成大功的始皇,只歸之於一個普通的先公,這件事頗值得研究。

按史記十二諸侯年表,秦文公立於周平王六年(西元前七六五),卒於桓王四年(前七一六),凡享國五十載。年表中文公事實,僅有十年作鄜畤,十九年作陳寶祠兩事。秦本紀中,除了這兩件事之外,又有"二十七年,伐南山大梓,豐大特"的話,亦含有神話意味。封禪書中則對於鄜畤陳寶兩事有較詳的敘述:

> 秦文公東獵汧渭之間,卜居之而吉。文公夢黃蛇自天下屬地,其口止於鄜衍。文公問史敦,敦曰,"此上帝之徵,君其祠之!"於是作鄜畤,用三牲。………
>
> 作鄜畤後九年,文公獲若石云,於陳倉北阪城祠之。其神或歲不至,或歲數來;來也常以夜,光輝若流星,從東南來,集於祠城,則若雄雞,其聲殷云,野雞夜雊。以一牢祠,命曰陳寶。

讀此,可見秦文公是很崇信神道的人。他夢見了一條黃蛇就造鄜畤,拾到了一塊石頭就造陳寶祠,足見他所信仰的宗教還是拜物教。

秦文公造了兩個大廟,又初置史官以紀事(秦本紀),是秦的文化的創造者,故常爲後人所記念。這個爲騶衍之學的齊人,迎合秦人心理,假借了"秦文公東獵汧渭之間"的一件舊故事,杜造了"出獵獲黑龍"的一件新故事,以見秦的王業

之成早有豫兆於周室東遷之際。但這又何以解釋呂氏春秋的"天且先見水氣勝"的"且"字呢?

再有一個理由也是可能的。秦始皇應爲水德,其符瑞應爲黑龍,這在五德終始說上是確定了的。但那時實無黑龍出現,實無"天且先見水氣勝"的符瑞爲始皇所得。爲要證明五德終始說的眞實,使秦始皇聽了相信,只得把這個符瑞移到前代去了。

這位齊人既把這些有憑有據的符瑞告給始皇,始皇果然很相信,於是就根據了水德的條例,做出一番似"因"而實"創"的事業來。秦始皇本紀說:

> 始皇推終始五德之傳,以爲周得火德,秦代周,德從所不勝,方今水德之始。改年始朝賀皆自十月朔。衣服旄旌節旗皆上黑。數以六爲紀。符法冠皆六寸;而輿六尺。六尺爲步。乘六馬。更名河曰德水,以爲水德之始。剛毅戾深,事皆決於法,刻削毋仁恩和義,然後合於五德之數。於是急法,久者不赦。

封禪書也說:

> 於是秦更名河曰德水,以冬十月爲年首,色上黑,度以六爲名,音上大呂,事統上法。

這是中國歷史上第一次用了五德終始說而制定的制度。

看了上一段記載,可知在五德的法典裏,注意的是以下幾件事;其受水德支配的是這樣:

五德法典中的事項	水德下的制度
年始,朝賀	十月朔(以十月爲正月,建亥)
衣服,旄,旌,節,旗	上黑
數	以六爲紀
符,法冠	六寸
輿	六尺
步	六尺
乘	六馬
音	上大呂
(政術)	剛毅戾深,事皆決於法

從上面一個表裏,使我們推知五德法典的大概當如下表:

五德	正朔	服色	度數	音律	政術
土	?	上黃	以五爲紀	上黃鐘	?
木	建寅	上青	以八爲紀	上姑洗	助天生
金	建丑	上白	以九爲紀	上無射	助天收
火	建子	上赤	以七爲紀	上林鍾	助天養
水	建亥	上黑	以六爲紀	上大呂	助天誅
根據書籍	春秋繁露	呂氏春秋	月令	月令	洪範五行傳

有了這一個方式,每逢新朝起來時就可照此安排了。

中庸篇末道:

> 非天子不議禮,不制度,不考文。今天下車同軌書同文行同倫。雖有其位,苟無其德,不敢作禮樂焉。雖其有德,苟無其位,亦不敢作禮樂焉。……

> 上焉者雖善無徵,無徵不信,不信民弗從。下焉者雖善不尊,不尊不信,不信民弗從。故君子之道,本諸身,徵諸庶民,考諸三王而不繆,建諸天地而不悖,質諸鬼神而無疑,百世以俟聖人而不惑。

騶衍創了五德終始說,把三代的制度用了五德之運來說明,這是"考諸三王而不繆"的。這個學說永遠可以循環應用,乃是"百世以俟聖人而不惑"的。這個學說給"功過五帝,德侔三皇"的秦始皇帝在"天下車同軌,書同文,行同倫"的時候用來"議禮,制度,考文,"自然萬民就尊而信之,信而從之了。所以中庸這一段話,可以抵得一篇秦始皇帝改制頌。

V　漢爲水德或土德的爭辨

自從秦始皇統一天下之後,不過十五年,就給漢高祖們滅掉了。這水德之運僅有十五年,太短了。就是從周亡算起,也不過四十九年,依舊是太短。秦的據有水德之運的時期既這樣短,算不算呢?

封禪書說:

> 漢興,……二年,東擊項籍而還入關,問,"故秦時上帝祠何帝也?"對曰,"四帝:有白,青,黃,赤帝之祠。"高祖曰,"吾聞天有五帝,而有四,何也?"莫知其說。於是高祖曰,"吾知之矣,乃待我而具五也!"乃立黑帝祠,命曰北畤。

漢高祖立了一個黑帝祠之後,歷書說他:

> 高祖曰,"北畤待我而起,"亦自以爲獲水德之瑞。雖明習曆及張蒼等咸以爲然。是時天下初

定，方綱紀大基，高后女主皆未遑，故襲秦正朔服色。可見漢高祖也自以爲是水德，其符應即是北畤待他而起。贊同這一說的有張蒼等。他既自信爲水德，所以仍舊沿用秦的正朔和服色。一直到高后執政時沒有發生過問題。

這件事可以作兩種解釋：其一，是承認秦爲水德，也承認漢爲水德，兩代的水德不妨並存。其二，承認漢爲水德，但以爲漢是直接繼周的，不承認秦的占有五德之運，其理由是秦的年代太短。這兩種解釋不知道他們用的是哪一種。看高祖的"亦自以爲獲水德之瑞"的"亦"字，似乎他用的是第一種。但同德的能不經五德的一度循環而緊緊地承接嗎？這恐怕不能爲鄒子終始所許可吧？

因爲這個原故，到文帝時就有人樹起異議來了。第一個是賈誼。史記賈生列傳云：

> 賈生以爲漢興至孝文二十餘年，天下和洽而固，當改正朔，易服色，法制度，定官名，興禮樂。乃悉草具其事儀法，色尙黃，數用五，爲官名，悉更秦之法。

他是承認秦爲水德，又承認漢滅秦，土克水，漢應爲土德的。秦爲水德故尙黑；漢爲土德故尙黃。水德之數以六爲紀；土德之數以五爲紀。他是確遵了五德終始說而議禮的。只有定官名一項，始皇本紀沒有提起，不知曾否根據了五德之數而有所改定；如今賈誼也改作了。

他草具其事儀法之後，本傳云：

> 孝文帝初即位，謙讓未遑也。諸律令所更定及列侯悉就國，其說皆自賈生發之。於是天子議以爲賈生任公卿之位。絳灌東陽侯馮敬之屬盡

害之,乃短賈生曰,"雒陽之人,年少初學,專欲擅權紛亂諸事!" 於是天子後亦疏之,不用其議;乃以賈生爲長沙王太傅。

他胸中的一大套土德制度,竟以文帝的謙讓和絳灌之屬的嫉妬,沒有施用的機會。過了數年,他就死了。在這件事上,可見漢初並不以定德改制當作一個重要的問題,所以賈誼的主張不曾得着一班民衆做後盾,而且從絳灌們的眼光看來,這種改制說簡直足以"紛亂諸事"的,於是他只得鬱鬱以沒世了!

大約是文帝十四年吧(史記孝文本紀及漢書郊祀志說是十四年,封禪書則說爲十二年),又有一個人起來,繼續這個"改德運動。"封禪書云:

魯人公孫臣上書曰,"始秦得水德,今漢受之。推終始傳,則漢當土德。土德之應黃龍見。宜改正朔,易服色,色尚黃。"

他因爲第一個得土德的黃帝,他的符應是"黃龍地螾見"的,所以第二次得土德的漢,其符應也該有"黃龍見。"這個符應雖還沒有出來,但他豫言它是會得顯現的。賈誼僅言漢當爲土德而已,他則更言漢當有土德的符應,這是他比賈誼進一步的地方,也是他比賈誼膽大的地方,也是他比賈誼能夠吸引民衆信仰的地方。

不幸這時候的丞相恰恰是那位主張水德的張蒼,所以他碰了一鼻子的灰。封禪書道:

是時丞相張蒼好律厤,以爲"漢乃水德之始。故河決金堤,其符也。年始冬十月,色外黑內赤(服

> 虔曰,"十月陰氣在外,故外黑;陽氣尙伏在地,故內赤也),與德相應。如公孫臣言,非也!" 罷之。

張蒼不信那未來的土德的符應(黃龍見)而信據這已見的水德的符應(河決金堤),故斥公孫臣說。因爲他官居丞相,他勝利了。

但是,公孫臣終於靠了他的幸運(也許靠了他的詭計)戰勝了張蒼。文帝十五年,黃龍眞的在成紀(天水郡屬縣)出現了!史記孝文本紀云:

> 十五年,黃龍見成紀。天子乃復召魯公孫臣,以爲博士,申明土德事。於是上乃下詔曰,"有異物之神見於成紀,無害於民,歲以有年。朕親郊祀上帝諸神;禮官議,毋諱以勞朕!" 有司禮官皆曰,"古者天子,夏躬親禮祀上帝於郊,故曰郊。" 於是天子始幸雍;郊見五帝,以孟夏四月答禮焉。

又封禪書云:

> 文帝乃召公孫臣,拜爲博士,與諸生草改厤服色事。

又厤書云:

> 其後黃龍見成紀,張蒼自黜,所欲論著不成。
>
> (按,史記十二諸侯年表序云,"漢相張蒼歷譜五德,"漢書藝文志陰陽家有"張蒼十六篇,"爲張蒼論著,惜不傳。)

又張丞相列傳云:

> 其後黃龍見成紀,於是文帝召公孫臣以爲博士,草土德之厤,制度,更元年。張丞相由此自紬,謝病稱老。

綜合以上幾條看來,可知黃龍出現之後,文帝即幸雍郊祀五帝,拜公孫臣爲博士,與諸生草土德的厤法,服色,制度,張蒼就免職了。

但張丞相列傳所說的"更元年,"卻不與黃龍見爲一事。這件事出在新垣平的手裏。封禪書云:

> 其明年(十六年),趙人新垣平以望氣見上,言長安東北有神氣成五采,若人冠絻焉。……… 天瑞下,宜立祠上帝以合符應。於是作渭陽五帝廟,同宇,帝一殿,面各五門,各如其帝色。……… 貴平上大夫,賜累千金。而使博士諸生刺六經中作王制,謀議巡狩封禪事。………
>
> 其明年,新垣平使人持玉杯,上書闕下獻之。平言上曰,"闕下有寶玉氣來者。"已視之,果有獻玉杯者,刻曰"人主延壽。"平又言,"臣候日再中。"居頃之,日卻復中。於是始更以十七年爲元年。

讀此,可知文帝的更元年完全因新垣平而不因公孫臣。但新垣平所以這樣做,也可以說是步公孫臣的後塵。他看見公孫臣豫言黃龍見而眞的黃龍見,得着天子的寵信,他就變本加厲,想出神氣五采,獻玉杯,日再中…………種種花樣來了。他比公孫臣的胆子更大,欺騙皇帝的次數更多,所以土德的制度尚未頒行,而後元年卻先實定了。

土德的制度爲什麼終沒有頒行呢? 那可以說,公孫臣受了新垣平的累。厤書云:

> 新垣平以望氣見,頗言正厤服色事,貴幸。後作亂,故孝文帝廢不復問。

封禪書云:

> 人有上書告新垣平所言氣神事皆詐也。下平吏治,誅夷新垣平。自是之後,文帝怠於改正朔服色神明之事。

可見新垣平也是講改正朔,易服色的,因爲他詐欺的事發覺,殺了,文帝遂不高興再辦土德的大典了。公孫臣的"黃龍見"的豫言雖幸得應驗,而漢家終沒有實定爲土德,這未免辜負了他的一番好意。

綜合以上的記叙,我們可以知道:漢高帝惠帝時,漢德已定爲水德;文帝時,賈誼公孫臣等要把水德推翻而建立土德制;自從黃龍見於成紀,這事頗有實現的可能,不幸以新垣平伏誅,又擱下了。這是西元前二〇六至一五七年中的情形。

VI 漢武帝的改制及三統說的發生

這種改德和改制的運動,在景帝時怎樣,我們沒有找到記載,不敢懸斷。但文帝時既有賈誼,公孫臣,新垣平一班人的宣傳,又有黃龍見及改元年的事實,儒者和方士們一定繼續鼓吹着。雖沒有給景帝提倡,又因新垣平的族誅而銷聲匿跡,但潛伏的勢力總是不可侮的。

到武帝時,這潛伏的勢力又飛躍了。恰好武帝是一位好大喜功之主,又憑藉漢家全盛之業,所以他和秦始皇最相類:他們的黷武窮兵是一樣的,封禪求仙是一樣的,就是定德改制也是一樣的。

封禪書中記他初即位時事,道:

> 今天子初即位,尤敬鬼神之事。元年,漢興已

> 六十餘歲矣,天下艾安,搢紳之屬皆望天子封禪改正度也。而上鄉儒術,招賢良,趙綰王臧等以文學爲公卿,欲議古立明堂城南以朝諸侯,草巡狩,封禪,改厤服色事。

可見在漢武帝的初年,改歷服色之事,搢紳之屬已伸長了脖子在望,以文學爲公卿的人又已在討論,在起草,武帝又正心向着他們;這件事運動了三十餘年,成熟了,全國人一致有此要求了。

不幸,那時有道家與儒家之爭,而竇太后是道家的護法者。她看見儒家佔了上風,很不快樂。史記儒林列傳云:

> 孝文時頗徵用(儒者)。然孝文帝本好刑名之言。及至孝景,不任儒者。而竇太后又好黃老之術。故諸博士具官待問,未有進者。及今上(武帝)卽位,趙綰王臧之屬明儒學,而上亦鄉之,於是招方正賢良文學之士。……太皇竇太后好老子言,不說儒術,得趙綰王臧之過以讓上。上因廢明堂事,盡下趙綰王臧吏。後皆自殺。

封禪書云:

> 草巡狩,封禪,改歷服色事,未就。會竇太后治黃老言,不好儒術,使人微伺,得趙綰等姦利事,召案綰臧,綰臧自殺,諸所興爲皆廢。

於是這個快要實現的制度又打消了! 綜計這個改德和改制的運動,賈誼始倡之而阨於絳灌,公孫臣繼倡之而阨於張蒼,新垣平繼倡之而見殺於文帝,趙綰王臧繼倡之而見殺於竇太后,眞可謂盤根錯節,厄運太多了。

但是,到了這時,已有一班搢紳之屬作後盾;所徵的賢良文學之士雖不用,他們總是豫備繼承着趙綰王臧的事業而努力的。武帝建元六年(前一三五)五月,竇太后崩。元光元年(前一三四)冬十一月(那時建亥,故冬十一月即元光元年二月,離六年五月〔即八月〕竇太后崩僅六個月耳),武帝就令郡國舉孝廉了,夏五月就詔試賢良了,董仲舒公孫弘一班人就起來了,給竇太后摧殘的儒術又像春草一般地怒茁了。

不過我們在那時的記載上,並不曾找到公布改德的事實。這或因記載脫漏,或因改制之事需要長期的豫備,均未可知。

元封元年(前一一〇),有"報德星"的一件事。漢書郊祀志云:

> 望氣王朔言候獨見塡星出如瓜,食頃復入。
>
> 有司皆曰,"陛下建漢家封禪,天其報德星云。"

按,漢代以五星分配五行,淮南子天文訓及郊祀志王莽請祀六宗奏書中均有記載,其方式如下:

書名＼五行	木	火	土	金	水
淮南子	歲星	熒惑	鎮星	太白	辰星
郊祀志	歲星	熒惑星	塡星	太白星	辰星

這五種星,兩書所載惟土行之星不同;但"鎮"與"塡"在聲音及字體上並相近,當是一字。塡星出而謂"天報德星,"是漢已自承爲土德可知。秦爲水德,改名河爲"德水;"漢爲土德,因稱塡星爲"德星;"這是很相類的事。(此事,史記封禪書亦有之,但"塡星"二字,除索隱本及北宋本外均誤作"旗星,"見張文虎校刊史記札

記。)

改制中最困難的是曆法。到太初元年(前一〇四),曆法方面的研究得到一個結果了,所以就正式宣布改制。漢書武帝紀云:

> 太初元年………夏五月,正曆,以正月爲歲首。色上黃。數用五。定官名。協音律。

又史記封禪書云:

> 夏,漢改厤,以正月爲歲首。而色上黃。官名更印章以五字。爲太初元年。

又厤書云:

> 至今上卽位,招致方士。唐都分其天部,而巴落下閎運算轉厤,然後日辰之度與夏正同。乃改元,更官號,封泰山。因詔御史曰,"乃者有司言星度之未定也,廣延宣問以理星度,未能詹也。蓋聞昔者黃帝合而不死,名察度驗,定清濁,起五部,建氣物分數。然蓋尚矣。書缺樂弛,朕甚閔焉。朕唯未能循明也。紬績日分,率應水德之勝。今日順夏至,黃鍾爲宮,林鍾爲徵,太蔟爲商,南呂爲羽,姑洗爲角。自是以後,氣復正,羽聲復淸,名復正變,以至子日當冬至,則陰陽離合之道行焉。十一月甲子朔旦冬至已詹。其更以七年爲太初元年,年名焉逢攝提格,月名畢聚,日得甲子,夜半朔旦冬至"。

用了以上的記載,把秦始皇與漢武帝的改制作一比較表,如下:

帝王 改制	秦始皇	漢武帝
正朔	十月朔(建亥)	正月朔(建寅)
服色	上黑	上黃
度數	以六爲紀(例如乘輿,符)	以五爲紀(例如官名印章)
音律	上大呂	上黃鍾
政術	上法	(未言)

在這個表裏,服色度數與賈誼們說的一模一樣,確是土德的制度。只有正朔,是分明不依照五德說改的。因爲在漢前之秦建亥,如以"戌,亥,子,丑,寅"爲次而逆數之(因爲周建子,秦建亥,亦以逆數),則漢應建戌;如以"亥,子,丑,寅,卯"爲次而循環之,則漢應建卯。爲什麼他們不順了五德之數,建戌或建卯,反而建了離亥兩辰的寅呢?

說到這裏,我們應當考一考三統說。

三統說是什麼? 在我們看得見的材料中,最早的是董仲舒的三代改制質文篇所舉的:

> 春秋曰,"王正月。"……… 何以謂之"王正月?"曰,王者必受命而後王。王者必改正朔,易服色,制禮樂,一統於天下,所以明易姓非繼人,通以己受之於天也。王者受命而王,制此月以應變,故作科以奉天地,故謂之"王正月"也。
>
> 王者改制作科柰何? 曰,當十二色,歷各法而(當作"其")正色,逆數三而復。絀三之前曰五帝,帝迭首一色,順數五而相復。禮樂各以其法象其宜,順數五而相復。咸作國號,遷宮邑,易官名,制禮,作

樂。

故湯受命而王,應天變夏作殷號,時正白統,親夏,故虞,絀唐謂之帝堯,以神農爲赤帝,作宮邑於下洛之陽,名相官曰尹,作濩樂,制質禮以奉天。

文王受命而王,應天變殷作周號,時正赤統,親殷,故夏,絀虞謂之帝舜,以軒轅爲黃帝,推神農以爲九皇,作宮邑於豐,名相官曰宰,作武樂,制文禮以奉天,………

故春秋應天作新王之事,時正黑統,王魯,尚黑,絀夏,親周,故宋,樂宜親招武,故以虞錄親,樂制(疑當作"制爵")宜商,合伯子男爲一等。

這段話的內容很複雜,擬另作三統說下的政治及其歷史一文論之。現在且簡單地一講。

創三統說的,他把朝代的遞嬗歸之於三個統的循環。這三個統的名字是黑統,白統,赤統。得到哪一個統而爲天子的,那時的禮樂制度就照着哪一個統的定制去辦理。他把本代和前二代列爲三王(即本屆的三統),三王之前的五代列爲五帝,五帝之前的一代列爲九皇,一共是九代。

所以三王,五帝,九皇,都不是固定的名稱而是推移的名稱,好像親屬之有高祖,曾祖和曾孫,玄孫一樣。除此之外,又有所謂"四法。"四法之名是夏,商,質,文(夏商不是代名,乃是兩種法制的類名);也是循環的。因爲三統以三數循環,四法以四數循環,故必歷了十二代始得一次大循環(例如第一代爲黑統法文,第二代爲白統法商,……到了第十三代仍爲黑統法文)。

我們在明瞭了五德終始說之後再來看這種學說,不消

說得,這是從五德說蛻化出來的。五德說終而復始,它也終而復始,此其一。五德說以顏色分,它也以顏色分,此其二。五德說以五德作禮樂制度的標準,它也以三統四法作禮樂制度的標準,此其三。不過五德說但以五數循環,而它則以三與四爲小循環,十二爲大循環。可見它起得較後,故能把簡單的五德說改頭換面,變成了複雜的三統說。

現在我們順了代次,把五德說與三統說作一比較表,如下:

代次	五德說		三統說		附記
夏前一代	土德	(尙黃)	赤統	法商	此一代,五德說說爲黃帝,三統說說爲帝嚳。
夏	木德	(尙靑)	黑統	法夏	
商	金德	(尙白)	白統	法質	
周	火德	(尙赤)	赤統	法文	
周後一代	水德	(尙黑)	黑統	法商	此一代,五德說說爲秦(漢初說爲漢),三統說說爲春秋。
周後二代	土德	(尙黃)	白統	法夏	此一代,漢文帝以下之五德說說爲漢,三統說無文,

在這個表裏,兩說相同之點顯現得最淸楚的是商周及周後一代,顏色完全一樣。商在五德說中尙白,在三統說中亦爲白統。周在五德說中尙赤,在三統說中亦爲赤統。周後一代在五德說中尙黑,在三統說中亦爲黑統。所以我很疑心三統說是割取了五德說的五分之三而造成的。董仲舒在此文中所以只敢從"湯受命而王"說起者,正因這三代所尙之色和五德說一致,凡五德說所擺佈下的符應和制度,大可取作三統說之用而不見其矛盾。若一說到夏,則一邊靑,一邊黑,就要惹人疑惑了。

董仲舒是春秋家,春秋家說孔子作春秋是制一代之法的,孔子之被稱爲"素王"卽因於此。孔子旣受命而王,所以他要改正朔,易服色,制禮樂。但不幸他有其德而無其位,終究是一個素王(空王),因此,他只能在春秋一經裏把他手定的制度垂諸空文。董仲舒在這篇中說,孔子作春秋託王於魯;因爲春秋與虞在四法裏都是"法商,"故春秋便"以虞錄親,樂制宜商"了。

在這篇文字中,講改制的方式極詳;今以文繁,只摘其與周後一代相關的兩種鈔出來,其一是黑統,其二是法商:

> 三正以黑統初。正日月朔於營室;斗建寅。天統氣始通化物,物見萌達。其色黑,故朝正服黑,首服藻黑,正路輿質黑,馬黑,大節綬幘尙黑,旗黑,大寶玉黑,郊牲黑。犧牲角卵。冠於阼;昏禮迎於庭;喪禮殯於東階之上。祭牲黑牡;薦尙肝。樂器黑質。…… 親赤統,故日分平明,平明朝正。(以上是黑統的制度)。
>
> 主天法商而王,其道佚陽,親親而多仁樸。故立嗣予子;篤母弟;妾以子貴。昏冠之禮字子以父;別眇夫婦對坐而食;喪禮別葬;祭禮先臊;夫妻昭穆別位。制爵三等;祿士二品。制郊宮明堂員;其屋高嚴侈員;惟祭器員。玉厚九分;白藻五絲。衣制大上;首服嚴員。鸞輿尊蓋法天列象;垂四鸞。樂制鼓;用錫儛,儛溢員。先毛血而後用聲。正刑多隱;親戚多諱。封禪於尙位。(以上是法商的制度)

讀此,可知這也是把一代的正朔,服色,禮樂,爵祿,宮室,器物,刑

法……一一制定了的。可惜鄒子終始不曾傳下來,可惜史書上記的秦始皇漢武帝的改制太簡單,我們不能把五德說下的制度和這三統說下的制度作一詳細的比較。我們只能說,從這一篇三統說的制度裏可以推知五德說下的制度亦當爲很瑣細的,不會像史書裏所說的漢武帝改制,數用五,只改了官名的印章爲五字。

他們說,孔子是定了一代的制度而沒有實行的。實行的是誰呢? 當然是漢。所以漢人有"孔子爲漢制法"的話。所以說春秋繼周實即是說漢繼周。換句話說,就是把秦踢出了三統之外,不算它是一代。再換句話說,就是周爲赤統,漢繼周後應爲黑統,應當照着上邊開的一個黑統的單子去做。

這不是我有意文致,乃是有實據可查的。史記高祖本紀末,司馬遷的贊裏說:

> 夏之政忠;忠之敝,小人以野,故殷人承之以敬。敬之敝,小人以鬼,故周人承之以文。文之敝,小人以僿,故救僿莫若以忠。三王之道若循環,終而復始。周秦之間,可謂文敝矣。秦政不改,反酷刑法,豈不謬乎! 故漢興,承敝易變,得天統矣。

這是說,政術是循環的,三代是一次的終始,故夏爲忠,殷爲敬,周爲文;周之後又應當是忠了。秦既承周,乃不知救文敝,反酷刑法,這是它的謬誤,這是它的不能在三統中占得一統的緣故。到漢興,承敝易變,以忠救文,於是就得到了自然的統(天統)了。這是很清楚的三統說,他也把秦剔出了三統之外,司馬遷的春秋學是"聞諸董生"的,所以我們可以推知董仲

舒是主張漢爲黑統的。

他們建立這三統說只是一種玩意兒嗎？不是，那時的社會正有此需要。什麼需要？就是"行夏之時。"在一部左傳中，告訴我們那時有兩種歷法，一是周歷，一是晉歷：周歷是建子的，晉歷是建寅的。因爲晉國即夏墟，故他們的歷法也稱爲"夏時。"這是一個大問題，當在三統說的專篇論文中說明之。現在我們所要提出來的，即是在三統說中，黑統建寅，夏與漢在代次上旣俱爲黑統，故俱應建寅。夏之爲寅正，古書中已證明了。漢應爲寅正，在三統說中也確定了，正可照此改造歷法了。三統說的中心主張，不過如此。

三統說何以有"漢應爲寅正"的中心主張呢？這只要看漢書律歷志便知。志中說：

> 三代旣沒，五伯之末，史官喪紀，疇人子弟分散，或在夷狄，故其所記有黃帝，顓頊，夏，殷，周及魯歷。戰國擾攘，秦兼天下，未皇暇也；亦頗推五勝，而自以爲獲水德；乃以十月爲正，色上黑。漢興，方綱紀大基庶事草創，襲秦正朔。以北平侯張蒼言，用顓頊歷，比於六歷，疏闊中最爲微近。然正朔服色未覩其眞。而朔晦月見，弦望滿虧多非是。

讀了這一段，可以知道漢初是歷法最混亂的時候，那時有六種歷法，但都是疏闊得很。顓頊歷在六種歷法中比較最精密，但漢朝聽了張蒼的話用了它，弄得月盡月初見了月亮；到了月望，反而虧了；上下弦時卻又滿了。有了朔晦弦望之名，沒有朔晦弦望之實，這在民生日用之間有怎樣的不便。加以十月爲正，先冬後春，於四時之序又不相應。故這時的改

歷運動是全體人民的要求。他們的設想,以用寅正爲最善。但漢代是"必則古昔,稱先王"的時代,一切的行事必須在經典中找出證據,於是有孔子"行夏之時"之言;有孔子傳夏小正之說;有孔子到杞國訪得夏時之事;有孔子應天作新王,作春秋以正黑統之書:把這個要求完全推到孔子身上,說漢的該用寅正是孔子主張的。這也是很複雜的一個傳說,待在專文中詳細討論。

可是,改歷並不像改服色的容易,必有經久的豫備。漢武帝初年雖已有改制之志,而終於遲至三十年之後者,未始不是爲了求得精密的歷法之難。律歷志云:

> 至武帝元封七年,漢興百二歲矣。大中大夫公孫卿,壺遂,太史令司馬遷等言歷紀壞廢,宜改正朔。是時御史大夫兒寬明經術,上乃詔寬曰,"與博士共議,今宜何以爲正朔? 服色何上?" 寬與博士賜等議,皆曰,"帝王必改正朔,易服色,所以明受命於天也。……… 推傳序文,則今夏時也。……… 臣愚以爲三統之制,後聖復前聖者,二代在前也。今二代之統絕而不序矣,唯陛下發聖德,宣考天地四時之極則,順陰陽以定大明之制,爲萬世則!"

在這一段話裏,很明白地說,推三統之制,固然現在該用夏時,但以前的歷法已不可知了,不能遵行古制而必須另外創造新制了。創造了新制,便可"爲萬世則"了。這就是說,現在定的歷法如果精密,將來即使換朝代也不必改了。漢行夏時而於前代無所遵循,漢定歷法而後世可以相承不變,這不是把三統說打破了嗎? 所以,三統說只是漢用寅正的敲門

磚,孔子行夏時等等又只是三統說的護身符,實際上乃與漢家歷法沒有關係,因爲那時所要求的乃是一個精密的歷法,什麼"夏時,"什麼"黑統,"都不過替它戴上的帽子而已。

漢在五德說上是應當尚黃的,在三統說上是應當建寅的,所以漢武帝的改制就"以正月爲歲首,色上黃,"對於這兩方面都顧到了。

說到這裏,該得發問:漢爲黑統,黑統是"朝正服黑,首服藻黑,正路輿質黑,馬黑,大節綬幘尚黑,大寶玉黑,郊牲黑"的,現在服色尚黃,不是衝突了嗎? 爲什麼這兩種衝突的學說會得同時應用呢?

這個問題很難回答。最直捷的答語,是漢人的行事本來很滑稽,不能叫他們跟了我們的理性走。宛轉一點,也可說是三統說的詳密的組織僅見於董仲舒書,這或是他的一家之言,未得當時多數人的承認;而三統說的中心問題即在歷法,歷法既改,其餘便不關重要;況五德說的勢力亦正不小,三統說自不能把它全部吞併過來。最重要的一個理由,或在當時改制的幾個中心人物,他們對於這兩種學說都有相當的信仰。漢書郊祀志贊云:

> 漢興之初,庶事草創,唯一叔孫生略定朝廷之儀。若乃正朔,服色,郊望之事,數世猶未章焉。至於孝文,始以夏郊。而張倉據水德,公孫臣賈誼更以爲土德,卒不能明。孝武之世,文章爲盛。太初改制,而兒寬司馬遷等猶從臣誼之言,服色數度遂順黃德;彼以五德之傳從所不勝,秦在水德,故謂漢據土而克之。

太初改制是兒寬司馬遷主持的。兒寬有書九篇,列於七畧儒家(見漢書藝文志),可惜現在看不到。司馬遷則傳下一部大著作,史記,其中用三統說的,如上舉的高祖本紀贊;用五德說的,如五帝本紀的

有土德之瑞,故號黃帝。

其反對漢用水德的,如張丞相列傳贊:

張蒼文學律厤,爲漢名相,而絀賈生公孫臣等,言正朔服色事而不遵明,用秦之顓頊厤,何哉?

可見他是贊成賈誼公孫臣的主張的,他是以五勝定五德的終始的。他對於三統說和五德說都有信仰。推之兒寬,當亦如此。有了他們主張漢爲黑統兼土德,於是漢的受命之符遂眞成爲黑統兼土德了。

我們在這一章裏,可以知道三統說和五德說各有其正朔和服色,他們除了顏色的偶然相合(如殷爲白統兼金德,周爲赤統兼火德)之外是不相容的。漢武帝時,三統說主張漢應爲黑統,五德說主張漢應爲土德,他們都接受了。接受的方法,是取了三統說中的正朔而去其服色,取了五德說中的服色而去其正朔。這兩種不相容的學說終於相容了,太初改制就這樣地改了。

VII 世經的出現

漢的成爲土德,醞釀於文帝時而實現於武帝太初元年,具如上述。照我們想,這事旣醞釀了七十餘年,又經國家頒爲法典,已是十分確定的了。自從天地剖判以來,五德終始之序,爲:

黃帝——夏——殷——周——秦——漢

土←——木←——金←——火←——水←——土

已是不可改移的事實了。

可是,事情常有出乎意料之外的,到世經出現,這個系統又完全改變了樣子。世經是西漢末年的一部書,劉歆三統歷引用之。班固作漢書,他在律歷志裏說:

> 至孝成世,劉向總六歷,列是非,作五紀論。向子歆究其微眇,作三統歷及譜,以說春秋,推法密要,故述焉。

他明說自己的律歷志是"述"三統歷的。故顏師古注云:

> 自此以下,皆班氏所述劉歆之說也。

又律歷志首云:

> 至元始中,王莽秉政,欲耀名譽,徵天下通知鍾律者百餘人,使羲和劉歆等典領條奏,言之最詳。故删其僞辭,取正義著于篇。

可見劉歆們幫助王莽說話的"僞辭"是給他"删"掉了的。

世經這部書,在別的地方從沒有引用過,只見於劉歆的三統歷。以那時的學風而論,僞書是大批地出現,劉歆又是造僞書的宗師,(俱見康長素先生新學僞經考),則此書頗有亦出於劉歆的可能。話說得寬一點,此書也有出於劉歆的學派的可能。

世經中,商湯以上但詳世次,商湯以下則以三統歷說明其年月之數。其文甚多,今專錄其與五德終始說有關係的,如下:

> 春秋昭公十七年,"郯子來朝。"傳曰,"昭子

問少昊氏鳥名何故,對曰,'吾祖也,我知之矣! 昔者黃帝氏以雲紀,故為雲師而雲名。炎帝氏以火紀,故為火師而火名。共工氏以水紀,故為水師而水名。太昊氏以龍紀,故為龍師而龍名。我高祖少昊摯之立也,鳳鳥適至,故紀於鳥,為鳥師而鳥名。'" 言郯子據少昊受黃帝,黃帝受炎帝,炎帝受共工,共工受太昊,故先言黃帝,上及太昊。稽之於易,炮犧神農黃帝相繼之世可知。

太昊帝: 易曰,"炮犧氏之王天下也。" 言炮犧繼天而王,為百王先首。德始於木,故為帝太昊。作罔罟以田漁,取犧牲,故天下號曰炮犧氏。

祭典曰,"共工氏伯九域。" 言雖有水德,在火木之間,非其序也。任知刑以彊,故伯而不王。秦以水德,在周漢木火之間。周人遷其行序,故易不載。

炎帝: 易曰,"炮犧氏沒,神農氏作。" 言共工伯而不王,雖有水德,非其序也。以火承木,故為炎帝。教民耕農,故天下號曰神農氏。

黃帝: 易曰,"神農氏沒,黃帝氏作。" 火生土,故為土德。與炎帝之後戰于阪泉,遂王天下。始垂衣裳,有軒冕之服,故天下號曰軒轅氏。

少昊帝: 考德曰,"少昊曰清。" 清者,黃帝之子青陽也。是其子孫名摯立。土生金,故為金德。天下號曰金天氏。周遷其樂,故易不載,序於行。

顓頊帝: 春秋外傳曰, "少昊之衰,九黎亂德;

顓頊受之,乃命重黎。” 蒼林昌意之子也。金生水,故爲水德。天下號曰高陽氏。周遷其樂,故易不載,序於行。

帝嚳:春秋外傳曰,“顓頊之所建,帝嚳受之。” 淸陽玄囂之孫也。水生木,故爲木德。天下號曰高辛氏。帝摯繼之,不知世數。周遷其樂,故易不載。周人禘之。

唐帝:帝系曰,“帝嚳四妃,陳豐生帝堯。” 封於唐。蓋高辛氏世衰,天下歸之。木生火,故爲火德。天下號曰陶唐氏。讓天下於虞,使子朱處于丹淵,爲諸侯。即位七十載。

虞帝:帝系曰,“顓頊生窮蟬;五世而生瞽叟;瞽叟生帝舜。” 處虞之媯汭。堯嬗以天下。火生土,故爲土德。天下號曰有虞氏。讓天下於禹,使子商均爲諸侯。即位五十載。

伯禹:帝系曰,“顓頊五世而生鯀;鯀生禹。” 虞舜嬗以天下。土生金,故爲金德。天下號曰夏后氏。繼世十七王,四百三十二歲。


成湯:書經湯誓,湯伐夏桀。金生水,故爲水德。天下號曰商,後曰殷。……… 凡殷世繼嗣三十一世,六百二十九歲。


………武王:書經牧誓,武王伐商紂。水生木,故爲木德。天下號曰周室。……… 周凡三十六王,八百六十七歲。

秦伯:………五世,四十九歲。

漢高祖皇帝：著紀，伐秦繼周。木生火，故為火德。天下號曰漢。………

這是非常奇怪的一篇記載。用了這一篇記載，繪起五德終始的圖來，該成這個樣子（甲圖）。這比了前面說的五德終始（乙圖）差異了多少？





我們比較這兩個圖，可以知道，世經的系統，第一是不遵守五德相勝的次序，第二是把朝代伸展了兩倍。因此，本來以"土，木，金，火，水"為次的，現在改以"木，火，土，金，水"為次了；本來到秦代剛湊滿五德之數的，現在到周代已經是第三次終始了。這個系統是從

什麼地方出來的呢？大家不知道。然而大家都沿用它，無論作古史的和作通史的都依照着它。我們現在看到的歷史書，從皇甫謐的帝王世紀以至吳承權的綱鑑易知錄，沒有不這樣寫的，也沒有敢不這樣寫的。它是成了正統了！它是成了偶像了！它是成了大權威者了！

這個五德系統究竟是怎樣出來的？裡邊自有複雜的原因（因為它的原因太複雜了，所以二千年來的人看不破、拆不穿），非三言兩語所可道盡。諸君要知道嗎？讓我把這些理由一樁一樁地道來！

VIII 世經以前的古史系統

我們要明白世經的系統，必須先明白了世經以前的古史系統。世經以前的古史系統太多了，我們且從騶衍傳敘起。史記記騶衍的學說，其一，是：

> 先序今以上至黃帝，學者所共術，大並世盛衰，因載其禨祥度制，推而遠之，至天地未生，窈冥不可考而原也。

可見當騶衍之世，"學者所共術"的最古的帝王是黃帝，所以騶衍的推至"天地未生"的學說也只能從黃帝推起。其二，是：

> 稱引天地剖判以來，五德轉移，治各有宜，而符應若茲。

騶衍傳雖沒有明言以"五德轉移"的是哪幾代，但呂氏春秋及封禪書已代它言明了，是黃帝，夏，商，周四代。

根據這兩個學說，可以知道騶衍之世所共術及騶衍所

自造的古史系統應如下式:

(騶衍所造)　‖　(學者所共術)

天地未生→天地剖判→黃帝→夏→商→周

這實在是很簡單的一個系統。但到了後來,就有"五帝"之說。記載這一說的有以下許多書:

> 黃帝能成命百物以明民共財;顓頊能修之;帝嚳能序三辰以固民;堯能單均刑法以儀民;舜勤民事而野死。(國語魯語及禮記祭法)

> 昔黃帝令伶倫作爲律。……… 帝顓頊令飛龍作效八風之音。…… 帝嚳命咸黑作爲聲歌。……… 帝堯立,乃命質爲樂。……… 帝舜乃令質修九招,六列,六英以明帝德。(呂氏春秋古樂篇)

> 孔子曰,"黃帝,少典之子也,曰軒轅。……… 顓頊,黃帝之孫,昌意之子也,曰高陽。…… 帝嚳,……… 玄囂之孫,蟜極之子也,曰高辛。帝堯,………高辛之子也,曰放勳。……… 帝舜,…………蟜牛之孫,瞽瞍之子也,曰重華。………"(大戴禮記五帝德;史記五帝本紀略同)

> 少典產軒轅,是爲黃帝。黃帝產玄囂;玄囂產蟜極;蟜極產高辛,是爲帝嚳。帝嚳產放勳,是爲帝堯。黃帝產昌意;昌意產高陽,是爲帝顓頊。顓頊產窮蟬;窮蟬產敬康;敬康產句芒;句芒產蟜牛;蟜牛產瞽瞍;瞽瞍產重華,是爲帝舜。………(大戴禮記帝繫;史記五帝本紀略同)

這種說話是怎樣來的,是不是信實的記載,我們且不必管(四

爲裏邊的情形太複雜,非數言可了,當另作五帝考一文論之),但我們可以知道,在騶衍以後的古史系統已經放成

黃帝→顓頊→帝嚳→帝堯→帝舜→夏→商→周

了。我們如果依了帝繫篇的記載畫成一個"五帝世系表,"應如下式:

黃帝(五帝一)——玄囂—蟜極—帝嚳(五帝三)—帝堯(五帝四)
　　　　　　　|
　　　　　　　—昌意—顓頊(五帝二)—窮蟬—敬康—句芒—蟜牛—瞽瞍—帝舜(五帝五)

呂氏春秋和封禪書中的齊人所以在五帝之說已起之後仍維持"黃帝,夏,商,周"四代的舊說者,或因五帝出於一族,時代亦極相近,所以把顓頊,帝嚳,帝堯,帝舜歸併在黃帝的一代中也未可知。

五帝之說,大約是戰國後期起來的。在未有此新系統時,孟子書中但云:

五霸者,三王之罪人也。

等到有了這個新系統,荀子書中即謂:

誥誓不及五帝;盟詛不及三王;交質子不及五霸,

而"五帝——三王——五霸"遂成了一個很長的歷史系統了。

到了戰國之末,這個系統又伸展了。呂氏春秋(西元前二三九所作)云:

故耳之欲五聲,目之欲五色,口之欲五味,性也;雖神農黃帝,其與桀紂同。(情類)

無訝無訾,一龍一蛇,與時俱化而無肯專爲,……………此神農黃帝之所法。(必己)

然而以理義斲削,神農黃帝猶有可非,微獨舜湯。(離俗覽)

爲天下及國,莫如以德,莫如行義,………此神農黃帝之政也。(上德)

神農師悉諸;黃帝師大撓。………(尊師)

於是黃帝之前又有神農了! 又云:

天地大矣,生而弗子,成而弗有,…………此三皇五帝之德也。(貴公)

夫取于衆,此三皇五帝之所以大立功名也。(用衆)

夫孝,三皇五帝之本務而萬事之紀也。(孝行覽)

於是五帝之前又有三皇了! 三皇是哪三個人,神農旣在黃帝之前是否卽爲三皇之一,呂氏春秋都沒有說。

呂氏春秋作成了十八年,秦王政削平六國,令丞相御史議帝號。丞相王綰等議道:

昔者五帝地方千里;其外侯服夷服諸侯或朝或否,天子不能制。今陛下興義兵,誅殘賊,平定天下,海內爲郡縣,法令由一統,自上古已來未嘗有,五帝所不及。臣等謹與博士議曰:古有天皇,有地皇,有泰皇;泰皇最貴。臣等昧死上尊號,王爲"泰皇"。

在這一說裏,可見三皇是天皇,地皇,泰皇。和呂氏春秋合看,則秦時的古史系統,是:三王之前爲五帝,五帝之前爲三皇,而在三皇五帝之間又有一個神農氏。

到了西漢初葉,這個古史系統又有些增益了。淮安王安立於文帝十六年(西元前一六四),死於武帝元狩元年(前一二

二),他的淮南子一書即是作於此四十二年中的。在這一書內說起的古史,我們也可尋出它的系統:

> 故不言之令,不視之見,此伏犧神農之所以爲師也。(主術訓)
>
> 昔者黃帝治天下,…………田者不侵畔,漁者不爭隈;…………鳳凰翔於庭,麒麟游於郊。………… 然猶未及虙戲氏之道也。(覽冥訓)
>
> 至德之世,甘瞑于溷澖之域而徙倚于汗漫之宇。……… 及世之衰也,至伏羲氏,…………而知乃始昧昧晽晽,………是故其德煩而不能一　乃至神農黃帝,剖判大宗,竅領天地,…………是故治而不能和下。(俶眞訓)

在這幾段裏,很明白地在神農黃帝之前又捧出一位伏羲氏來了!

莊子雖是戰國時人,但莊子這部書卻極多漢人的著作,因爲西漢初葉是道家全盛時代,這部書爲那時的道家的著作所湊集,不啻一部道家叢書。所以莊子的古史系統和淮南子的古史系統極相像,只是又多出了一些:

> 古之人在混芒之中,與一世而得澹漠焉。………逮德下衰,及燧人伏戲始爲天下,是故順而不一。
>
> 德又下衰,及神農黃帝始爲天下,是故安而不順。
>
> 德又下衰,及唐虞始爲天下,興治化之流,澆淳散朴,…………然後民始惑亂。(繕性)

它固然把伏戲放在神農之上,但又把燧人放到伏戲之前了!

管子,也是一部雜亂的書。孟子對公孫丑說,"子誠齊

人也,知管仲晏子而已矣!"因爲管仲是齊國的中心人物,故爲齊人的著作所湊附。西漢時,齊學極發達,我們無論在儒林傳中看儒生,或在封禪書中看方士,齊人皆佔大部分。所以管子這部書,我們可以用了"秦漢間的齊學叢書"的眼光去看它。它裏面有一篇封禪,說道:

> 桓公旣霸,會諸侯於葵丘而欲封禪。管仲曰,古者封泰山,禪梁父者七十二家,而夷吾所記者十有二焉。昔無懷氏封泰山,禪云云。虙羲封泰山,禪云云。神農封泰山,禪云云。炎帝封泰山,禪云云。黃帝封泰山,禪亭亭。顓頊封泰山,禪云云。帝俈封泰山,禪云云。堯封泰山,禪云云。舜封泰山,禪云云。禹封泰山,禪會稽。湯封泰山,禪云云。周成王封泰山,禪社首。皆受命,然後得封禪,"
>
> (史記封禪書文同。)

這是在黃帝以前更加上炎帝,在神農氏以前更加上虙羲和無懷氏的。據它說,必須受命的人(卽受天命而爲天子的)始得封禪,自上古到周上泰山去封禪的已有七十二家了。可惜管仲只記得十二家而忘記了六十家,否則古史系統要怎樣地放長呢!

到這裏止,黃帝以上已有炎帝,神農,虙羲,燧人,無懷氏五代。但司馬遷作史記,對於這五代概不理會,仍依五帝德及帝繫之說,從黃帝開頭。炎帝和神農則以與黃帝有關,在黃帝的本紀中帶說了幾句:

> 軒轅之時,神農氏世衰,諸侯相侵伐,暴虐百姓,而神農氏弗能征,於是軒轅乃習用干戈以征不享,

諸侯咸來賓從。而蚩尤最爲暴,莫能伐。

炎帝欲侵陵諸侯,諸侯咸歸軒轅。軒轅乃修德振兵,…………以與炎帝戰於阪泉之野;三戰,然後得其志。

蚩尤作亂,不用帝命,於是黃帝乃徵師諸侯,與蚩尤戰於涿鹿之野,遂禽殺蚩尤。而諸侯咸尊軒轅爲天子,代神農氏。

在這幾段話中,可以知道:(1)神農氏是黃帝以前的天子,但到黃帝時已很衰微,諸侯又橫暴,於是黃帝興勤王之師,使諸侯仍去服從神農氏。(2)炎帝(大約是當時諸侯中的一個)還要想侵陵諸侯;黃帝和他打了三次仗,方把他打敗。(3)蚩尤(大約也是當時諸侯中的一個)又作亂,不用神農氏之命,黃帝又把他擒殺了。(4)黃帝有了這三次武功,於是諸侯歸心,推他爲天子以代神農氏。

這一個記載的來源也不必講(因爲這些事不出一源,講起來複雜得很),但我們可以知道,在司馬遷作史時,他確認神農氏與黃帝是相承接的兩代,在神農的季世有侵陵諸侯的炎帝和蚩尤而爲黃帝所平定的事。

至於伏羲這人,司馬遷並非不知道,他曾在自序中說,"伏羲至純厚,作易八卦。"不過他作史記時有意確守五帝德的系統,故不肯說到黃帝以前罷了。

伏羲既進了古史系統,於是易繫辭傳中說:

古者包羲氏之王天下也,…………始作八卦以通神明之德,以類萬物之情。作結繩而爲罔罟,以佃以漁,蓋取諸離。

> 包犧氏沒,神農氏作。斲木爲耜,揉木爲耒,耒耨之利以教天下,蓋取諸益。…………
>
> 神農氏沒,黃帝堯舜氏作,…………垂衣裳而天下治,蓋取諸乾,坤。…………

戰國策也說:

> 帝王不相襲,何禮之循! 宓戲神農,教而不誅。黃帝堯舜,誅而不怒。及至三王,觀時而制法因事而制禮。(趙策二)

於是"伏羲——神農——黃帝——堯——舜"的一個新系統又成立了。這一個系統靠了繫辭傳在經典中的地位,幾有壓倒五帝德的系統的趨勢。

以上諸說,我們可以總列爲"夏以前的帝王表,"比較一下:

我們看了這個表,可以知道,在許多古史系統中,只有黃帝,堯,舜是不缺席的。再有二人,就很難定。一派說這二人是顓頊,帝嚳;別一派則說是伏羲,神農。說顓頊帝嚳的,以黃帝爲五帝的首一帝,與騶衍時的史說合,可以稱爲"前期五帝說。"說伏羲神農的,以伏羲爲首一帝,黃帝居五帝之中,殆是秦以後的史說,可以稱爲"後期五帝說。"這兩種學說各有其畛域,不容相混(國語,五帝德,帝繫,呂氏春秋,史記爲前期說;淮南子,莊子,易傳,戰國策爲後期說。當司馬遷作史記時,已當承受後期說了,只爲他讀書多,所以違俗而從了前期說),惟有貪多務博的管子封禪篇,想多拉攏幾位古帝王撐着"七十二代封禪"的場面,纔把這兩個系統併成了一個系統,連兩系統所俱不收的無懷氏和炎帝也一起拉進了。

我們看了這個表,又可知道,炎帝這人確是常給人家稱道的,但除了封禪篇以外卻再沒有把他放入古史系統的了。所以然之故,只因以前說爲他的子孫的國家,如申,呂,如齊,許,都早亡了,沒有人替他爭地位了。而帝嚳後之周,宋,晉,魯,燕,吳,顓頊後之秦,趙,楚,越,田齊,在戰國時,或保持其舊國,或正作新的發展,祖先的地位就靠了苗裔的勢力而不墜,而擴大。黃帝是最早的帝王,兼爲顓頊和帝嚳的祖父,又爲'百家言"的中心人物,其勢力之大自不消說。堯,舜,靠了"天下之顯學"儒墨二家的鼓吹,使禪讓的大典實現於燕國;舜又是田齊的祖先,齊人是最誇誕的,他們的勢力也正不可一世。在這種環境之下,五帝的座位哪能不請黃帝,顓頊,帝嚳,堯,舜去坐,哪裏再有空位給與炎帝。所以炎帝雖和黃帝同時出生(國語晉語云,"昔少典娶于有蟜氏,生黃帝炎帝"),而竟致落伍了。

到了秦漢,許多小民族已團結爲一大民族,顓頊帝嚳也失了人們的需要。那時道家極盛,他們篤信世代愈古則人民愈康樂的歷史律,要找黃帝以上的帝王來壓倒黃帝以下的帝王,恰好那時農家所鼓吹的古帝神農,音樂家所鼓吹的古帝伏羲(楚辭大招云,"伏戲駕辨,楚勞商只。" 世本云,"伏羲作琴,伏羲作瑟"),也正風靡一時,於是伏羲神農便給道家取去,成了道家學說的工具了。他們使用這工具,在罵儒墨的時候,便把伏羲神農請出來,說伏羲神農時是如何好,到黃帝堯舜時便如何如何的墮落。逢了講至道至德的時候,又把伏羲神農請出來,說在至道至德之世是何等好,到伏羲神農之世就如何漸漸地澆漓起來了。因爲有了他們的鼓吹,而伏羲神農在黃帝前的系統遂得確立。又因爲有了他們的鼓吹,而儒家也把這兩位古帝請進了易的範圍。可是"五帝"是只許容納五個人的,擠進了伏羲神農,只得擠出了顓頊帝嚳,因爲他們的地位已經不重要了,有類於戰國以後的炎帝了。

這是兩個五帝系統的來源。因篇幅的限制,說得太簡了,有許多問題簡直沒有講清楚;俟將來作專篇論文時再細談吧。

IX 漢帝應讓國說及再受命說

騶衍創立五德終始說,給人兩個暗示。第一個暗示是不可妄冀非分,凡無五德之運的決做不成天子。第二個暗示是天命不永存,此德衰而彼德興,則易姓受命之事便立刻顯現。這兩個暗示如果是他創說的本意,則上一事是用以對一般人說法的,下一事是用以對君主說法的。他希望沒

有人爭爲天子,天子亦不以"時日曷喪"而暴虐天下。

堪笑秦始皇一方面要"至於萬世,傳之無窮,"一方面卻又聽信了齊人的話,自定爲水德。他不想想:倘有土德之帝起來,他的天子之位是不是尚可傳之無窮呢?

五德說旣演"五德轉移天命無常"的道理,三統說是模倣五德說而作的,這中心思想自然一樣。封禪說雖簡單些,但它說泰山是新受命的帝王封禪告天的地方,自古以來已有七十二代的帝王到過泰山封禪,則也是一種革命受命的學說。這幾種學說天天鼓吹,使得一般人深信天命的天子是常會被革職的;只要皇帝做得不好,失了上天的撫育黎元的用意,就應當有新的皇帝起來嬗代。那時人看皇帝是上帝的官吏,符應是上帝給與他的除書,封禪是他上任時發的奏書,五德和三統的改制是上任後的一套排場。

關於這種情形,我們可以舉出一個適當的例來。當光武帝時,公孫述據蜀稱成帝,移檄中國,徵引圖緯。光武帝報他道:

> 西狩獲麟讖曰"乙子卯金,"即以未歲授劉氏,非西方之守也。"光廢昌帝,立子公孫,"即霍光廢昌邑王,立孝宣帝也。黃帝姓公孫,自以土德,君所知也。"漢家九百二十歲,以蒙孫亡;受以丞相,其名當塗高,"高豈君身耶?(華陽國志公孫述志)

讀此,可知公孫述的檄文中曾引了西狩獲麟讖以見處在西方的他具有應運而興的資格,讖上說的"立子公孫,"也即是他的姓。光武駁他,說西狩獲麟讖指的是漢,所謂"乙子卯金"是漢高祖以乙未歲受命;所謂"立子公孫,"是皇孫病已

嗣位。這都沒有什麼大關係。所奇怪的,乃是他以中興之主的地位,而說漢家將來應亡於蒙孫之手,得國的是丞相當塗高。這種預言自己滅亡的度量,似非後世的君主所能有。

因爲那時人相信做天子的也像做官一樣,多少年後須換一新任,故緯書中便有下面的話:

黑帝治八百歲,運極而授木。蒼帝七百二十歲而授火。(春秋緯保乾圖,文選漢高功臣頌注引)。

蒼帝之治八百二十歲……　白帝之治六十四世。(尚書緯運期授;詩大雅正義及御覽皆徵部引)。

它把每一德的帝王的世數和年數都明白規定了。(黃帝赤帝的年數世數並非沒有,只因緯書久佚,我們無從尋到)。

以上所引,都是東漢初年的材料。我現在要說的是西漢之季的事實,爲什麼卻先引了東漢之初的材料呢?這因西漢中葉以前的歷史,我們有史記漢書兩部書可用;但到西漢中葉以後,只有漢書一部書了,材料太少,不夠說明那時的時代思潮。讖緯書固非西漢中葉後所有(七略不錄此類書可證),但這樣大規模的,有組織的迷信思想決不會突然發生,一定積累了多少年而後成就;西漢一代,就是讖緯書的孕育時期。我們正可從讖緯中尋求些西漢人所播下的種子。

在這一章裏,我們要講許多人心厭漢的故事。現在且把西漢的國勢先說一下:

當戰國秦漢之際,疲於戰爭,民生陷於極度的痛苦。到文帝之後,居然太平了數十年,百姓們快樂極了。故封禪書云:

今天子(武帝)……元年,漢興已六十餘載矣,天

下艾安,搢紳之屬皆望天子封禪改正度也。

可見漢武帝的封禪和改制雖出於他的好大喜功但當時的民衆也確有此種要求,許他如此。不幸武帝處此全盛時代太奢侈了,封禪巡狩之事遂又成了民衆的痛苦。試看成帝初,匡衡等奏言:

> 承天之序莫重於郊祀。……… 祭天於南郊,就陽之義也;瘞地於北郊,即陰之象也。……… 今……… 至雲陽(泰畤所在),阨陜且百里;汾陰(后土祠所在),則渡大川,有風波舟楫之危,皆非聖主所宜數乘。郡縣治道共張,吏民困苦,百官煩費。勞所保之民,行危險之地,難以奉神靈而祈福祐,殆未合於承天子民之意。……… 甘泉泰畤,河東后土之祠,宜可徙置長安。

其實,在那時,天子只有到甘泉和河東去郊祀了;走得並不遠,而匡衡們還說"吏民困苦,百官煩費,"要把那兩個廟搬到國都中去。那麼,武帝的東至海上,西至隴西,北至朔方,南至彭蠡,且令"郡國各除道,繕治宮館,名山神祠所"(封禪書)的,吏民的困苦要怎樣呢? 百官的煩費又要怎樣呢?

然封禪所費雖多,還遠不及征伐之甚。武帝時的武功自然是炳爛千秋,但耗費的財力也着實可驚。漢書食貨志云:

> 武帝因文景之畜,忿胡粤之害,即位數年,嚴助朱買臣等招徠東甌,事兩粤,江淮之間蕭然煩費矣。唐蒙,司馬相如始開西南夷,鑿山通道千餘里,以廣巴蜀,巴蜀之民罷焉。彭吳穿穢貊朝鮮,置滄海郡,

則燕齊之間靡然發動。及王恢謀馬邑，匈奴絕和親，侵擾北邊，天下共其勞，干戈日滋，行者齎，居者送，中外騷擾相奉，百姓抏敝以巧法，財賂衰耗而不澹。入物者補官，出貨者除罪，選舉陵夷，廉恥相冒，………興利之臣自此而始。

又漢書西域傳云：

孝武之世，圖制匈奴。……… 遭值文景玄默，養民五世，天下殷富，財力有餘，士馬強盛。故能睹犀布瑇瑁，則建珠崖七郡；感枸醬竹杖，則開牂柯越巂；聞天馬蒲萄，則通大宛安息……… 於是廣開上林，穿昆明池，營千門萬戶之宮，…………天子負黼依，襲翠被，馮玉几而處其中。設酒池肉林，以饗四夷之客。……… 及賂遺贈送，萬里相奉，師徒之費不可勝計。至於用度不足，迺榷酒酤，筦鹽鐵，鑄白金，造皮幣，算至車船，租及六畜。民力屈，財用竭，因之以凶年，寇盜並起，道路不通。直指之使始出，衣繡杖斧，斷斬於郡國，然後勝之。是以末年遂棄輪臺之地而下哀痛之詔，豈非仁聖之所悔哉！

這幾段文字，把漢武帝浪費的情形及其傷害民生的結果寫得清楚極了。武帝以前積了五世的休養，財力有餘；給他這樣痛快地一幹，國庫也空了，人民也窮了，寇盜也起來了。武帝眞是一個敗家子，把偌大的家產揮霍個乾淨！

因為武帝的功業雖大而陷溺其民者亦甚酷，所以那時的人民對於他的怨毒很深。當宣帝初即位時，令丞相御史議孝武廟樂，下詔道：

孝武皇帝躬仁誼,厲威武;北徵匈奴,單于遠遁;南平氐,羌,昆明,甌駱兩越,東定薉貉,朝鮮,廓地斥境,立郡縣,百蠻率服,欵塞自至……… 封太山,立明堂,改正朔,易服色。……… 上天報況,符瑞並應,寶鼎出,白麟獲。……… 而廟樂未稱,朕甚悼焉。其與列侯二千石博士議!(漢書夏侯勝傳)

長信少府夏侯勝獨說:

武帝………多殺士衆,竭民財力,奢泰亡度,天下虛耗。百姓流離,物故者過半。蝗蟲大起,赤地數千里,或人民相食,……… 亡德澤於民,不宜爲立廟樂!(同上)

天下怨憤之情,於此可見。在這樣怨憤的空氣中,人民對於漢帝的信仰是衰微了,一班五德三統論者就依據了自家的學說而主張易姓受命了。這不是他們好弄術數的玄虛,正是他們在失望之下的希望。

就我們看得見的材料中,把這個希望公開地向漢帝講說的,第一個是眭弘。漢書本傳云

眭弘,字孟,魯國蕃人也。……… 從嬴公受春秋(據儒林傳,嬴公是董仲舒的弟子)。至符節令。

孝昭元鳳三年(西元前七八)正月,泰山萊蕪山南匈匈有數千人聲。民視之,有大石自立,高丈五尺,大四十八圍,入地深八尺,三石爲足。石立後,有白烏數千下集其旁。是時昌邑有枯社木臥復生。又上林苑中大柳樹斷枯臥地,亦自立。有蟲食樹葉成文字,曰"公孫病已立。"

孟推春秋之意,以爲石柳皆陰類,下民之象,而泰山者,岱宗之嶽,王者易姓告代之處。今大石自立,僵柳復起,非人力所爲,此當有從匹夫爲天子者。枯社木復生,非故廢之家。公孫氏,當復興者也。

孟意亦不知其所在,卽說曰,"先師董仲舒有言,'雖有繼體守文之君,不害聖人之受命。'漢家,堯後,有傳國之運。漢帝宜誰差天下,求索賢人(顏注引孟康曰,"誰,問;差,擇也。問擇天下賢人"),禪以帝位;而退自封百里,如殷周二王後:以承順天命。"孟使友人內官長賜上此書。

我們倘使單看這一篇,未有不以眭弘爲發狂,亦未有不以春秋家的學說爲誕妄已極的。但我們知道,漢代的學問的基礎本不建築於事實上,它本沒有客觀的眞實性;它只是些頭痛醫頭,脚痛醫脚的方案,只是些適應時勢,刻刻改變的理論。它逢了盛世,便作誇揚;逢了亂世,便作怨讟。要是泰山大石自立,上林苑中枯了的大柳樹再生的事實出現在漢武帝時,不知道這班儒生和方士又要如何地說作祥徵,漢武帝將又去封禪且改元了。不幸那時武帝已經享盡榮華而死,(自武帝崩至此凡九年),人民經了一番大痛苦,創痍未復,他們長在希望易姓受命,有一個新天子出來救濟他們一下,旣有這等事情發生,正好爲易姓受命之說張目,哪裡再肯說作符瑞,討漢家的歡喜。所以泰山大石自立,就是到泰山告易代的象徵。蟲食樹葉成"公孫"字,就是公孫氏要繼漢而興的象徵。石柳爲下民之象,石自立,柳復起,就是"當有從匹夫爲天子者"的象徵。繼體之君(昭帝)雖無失德,但上天旣要使另一

聖人受命,也只得禪讓了;何況漢是堯後,其應當傳國已是前定的呢。(漢爲堯後說,下邊再論)。這些說話,都不是眭弘一人忽發奇想想出來的,乃是當時的社會上有此要求,有此醞釀,而後他順了這個趨勢說出的。不過既經據了天位的人,哪肯輕易讓給人家,所以眭弘就以妖言惑衆之罪伏誅了!這眞可算得一個民衆革命思潮中的犧牲者。

眭弘身歿之後,民衆對於易代的想望仍未終止。這種宣傳的情形,可惜沒有紀載流傳下來,我們不能知道。但看宣帝神爵二年(西元前六〇),蓋寬饒的奏書道:

> 韓氏易傳言"五帝官天下,三王家天下。"家以傳子;官以傳賢。若四時之運,功成者去。不得其人,則不居其位。(漢書蓋寬饒傳)

可以知道這種宣傳在眭弘死後並沒有間斷,成了民衆的口頭禪,所以蓋寬饒便很不游移地說出來了。可憐他們感到了社會的不安,想不出解決的方法,只會希望皇帝去複演歷史上的故事而讓位與賢人,這豈非"與虎謀皮"。所以蓋寬饒也犯了"大逆不道"之罪;他不甘下吏,自剄於北闕下了。

在這十八年中,眭弘與蓋寬饒兩次請求漢帝禪讓,都做不到。但民間的怨氣自在,他們對于漢帝早已沒有好感了。漢帝失去了信仰,猶居天位而不肯去。人民的膽子又小,自揣沒有得到五德之運,可把漢德勝了,因此也不敢反叛。長此相持,怎麼辦呢?於是有許多災異之說起來,想把漢帝嚇倒(災異的學說在董仲舒時已有,但至此時而大盛)。這種災異說,就是封禪說的反面文章;做得最有名的是京房谷永等。劉向在這個時代思潮之中,耿耿忠心,惟恐漢室眞爲災異壓倒,

又極力以災異說向元成二帝下警告,冀其感動修德,所以他也成了一個災異專家。

京房是一個易學家,他的學說託於孟喜(見漢書儒林傳)。漢書藝文志上有災異孟氏京房六十六篇,即是他一手造成的學說。元帝中,他曾於召對時言道:

春秋紀二百四十二年災異,以視萬世之君。今陛下即位以來,日月失明,星辰逆行,山崩泉涌,地震石隕,夏霜冬靁,春凋秋榮,隕霜不殺,水旱螟蟲,民人飢疫,盜賊不禁,刑人滿市。春秋所記災異盡備。陛下視今爲治邪亂邪?(漢書京房傳)

說到這等地步,元帝只得自承,"亦極亂耳,尙何道!"如此,漢帝也已自知漢有亡徵了。

谷永,是研究京氏易最密的人,善言災異。成帝初即位,委政元舅大將軍王鳳。是時日食地震,議者多歸咎於他。永知他方見柄用,陰欲自託,上書云:

〔日食地震〕…………不可歸咎諸舅。此欲以政事過差丞相父子,…………皆瞽說欺天者也。…………

元年正月,白氣較然,起乎東方。至其四月,黃濁四塞,覆冒京師。………白氣起東方,賤人將興之徵也。黃濁冒京師,王道微絕之應也。夫賤人當起而京師道微,二者已醜(王先謙補注引王文彬曰,"言二者之徵兆已相連比而見也")。陛下誠………急復益納宜子婦人,毋擇好醜,毋避嘗字,無論年齒。推法言之,陛下得繼嗣於微賤之間,乃反爲福。(漢書谷永傳)

"王道微絕,賤人當興,"這是已固定的事實。谷永卻想出禳解的方法,勸成帝多納宜子的婦人,不論貌的美醜,年的長幼,和曾經生產過沒有,只要使太子出於微賤之間,就可對付了上天的垂象。如此,漢就不可亡了。不幸成帝生不出兒子,谷永空設下這個計策。

成帝永始二年(西元前一五),有黑龍見東萊。上使上書問永,受所欲言。永對曰:

> 臣聞王天下有國家者患在上有危亡之事而危亡之言不得上聞。如使危亡之言輒上聞,則商周不易姓而迭興,三正不變改而更用。夏商之將亡也,行道之人皆知之;晏然自以若天有日,莫能危。是故惡日廣而不自知,大命傾而不寤。…………
>
> 漢家行夏正,夏正色黑;黑龍,同姓之象也。……未知同姓有見本朝無繼嗣之慶,多危殆之隙,欲為擾亂,舉兵而起者邪?…………
>
> 今陛下輕奪民財,不愛民力,聽邪臣之計,去高敞初陵,捐十年功緒,改作昌陵,…………大興繇役,重增賦斂,…………百姓財竭力盡,愁恨感天,災異屢降,饑饉仍臻,流散冗食,餧死於道,以百萬數。公家無一年之畜,百姓無旬日之儲;上下俱匱,無以相救……………(同上)

這條黑龍若出在文帝前,豈不成了漢的水德的符瑞。就是出在武帝後,也是漢的黑統的符瑞。為什麼成帝時出來了,不當它是祥瑞而反看成災異呢?為什麼谷永不勸成帝去封禪,倒說同姓者將起兵呢?至於改造一個昌陵,在全盛時

代算得了什麼,而在那時也就要上下俱匱,愁恨感天了。可見那時的漢朝,正像一個衰病的人一樣,處處露出了下半世的光景。

成帝元延元年(西元前一二),因災異尤數,上又問谷永。永對曰:

> 臣聞天生蒸民,不能相治,爲立王者以統理之。方制海內,非爲天子;列土封疆,非爲諸侯:皆以爲民也。垂三統,列三正,去無道,開有德,不私一姓;明天下乃天下之天下,非一人之天下也。…………
>
> 陛下承八世之功業,當陽數之標紀,涉三七之節紀,遭无妄之卦運,直百六之災阨,三難異科,雜焉同會。建始元年以來,二十載間,羣災大異交錯鋒起,多於春秋所書。……… 彗星,極異也,土精所生,流隕之應,出於飢變之後,兵亂作矣,厥期不久。隆德積善,懼不克濟。(同上)

這實在是咒詛漢朝,說它逢了重重疊疊的厄運,又出了許許多多的災異,是一定亡了,雖隆德積善也怕過不去了。但那時"北無葷粥冒頓之患,南無趙佗呂嘉之難,諸侯無吳楚燕梁之勢"(谷永語),他們所怕的是什麼?爲什麼他們惶惶若不可終日,在臣子的奏書中也把這種很可忌諱的話盡情地講出來呢?

他說的漢的厄運,共有五句,但下云"三難異科,"可知只有三種。這大約因前兩句都歸併到末一句裡去了。現在逐句解釋於下:

(1)三七之節紀——從高帝元年(西元前二〇六)

到平帝元始四年(西元四)爲二百十年。谷永此對在成帝元延元年(前一二),離二百十年之數只有十五年了。大約那時災異家言,二百十年是一個大厄運。

(2)无妄之卦運——易雜卦傳曰,"无妄,災也。"京房說无妄,以爲"大旱之卦,萬物皆死,無所復望"(見周易集解)。顏注引應劭曰,"无妄者,無所望也。萬物無所望於天,災異之最大者也。"王補注引項安世曰,"古'妄'與'望'通。秦漢言无妄,皆無望也。朱英之說黃歇與揚子法言皆然,故太玄以去準无妄。"

(3)百六之災阨——漢書律歷志引易九戹曰,"入元百六,陽九;次三百七十四,陰九。"顏注引孟康曰,"所謂陽九之阨,百六之會者也。……百六與三百七十四(共四百八十),六乘八之數也。"律曆志又云,"凡四千六百一十七歲,與一元終,經歲四千五百六十,災歲五十七。"可見他們在四千餘年中定出五十餘個災歲,而第一百零六年是陽九的阨年。在這四百八十年中,以這一年和第三百七十四年爲重大的災歲。可是從高祖到成帝,已經不止一百零六年了,爲什麼說他"直百六之災阨?"這個問題很難解釋,所以自來注漢書的人都不注。以我猜想,或者從高祖元年到武帝太初四年爲一百零六年,他們以爲在這一年上發生的災阨直到成帝時尙未消散;或者他們因成帝是漢

帝的第九代(故云"承八世之功業"),從這"九"字上想到陽九(故云"當陽數之標季"),又從這陽九上想到百六之阨(故云"直百六之災阨"),遂有此言:均未可知。

我們在這種話裡可以知道,在這時候,大家相信,漢代是大阨當前而且已是無望的了。大家只有靜待着大恐怖的來臨!

劉向曾集合上古至秦漢的災異,著成洪範五行傳論十一篇,爲災異說中最有系統的記載。此書雖亡,但班固作漢書五行志,把它收入,我們還能看見。他因元帝起昌陵,制度泰奢,上疏諫道:

> 王者必通三統,明天命所授者博,非獨一姓也。孔子論詩,至於"殷士膚敏,祼將于京,"喟然歎曰,"大哉天命,善不可不傳于子孫!是以富貴無常。不如是,則王公其何以戒慎,民萌何以勸勉!"蓋傷微子之事周而痛殷之亡也……自古及今,未有不亡之國也。
>
> 昔高皇帝既滅秦,將都雒陽,感寤劉敬之言,自以德不及周而賢於秦,遂徙都關中,依周之德,因秦之阻。世之長短,以德爲效。故常戰栗不敢諱亡。…………
>
> 陛下……徙昌陵,…………功費大萬百餘。死者恨於下;生者愁於上。怨氣感動陰陽,因之以饑饉,物故流離以十萬數。臣甚惛焉!(漢書劉向傳)

這也是很清楚地說,漢室快要亡了。而成帝起昌陵,就是致亡的原因之一。這種話若給漢武帝聽得,豈不要大笑他們的眼孔太小。然而若無武帝的大傷元氣於先,成帝的徙昌

陵又何至挨諸臣的痛罵,以爲這是亡國的舉動呢!

那時人都承認漢運已衰,滅亡在即,但實際上卻沒有新受命的天子起來,滅亡不了,這又使許多人心焦了。於是在這不生不死的局面之中,他們又創造了一種新學說,——漢再受命說。這一說是調和民衆的"漢運已衰,將有新受命的天子出來"的一個觀念和皇室的"漢運雖衰,天命未改"的一個觀念而成的。這就是說:新受命的天子將出來,固然是事實,但這新受命的依然是漢。在我們看來,這種"換湯不換藥"的設想,豈非太滑稽了?

這個新學說的創造者,是甘忠可。漢書李尋傳云:

> 成帝時,齊人甘忠可詐造天官歷,包元太平經十二卷,以言"漢家逢天地之大終,當更受命於天。天帝使眞人赤精子下敎我此道。"忠可以敎重平夏賀良,容丘丁廣世,東郡郭昌等。
>
> 中壘校尉劉向奏忠可假鬼神罔上惑衆,下獄治,服。未斷,病死。賀良等坐挾學忠可書,以不敬論。後賀良等復私以相敎。

這不知道是成帝哪一年的事。通鑑載劉向上論王氏封事於陽朔二年(西元前二三),漢書劉向傳又以作中壘校尉次於上封事之後,而此云"中壘校尉劉向奏忠可,"則此事當在陽朔二年之後。距蓋寬饒之死,已近四十年了。

所可怪者,是劉向奏他罔上惑衆。劉向不是惓惓君國,惟恐漢室之亡的嗎?有了甘忠可的學說,正可向民衆宣傳,使他們對於漢朝懷了新的希望,延長漢的壽命。爲什麼他竟竭力地破壞呢?大約一種運動發生,總是盲目的。惟有

盲目的潮流,纔是一種最堅强不可抵禦的勢力。我們現在站在旁觀的地位來看漢代的社會,自然對於他們的行事的是非,學說的因果,和思想演變的系統看得很清楚。但漢代人正在這個大潮流之中,爲潮流所激盪,只會盲目地奔馳,不會有自覺的評判。劉向所信仰的是災異,其所望於漢家的是皇帝的修德行仁以除去其災異;至於再受命說,則是他的書裏所沒有的,其怪妄不經也顯而易見,所以他反對了。他不知道在這個大潮流中,甘忠可正和他在一條路上走,他們原來是同志呢。(這和孟子提倡堯舜禹的禪讓說而反對燕王噲的禪位於子之正相類。)

甘忠可雖死,夏賀良仍在。過了些時候,他又起來作這個運動了。李尋傳云:

> 哀帝初立,司隸校尉解光亦以明經通災異得幸,白賀良等所挾忠可書。事下奉車都尉劉歆。歆以爲不合五經,不可施行。而李尋亦好之。光曰,"前歆父向奏忠可下獄,歆安肯通此道!"
>
> 時郭昌爲長安令,勸尋宜助賀良等。尋遂白賀良等;皆待詔黃門。數召見,陳說"漢歷中衰,當更受命。成帝不應天命,故絕嗣。今陛下久疾,變更屢數,天所以譴告人也。宜急改元易號,迺得延年益壽,皇子生,災異息矣。得道不得行,咎殃且亡。不有洪水將出,災火且起,滌盪人民!"

經了他的半利誘,半威刼之後,哀帝遂眞的再受命了:

> 哀帝久寢疾,幾其有益,遂從賀良等議。於是制詔丞相御史:"'蓋聞尚書五曰'考終命,'言大運壹

終，更紀天元人元，考文正理，推歷定紀，數如甲子也。

"朕以眇身，入繼太祖，承皇天，總百僚，子元元，未有應天心之效。即位出入三年，災變數降，日月失度，星辰錯謬，高下貿易，大異連仍，盜賊並起。朕甚懼焉，戰戰兢兢，唯恐陵夷。

"惟漢興至今二百載，歷紀開元，皇天降非材之右，漢國再獲受命之符。朕之不德，曷敢不通！夫受天之元命必與天下自新，其大赦天下。以建平二年爲太初元將元年。號曰陳聖劉太平皇帝。漏刻以百二十爲度。布告天下，使明知之。"(同上)

這也是受命連改制的。但所改的制只見"漏刻以百二十爲度"一事，不知道還有別的沒有。夏賀良所云"得道不得行，咎殃且亡，"此"行"字當作世經之"序于行"的"行"字講，即指五德之運。但哀帝的詔書上沒有說，不知是否記載的疏漏。

哀帝受命改制，夏賀良等達到了心願，這是何等可喜的事。不幸他們所許給哀帝的利益絲毫沒有着落，而他們一經得勢就忘形起來，弄得不久又失敗了。李尋傳云：

後月餘，上疾自若。賀良等復欲妄變政事；大臣爭以爲不可許。賀良等奏言，"大臣皆不知天命，宜退丞相御史，以解光李尋輔政。"

上以其言亡驗，遂下賀良等吏，而下詔曰，"………待詔賀良等建言，改元易號，增益漏刻，可以永安國家。朕信道不篤，過聽其言，幾爲百姓獲福；卒無嘉應，久旱爲災。以問賀良等，對當復改制度；皆背經誼，違聖制，不合時宜。……… 賀良等反道惑衆，

> 姦態當窮竟!」皆下獄。……… 賀良等皆伏誅。尋及解光減死一等,徙敦煌郡。(同上)

這一齣再受命的滑稽劇就這樣地完了。這個運動大約有二十年的歷史,有一月餘的成功。

在這一件事情之外,哀帝時尚有一事也是值得一說的。漢書佞幸傳云:

> 董賢,…………為人美麗自喜。哀帝望見,說其儀貌,…………拜為黃門郎,由是始幸。……… 賢寵愛日甚,…………出則參乘,入御左右,…………常與上臥起。…………
>
> 上舅丁明………為大司馬,亦任職,頗害賢寵。……… 上寖重賢,欲極其位,…………遂以賢代明為大司馬,冊曰,「………往悉爾心,統辟元戎,…………允執其中!……」 是時賢年二十二。……… 咸(蕭咸)私謂閎(王閎)曰,「董公為大司馬,冊文言『允執其中,』此乃堯禪舜之文,非三公故事。長老見者莫不心懼。此豈家人子所能堪邪!」………
>
> 後上置酒麒麟殿,賢父子親屬宴飲,王閎………在側。上有酒所,從容視賢笑曰,「吾欲法堯禪舜,何如?」閎進曰,「天下乃高皇帝天下,非陛下之有也。陛下承宗廟,當傳子孫於無窮。統業至重,天子無戲言!」 上默然不說,左右皆恐。於是遣閎出,後不復侍宴。……… 後數月,哀帝崩。

可見哀帝為了愛幸董賢,心欲禪讓,既見之於冊文,復出之於口語。眭弘蓋寬饒們所為流血以求者,至是乃有實現的希

望。但因哀帝不久便死,又只成了一句空話。

我們看了這一章,可以知道:自武帝好大喜功,弄得四海困窮之後,人民已不願漢家再居天位。眭弘蓋寬饒提出禪位賢人的辦法,漢帝大怒,他們都被殺了。災異說者從歷數上指出漢家的大厄運,又把一切稍失常態的物事都說成了漢運衰微的徵象,甚而至於說漢已無望,想去嚇倒漢帝;但要漢帝自承爲極亂則可,要他退位則不可。民間雖有種種革命受命的流言,但也沒有一個勇夫挺身而起,自居爲新受命的天子而把漢帝趕掉。甘忠可等雖想出調和的辦法,請漢帝再受命,但結果只掙得曇花的一現,白送掉幾條性命。哀帝雖有禪位董賢的意思,但天年不永,又未得如願。"漢室將亡,賤人將興,"在武帝後九十年中,自庶人以至於天子,已成了公同的信念了,但老不實現。進旣不可,退又不能,大家悉在此殭局之下徘徊觀望。

上兩章裡,講世經以前的古史系統,講西漢之季的人心不安的現象,占了許多篇幅,似乎軼出了五德終始說的範圍之外。但我們要明白相勝的五德終始說何以會得變成相生的五德終始說,簡單的五德系統何以會得變成複雜的五德系統,實在不可不對於這個題目以外的情形周覽一遍。一件事情是不會無端發生的,必有許多的積因。這些積因日在鼓盪之中,一遇到適當的機會就發洩出來。發洩的力量有大小,小發洩則把現狀作小改變,大發洩則把現狀作大改變。現在世經之說把騶衍的五德終始說澈底改造,而又爲後世所遵用,是其所積之因必多,且必醞釀已久,達到成熟的

地步,故其發洩之力甚大而維持之力甚强。易傳曰,"臣弒其君,子弒其父,非一朝一夕之故,其所由來者漸矣,由辨之不早辨也,"就說得這個道理。

當騶衍創立五德終始說時,古史系統上至黃帝而止,所以他的五德系統就從黃帝算起。但以後古史系統愈放愈長,而五德系統固定不變,那就不能使人滿意了。只因秦皇漢武已把它用作國典,未可隨了民意改變,沒有法子。然而董仲舒作三代改制質文篇,三代以上就推出八代,已與世經相似。自董仲舒到西漢末約一百年,自然這新的古史系統更確立了,世經的作者即欲不用而亦勢有不可了。

西漢之季,國政不綱,皇位已搖動,羣情也浮動。依照那時的學說,實應有新受命的天子起來,否則漢室也應再受命。但這個問題在五德上作何處置呢?眭弘說,"漢爲堯後,有傳國之運,"那麼,堯是什麼德呢?這受禪的天子又應爲什麼德呢?甘忠可所得的天帝書是"赤精子之讖,"赤爲火德之色,是不是說漢家再受命時應爲火德呢?谷永說,"彗星,土精所生;兵亂作矣,厥期不久,"是不是說繼漢而起的應爲土德呢?那時的材料傳下來的太少,這些問題固然不能决定,但即在這些零碎話裏已可窺見大家正在猜測新天子的五德之運,所以有志于求天位的人也要迎合羣衆心理,自居于大家想望的某一德中纔對。

康長素先生(有爲)的新學僞經考,崔觶甫先生(適)的史記探源,抉出劉歆作僞之迹,使學術界中認識新代的學術及其改變漢學的情狀,自然是巨眼燭照;但他們把這個改變的責任一起歸在劉歆身上,以爲都是他想出來,造出來的,未免把

他的本領看得太大。劉歆固然得到改變學術的機會與權勢,且實有許多爲所竄亂或肌造的文件,但倘使前無所因,則無源之水,其涸也可立而待也。惟其所改變的東西在漢代已醞釀了二百年(如古史系統),或一百年(如漢帝應讓國說),大家耳濡目染已久,一旦逢到機會,取而易之,自然不致成爲大問題,使人疑駭 故外表雖爲突變,而實際則仍爲漸變。但劉歆所易,有醞釀成熟的,也有不成熟的,有順從民意的,也有出以獨斷的,所以有許多太新的東西就不能馬上取得一般人的信仰而屢受攻擊了(事實見下數章)。在這一點上,我很佩服錢賓四先生(穆),他的劉向歆父子年譜(燕京學報第七期),尋出許多替新代學術開先路的漢代材料,使我草此文時得到很多的方便。

在上兩章裏,我們已認清楚世經的歷史系統的由來(世經以前的古史系統)和改變鄒衍的五德終始說的動力(漢帝應讓國說及再受命說),於是我們再在下數章裏看編排世經的方式(五行相生說,漢爲火德說,漢爲堯後說,王莽的自本……)如何。

X.　五行相生說

五行的關係,我們在前邊只講了"相勝。"相勝的意義,我們一想就想得出來。例如拿了一柄斧跑到樹林裏砍下一棵樹,這就叫做"金勝木。"又如拿了一盆水澆滅一爐火,這就叫做"水勝火。"這是原始的相勝說。白虎通云:

> 五行所以相害者,天地之性衆勝寡,故水勝火也。精勝堅,故火勝金。剛勝柔,故金勝木。專勝散,故木勝土。實勝虛,故土勝水也。

這是進步的相勝說,因爲已經說得很抽象了。

自從有了五行相勝說,就引起了五德終始說,把五行相勝的原理用之於朝代的遞嬗上。這因下一代"革"上一代的命,正與五行中某一行"勝"某一行相像。

但朝代的遞嬗原有兩種方式,一是革命,一是禪讓;革命如商周,禪讓如虞夏。五行相勝的原理可以適用於商周的革命,但不可適用於虞夏的禪讓。以前的五德終始說,黃帝之後便是夏,這個牴牾還不顯明。但經了西漢人的宣傳,古史的系統既甚伸展,向來說爲一帝的又往往說成一代,那就顯出了支吾的樣子。例如史記中說"神農氏世衰,"即是承認神農爲一代名,在這一代中,首帝稱神農氏,末帝也稱神農氏。又如董仲舒的三代改制質文篇中說,"絀三之前曰五帝,帝迭首一色,"而記湯文王的改制之事云:

〔湯〕絀唐謂之帝堯,以神農爲赤帝。

〔文王〕絀虞謂之帝舜,以軒轅爲黃帝,推神農以爲九皇。

是他認堯爲湯之前四代(合本代而言,下同),神農爲湯之前八代;舜爲文王之前四代,軒轅爲文王之前八代,神農爲文王之前九代。照他的話,我們可以畫出一個"周代的古史系統表"來:

周 ←	殷 ←	夏 ←	虞 ←	唐 ←	帝嚳 ←	顓頊 ←	軒轅 ←	神農
(一代)	(二代)	(三代)	(四代)	(五代)	(六代)	(七代)	(八代)	(九代)
三王			五帝					九皇

在這個表中,可見他已把九皇五帝與三王同等看待。三王爲三代,九皇五帝即爲六代。這和騶衍時的古史系統,黃帝以後即繼以夏的,大不同了。

軒轅之與神農,照史記說是盡臣節的。後來軒轅作天子,乃出於諸侯的公推,非由革命。顓頊,帝嚳,據帝繫等說,是黃帝的孫和曾孫,同一皇族,也不必革命。帝堯是帝嚳的兒子,更不必說。舜受堯的禪讓,禹受舜的禪讓,止有祥和,毫無克伐。所以這個古史系統旣立,以前的五德終始說只有倒壞,因爲五德終始說的基礎是建築於五行相勝說之上的,而在這一個系統中,除了殷對夏,周對殷之外,無所用其相勝。這怎麼辦呢?

歷史系統和五行系統不能合拍,在漢代人的眼光看來,是多麼可以發愁的事。

不要慌罷! 五行系統除了相勝說之外還有相生說,歷史系統何嘗不可改用了相生說以濟相勝說之窮呢!

五行相生說,始見于董仲舒書(春秋繁露第五十八篇爲五行相勝,第五十九篇爲五行相生)。他道:

> 天地之氣合而爲一,分爲陰陽,判爲四時,列爲五行。行者行也,其行不同,故謂之五行。五行者五官也,比相生而間相勝也。…………
>
> 東方者木;…………木生火。南方者火;………火生土。中央者土;…………土生金。西方者金;………金生水。北方者水,…………水生木。

這段話雖明白,但他只言了相生而不言其所以相生,使人讀了不能有很深的認識。五行大義引白虎通云:

> 木生火者,木性溫煖伏其中,鑽灼而出,故生火。火生土者,火熱故能焚木,木焚而成灰,灰即土也,故火生土。土生金者,金居石依山津潤而生,聚土成山,山必生石,故土生金。金生水者,少陰之氣溫潤流澤,銷金亦爲水,所以山雲而從潤,故金生水。水生木者,因水潤而能生,故水生木。

這把五行所以相生之故說得很透澈了。

此外,還有易說卦傳中的一章也是用了八卦的方位來說明五行相生的原理的。其文如下:

> 帝出乎震,齊乎巽,相見乎離,致役乎坤,說言乎兌,戰乎乾,勞乎坎,成言乎艮。
>
> 萬物出乎震,——震,東方也。齊乎巽,——巽,東南也;齊也者,言萬物之潔齊也。離也者,明也,萬物皆相見,南方之卦也,——聖人南面而聽天下,嚮明而治,蓋取諸此也。坤也者,地也,萬物皆致養焉,故曰"致役乎坤。"兌,正秋也,萬物之所說也,故曰"說言乎兌。"戰乎乾——乾,西北之卦也,言陰陽相薄也。坎者,水也,正北方之卦也,勞卦也,萬物之所歸也,故曰"勞乎坎。"艮,東北之卦也,萬物之所成終而成始也,故曰"成言乎艮。"

讀這一章,很可見出,下一段是解釋上一段之文的。只有上段說"帝出乎震,"下段說"萬物出乎震,"其言"出"雖同,而所出之物卻不同。又看它說震爲東方,巽爲東南方,離爲南方,乾爲西北方,坎爲正北方,艮爲東北方,可見作者是把八卦分配四方四隅的。坤和兌雖未說出其方位,但坤爲西南,兌爲

正西,循文讀去自然知道。所以這個方位是從正東起,歷東南,正南,西南,正西,西北,正北,而至東北終,很淸楚。

易說卦傳是什麼時候箸作的呢? 據一般人的見解,則十翼爲孔子所作,說卦爲十翼之一,自當出孔子的手筆。但論衡正說篇云:

> 孝宣皇帝之時,河內女子發老屋,得逸易,禮,尙書各一篇,奏之。宣帝下示博士,然後易,禮,尙書各益一篇。

在這一段裏,雖沒有說明增益的逸易是哪一篇,而隋書經籍志却指爲說卦。文云:

> 及秦焚書,周易獨以卜筮得存,唯失說卦三篇。後河內女子得之。

論衡說是一篇,爲什麼隋書說爲三篇? 這因序卦,雜卦文少,合之則與說卦爲一篇,分之則與說卦爲三篇。(韓康伯注本及唐石經猶以序卦雜卦附說卦卷內)。 漢人所說的發屋得古書事凡有三次,伏生一次,魯共王一次,河內女子一次;但俱不可信,見康長素先生新學僞經考。

今單就宣帝時河內女子發得說卦一事說。康氏云:

> 法言問神篇,"易損其一也,雖惷知闕焉,"則西漢前易無說卦可知。楊雄王充嘗見西漢舊本故知之。說卦與孟喜卦氣圖合,其出漢時僞託無疑。(僞經考卷三上)

予按,五行與八卦本是兩個不相容的宇宙律。五行家看宇宙的一切是五種物質及其能力所演成,這五種東西的名字是"水,火,木,金,土。" 八卦家則看宇宙間的一切是八種物質

及其能力所演成，這八種東西的名字是"乾，坤，震，巽，坎，離，艮，兌，"其具體之物即是"天，地，雷，風，水，火，山，澤。"這如何合得攏來？但說卦傳卻異想天開，把這兩個宇宙律合攏來了！我們只要看說卦傳中這一章的後面所說的：

乾爲金。坤爲地（土）。巽爲木。離爲火。

坎爲水。艮爲山（土）。

可見金，木，火，水，土五行已具備於八卦之中。我們若把說卦傳的系統和董仲舒的五行相生的系統合列一表，當如下式：

春秋繁露	東		南	中央		西		北
	木		火	土		金		水
說卦傳	東	東南	南	西南	東北	西	西北	北
	震	巽（爲木）	離（爲火）	坤（爲地）	艮（爲山）	兌	乾（爲金）	坎（爲水）

這雖有兩卦（震，兌）未言其屬性，但東爲木，南爲火，西爲金，北爲水，在這一點上，五行與八卦已相一致。唐李鼎祚周易集解引干寶易注，云：


〔震，六二，震來厲〕干寶曰，六二木爻，震之身也。

則震之爲木可知。火珠林載八卦六位圖，云：

乾，屬金。坤，屬土。震，屬木。巽，屬木。坎，屬水。離，屬火。艮，屬土。兌，屬金。

至是而八卦即是五行了。八卦雖有八個，但以乾兌合爲金，坤艮合爲土，震巽合爲木，也只算是五個了。現在根據以上

諸說,總繪一圖,以見它們合爲一家的情狀及其終始的次序:



看了這個圖,我們可以知道,說卦傳上的八卦方位和五行相生說竟是一模一樣的,他們都是:

1 在五行上,以木,火,土,金,水爲次。

2 在方位上,以東,南,中,西,北爲次。

這種易學,把八卦遷就五行到如此地步,一定要在五行學說極昌盛的時候纔能發生。說卦既出於漢宣帝時,恐怕就是漢宣帝時人所作的吧?

自從八卦與五行合爲一物,而說卦傳上又言"帝出乎震"(這"帝"字,我以爲原是"萬物"二字,因爲要創造一個新的歷史系統,故改爲此字以張大之;今姑仍之),於是要把五行相勝說的歷史系統改到五行相生說的下面去的就可利用這一點了。漢書郊祀志贊云:

> 劉向父子以爲"帝出於震,"故包羲氏始受木德。其後以母傳子,終而復始。自神農黃帝下歷唐虞三代而漢得火焉。故高祖始起,神母夜號,著赤帝之符。旗章遂赤,自得天統矣。

又荀悅漢紀一高祖紀云:

> 及至劉向父子,乃推五行之運,以子承母,始自伏羲;以迄於漢,宜爲火德。其序之也,以爲易稱"帝出乎震,"故太皞始出乎震,爲木德,號曰伏羲氏。

他們都明白指出,創造這個新的歷史系統的人是劉向父子,劉向父子所持的理由是易傳上的"帝出乎震;"這比了我們以前知道的五德終始說差異了多少?

漢書律歷志云:

> 至孝成世,劉向總六歷,列是非,作五紀論。向子歆究其微眇,作三統歷及譜。

可惜五紀論現在不傳,不知道劉向對於這個問題的見解究竟怎樣。三統歷則因班固收入律歷志之故,我們還能彀看見裏邊所引的世經,證實了班固和荀悅的兩段記載。

我們在這一章裏,可以知道,到了漢代,因古史系統的伸展和所伸展的古史的不適於使用五行相勝的方式,故騶衍的五德終始說必須有一度澈底的改造。這澈底改造的口

號是說卦傳上的"帝出乎震,"而說卦傳是一篇五行相生化的八卦說。

XI. 漢爲火德說及秦爲金德說

在班固和荀悅的兩段記載中所引起的問題,別的且放在下面再講,現在先把漢爲火德的問題提出討論。

我們在上邊,知道漢高祖以作北畤祀黑帝之故而自承爲水德,張蒼亦以河決金堤之故而定漢爲水德。到文帝時,纔有賈誼公孫臣們說漢是土德。到武帝時,纔依了土德改制。如今卻說:

> 高祖始起,神母夜號,著赤帝之符,旗章遂赤,自得天統矣。

豈非太突兀了? 要是高祖始起時已著赤帝之符,旗章已用赤色,則漢之爲火德在開國時已昭著了,已確定了,爲什麼開國之後歷數十年,水德和土德還是一個爭論的問題呢? 爲什麼在爭論之際,沒有人舉出神母夜號的故事,說漢之爲火德已前定了呢? 爲什麼武帝的改制竟實定爲土德呢? 現在漢初的歷史中全沒有漢爲火德的痕跡,卻待劉向父子尋出了"帝出乎震"的前提,又尋出了"以母傳子"的方式之後,始回想起開國時曾有"神母夜號,著赤帝之符"的事來,這還能哄騙誰?

我們即此可以知道,漢之爲火德,非確有赤帝之符,乃是因爲伏羲始出於震,爲木德,從此排下去,到漢便是火了。在新的五德終始系統中,漢之不得不爲火,正如在舊的系統中漢之不得不爲土一樣。黃龍見於成紀的符瑞,是公孫臣主

張漢爲土德之後纔出現的。那麼，神母夜號的符瑞，自然應當待劉向父子發明了漢爲火德的主張之後而纔出現，可以無疑了。

這一件神母夜號的故事，我們鈔出來看一遍：

> 高祖被酒，夜徑澤中，令一人行前。行前者還報曰，"前有大蛇當徑，願還！"高祖醉曰，"壯士行，何畏！"乃前，拔劍斬蛇；分爲兩，道開。行數里，醉困臥。後人來至蛇所，有一老嫗夜哭。人問"嫗何哭？"嫗曰，"人殺吾子。"人曰，"嫗子何爲見殺？"嫗曰，"吾子，白帝子也，化爲蛇當道。今者赤帝子斬之，故哭。"人乃以嫗爲不誠，欲苦之。嫗因忽不見。後人至，高祖覺；告高祖。高祖乃心獨喜，自負；諸從者日益畏之。（漢書高帝紀。史記高祖本紀也有此事，但司馬遷時不能有此故事，必出僞竄。）

這一段故事爲了改造漢室的受命之符而出現，不消說得。但又有一個新問題應當討論了。漢之爲赤帝子，在新的五德終始系統中應當如此固無疑義（因爲從伏羲木排下去，神農火，黃帝土，顓頊金，嚳水，堯木，舜火，夏土，商金，周水，秦木，漢自當爲火），但爲什麼秦會成了白帝子呢？秦不是自居於水德的嗎？西漢定爲土德，不是也承認秦爲水德的嗎？水之色黑，爲什麼秦竟成了白帝子？白爲金德之色，爲什麼秦是金德？五行相生之序，生火者爲木，秦既列在漢的火德之前，爲什麼不改成了木德？

這個緣故很不易解釋。據我看來，這是仍用五行相勝說的。因爲秦爲漢滅，火勝金，漢既爲火德，秦自當爲金德了。

讀者們看了這個解釋,不免要問:漢之爲火德是由相生說來的,在相生說的系統中,如何容得下相勝? 對於這個駁詰,實在無法解答。我想,這或者是剛在改變五德系統,尚未成爲定論的時候所出;一經沿用,後來就沒法消滅了。或者那時曾有一個參用相勝和相生說的系統,看其得國以禪讓則用相生的系統次之,若其得國以征伐則用相勝的系統次之。只因那時的五德史說的材料傳下來的太少,我們無從判別。

如果有人說,"白帝子"的"白"字安知非本是"黑"字或他色字,後來傳訛的,你何必過信任它呢? 我說,不對,這確是"白"字,因爲還有他處的文字可以作證:

> 秦襄公既侯,居西陲,自以爲主少皞之神,作西畤,祠白帝。
>
> 櫟陽雨金,秦獻公自以爲得金瑞,故作畦畤櫟陽而祀白帝。(以上二條俱見漢書郊祀志。史記封禪書也有之,但司馬遷時不能有此說,亦必出僞竄,理由詳下。)
>
> 秦失金鏡,魚目人珠。(太平御覽八十六引尚書緯考靈曜)
>
> 有人雄起戴玉英,祈,且失籥,亡其金虎。(太平御覽八十七引尚書緯帝命驗。又引鄭玄注曰,"'祈,'讀曰'晢,'白也,謂之秦也。'且失籥',戶將開。'金虎',白獸之長,喩於秦君"。)

這些記載中,"西陲,""西畤"的"西,""雨金,""金瑞,""金鏡,""金虎"的"金,"和"白帝"的"白"聯成一個系統,確與五行說十分合拍。但秦襄公在春秋前(西元前七七七——七六六),秦獻公亦在戰國初(前三八四——三六二)、恐怕那時五行

之說還沒有起來呢！ 而且秦國倘使有了這些故事，秦之爲金德亦甚明白矣，爲什麼還要推本於秦文公的獲黑龍而自居於水德呢？ 恐怕襄公獻公的"自以爲"就是西漢末年的人的"自以爲"吧？

我說這段話，或者有人不服，以爲秦襄公獻公的作西畤畦畤而祀白帝，史記封禪書明載之，秦本紀及年表亦明載之。你說"司馬遷時不能有此說，必出僞竄，"請拿證據來！ 我對于這個質問，將答說，證據是有的，就出在封禪書上。 按封禪書記秦所祠的上帝，有下列諸條：

> 秦襄公既侯，居西陲，自以爲主少皞之神，作西畤，祠白帝。 其牲用騮駒，黃牛，羝羊各一云。
>
> 秦文公夢黃蛇自天下屬地，其口止于鄜衍。文公問史敦。 敦曰，"此上帝之徵，君其祠之！" 於是作鄜畤，用三牲，郊祭白帝焉。
>
> 秦宣公作密畤於渭南，祭青帝。
>
> 秦靈公作吳陽上畤，祭黃帝；作下畤，祭炎帝。
>
> 櫟陽雨金，秦獻公自以爲得金瑞，故作畦畤櫟陽而祀白帝。

照它所說，秦國的上帝祠共有六處，其分配如下：

甲，白帝——1. 西畤，襄公作；
　　　　　2. 鄜畤，文公作；
　　　　　3. 畦畤，獻公作。
乙，青帝—— 密畤，宣公作。
丙，黃帝—— 上畤，靈公作。
丁，炎帝（卽赤帝）—— 下畤，靈公作。

可見青帝,黃帝,炎帝都只一祠,而白帝凡有三祠。及漢高祖起,封禪書記他的事道:

> 漢興,高祖……二年,東擊項籍而還入關,問"故秦時上帝祠何帝也?"對曰,"四帝,有白,青,黃,赤之祠。"高祖曰,"吾聞天有五帝;而有四,何也?"莫知其說。於是高祖曰,"吾知之矣,乃待吾而具五也!"乃立黑帝祠,命曰北畤。

此祠一立,秦地的上帝祠又多出了一個:

> 戊,黑帝——北畤,漢高祖作。

大約秦公祠白,青,黃,赤帝時,只是把不同的顏色一次一次地增加;到漢高祖時,五行說的勢力大了,纔以爲既有四帝不容缺了一帝,既有白青黃赤四色不容缺了黑色,所以更立一個北畤而高祖亦遂自以爲得到了水德之瑞。

照這樣講,秦地的上帝祠在秦共有六個,在漢共有七個。但封禪書卻說:

> 秦幷天下,……唯雍四畤上帝爲尊。故雍四畤,春以爲歲禱,因泮凍,秋涸凍,冬賽祠。
>
> 孝文帝……卽位十三年,……有司議增雍五畤,車各一乘,駕被具。
>
> 黃龍見成紀,……於是夏四月,文帝始郊見雍五畤祠。
>
> 新垣平以望氣見上,言長安東北有神氣成五采,……宜立祠上帝以合符應。於是作渭陽五帝廟,……祠所用及儀亦如雍五畤。
>
> 今上(武帝)……郊雍,獲一角獸,若麟然。有司

曰,"陛下肅祗郊祀,上帝報享。………"於是以薦五時。

這眞是很奇怪的,秦時的上帝祠只有"雍四畤"而無六畤,漢時又只有"雍五畤"而無七畤。再有兩個到了哪裏去了?又爲什麼獨缺了這兩個呢?僞竄的人也曾見到這一層,所以插說:

〔秦幷天下〕………西畤畦畤祠如其故,上不親往。

〔孝文帝………即位十三年,………有司議增雍五畤,路車各一乘,駕被具〕西畤畦畤禺車各一乘,禺馬四匹,駕被具。

他以爲西畤畦畤的地位次於其他諸畤一等,故上不親往而祭品亦差("禺,"即俑偶之"偶,"非眞物)。因此之故,就不算在四畤或五畤之內了。可是,同樣的祭祀上帝之畤,爲什麼只有西畤畦畤的地位低一等呢?西畤爲襄公所立,是秦國的第一個畤,地位應當獨尊,爲什麼反低了呢?畦畤因獻公得金瑞而立,在許多畤中它最有符瑞的意味,爲什麼它的地位也低了呢?如果說,秦已幷天下,不再偏居西陲了,秦已定水德,不再希罕金瑞了,所以把這兩畤看作不重要,那麼,秦文公所立的鄜畤也是祠白帝的,在五行的系統上,白帝原是管着西方和金瑞的,爲什麼鄜畤的地位不因此而降低一等呢?

再有一個證據也足以證明西畦兩畤之爲僞竄。照他們所講,這兩畤在漢時是和其他五畤一樣地祭祀,不過祭品較差而已。但成帝建始元年(西元前三二),匡衡奏請罷雍五畤,云:

王者各以其禮制事天地,非因異世所立而繼

之。今雍鄜,密,上,下時,本秦侯各以其意所立,非禮之所載術也。漢興之初,儀制未及定,即因秦故祠,復立北畤。今既稽古,建立天地之禮,郊見上帝,青,赤,白,黃,黑五方之帝皆畢陳,各有位饌,祭祀備具。諸侯所妄造,王者不當長遵。及北畤,未定時所立,不宜復修。(漢書郊祀志)

他請罷的畤,只說秦侯以意所立的鄜,密,上,下四畤,和漢未定天下時所立的北畤,放過了西畤,畦畤。難道他要廢去五畤而獨留這兩個畤嗎?這大足證明這兩個畤本來沒有,所以他不說了。

於此,我們可以明瞭,青黃赤三帝所以只有一畤而白帝獨有三畤者,這原因就在西畦兩畤是西漢末年的人造出來的。他們所以造出這兩個畤的緣故,因爲漢是火德,被火德所勝的應爲金,故秦爲金德,故秦有金德的符瑞(櫟陽雨金),故秦首祀金德的上帝(少皞之神)。凡秦本紀,十二諸侯年表,六國表,封禪書中關於西畤畦畤的記載都是有了"赤帝子斬白帝子"的故事之後插進去的。因爲是插進去的,故務求周密,不像密畤上畤等,各篇中或載或不載,反不一律了。

郊祀志贊說,"高祖………著赤帝之符,旗章遂赤,"這一件事是本紀中所未見的。故顏師古注引鄧展(三國魏人)說云:

向父子雖有此議,時不施行。至光武建武二年,乃用火德,色尙赤耳。

足徵這一說很不能爲人所信。但封禪書中卻有漢初施行"色尙赤"的記載:

高祖………遂以十月至灞上,與諸侯平咸陽,立

爲漢王。因以十月爲年首,而色尙赤。

於是夏四月,〔文帝〕始郊見雍五畤祠,衣皆上赤。

這與下面說的:

十一月辛巳朔旦冬至昧爽,天子始郊拜太一,朝朝日,夕夕月,…………而衣上黃。(武帝元鼎五年)

天子………封太山下東方,如郊祠太一之禮。………禪太山下阯東北肅然山,如祭后土禮。天子皆親拜見,衣上黃,而盡用樂焉。(武帝元封元年)

是何等地衝突呵!

漢旣以居火德而色尙赤,同樣,秦亦當以居金德而色尙白。是以封禪書云:

秦幷天下,…………三年一郊。……… 通權火,拜於咸陽之旁,而衣上白,其用如經祠云。

XII. 漢爲堯後說

夏以前的歷史,我不知道了。若商,在湯之前有契,有相土,有王亥,王恆,有上甲微等。到湯滅夏時,國勢久已强盛了。周,在武王克商以前,有公亶父,有公劉,有太王,有王季,文王,也在岐山之下經營了許多年了。秦,自秦仲立國,訖於始皇成帝業,依史記的記載,已有六百二十三年的歷史。所以漢以前的朝代,都是從小國變成大國,從大國變成共主,沒有以平民的資格而作天子的。

但平民作天子的傳說,在戰國時卻很流行。例如堯典中寫的舜,起初只是民間的一個鰥夫,後來由四岳之薦而登庸,終於陟帝位。故孟子說,"匹夫而有天下者,德必若舜,禹。"

那時儒墨兩家的主張,誰有最好的德,誰就應居最高的位。

這種想像到了秦末果眞實現,漢高祖以平民登帝位了!雖則他的道德是否高出於一切人還是問題,但他開創一個古今未有的局面這是無疑的。

漢高祖以平民作皇帝,不是可羞的事,乃是可誇的。司馬遷於秦漢之際月表序中論之云:

> 昔虞夏之興,積善累功數十年,德洽百姓,攝行政事,合之於天,然後在位。湯武之王,乃由契后稷修仁行義十餘世。……… 秦起襄公,章於文繆,獻孝之後,稍以蠶食六國,百有餘載,至始皇乃能幷冠帶之倫。以德若彼,用力若此,蓋一統若斯之難也。
>
> 秦既稱帝,患兵革不休以有諸侯也,於是無尺土之封。……… 然王跡之興,起於閭巷;合從討伐,軼於三代。鄉秦之禁,適足以資賢者,爲驅除難耳。……… 此乃傳之所謂"大聖"乎! 豈非天哉! 豈非天哉! 非大聖孰能當此受命而帝者乎!

這些贊歎之辭,很能代表一般西漢人對於漢高祖的信仰。

因爲高祖起於閭巷不足爲羞,反可使人深信他是一個天命的大聖,所以他成就了帝業之後不曾爲自己的門第裝點。司馬遷作高祖本紀時也就直書其事,云:

> 高祖,沛豐邑中陽里人,姓劉氏,字季。父曰太公;母曰劉媼。

他的祖父是誰,已不能知道了,曾祖以上更不必提了。其實,就是"父曰太公,母曰劉媼"也何嘗是眞的名字。"太公"只是尊稱。例如史記齊太公世家云:

> 於是周西伯獵，果遇太公(呂尙)於渭之陽。與語，大說，曰，"自吾先君太公曰，'當有聖人適周，周以興'，子眞是邪？吾太公望子久矣！"故號之曰"太公望，"載與俱歸。

這一件事固然不是眞的歷史，但足見秦漢時人確有"太公"一個稱謂，故謂齊太公之名是由周文王的太公盼望他而來的。(這太公，是王季呢？是太王呢？如指王季，則太公爲父之尊稱。如指太王，則太公爲祖之尊稱。)至劉媼，則直是"劉家老太太"的意思，尙不可知其母家的姓(除非她是"劉劉氏")。就是高祖字季，實在也是他的排行，並非特地題出來的(看他的兩兄名伯，仲可知)；所以然之故，只因高祖起於貧賤之家，沒有受過貴族文化的薰陶，一家中人不必有像樣的名和字。至於他們家裏的譜牒，不消說得是沒有。所以漢書禮樂志中所載的郊祀歌，房中歌等，宣揚漢德，誇辭甚多，但終不曾提起高祖的先人來。一比了詩三百篇中的周，魯，商諸頌，各各誇陳其祖德的，眞是大不同了。

想不到過了多少年，漢高祖忽地成了名人的子孫了。漢書眭弘傳中說他上給昭帝的書：

> 先師董仲舒有言，"雖有繼體守文之君，不害聖人之受命。"漢家，堯後，有傳國之運。漢帝宜誰差天下，求索賢人，禪以帝位，而退自封百里，如殷周二王後，以承順天命。

這眞是一句破天荒的話。究竟漢爲堯後，是當時有此世系呢？還是儒者鼓吹堯舜禪讓太動人了，遂使人懸擬此後之易代應爲禪讓，漢旣居於堯的地位，遂聯想爲堯的子孫呢？

這種史料存留太少,我們無從猜測。眭弘是嬴公的弟子,嬴公是董仲舒的弟子,我們姑且假設在那時的春秋學說中曾有漢爲堯後的主張罷。

眭弘既秉承董仲舒們的受命的學說,主張漢帝應效法先祖堯的禪位賢人,自然可認他在春秋學中有所根據。但我們翻看公羊傳及春秋繁露等書,都毫沒有這件事的痕迹。不過,在左傳裏,關於此事,却確有詳細的記載。其文如下:

> 晉人患秦人之用士會也,…………乃使魏壽餘僞以魏叛者,以誘士會。執其帑於晉,使夜逸,請自歸於秦。秦伯許之。履士會之足於朝。秦伯師於河西;魏人在東。壽餘曰,"請東人之能與夫二三有司言者,吾與之先。"使士會。士會辭曰,"晉人,虎狼也;若背其言,臣死,妻子爲戮,無益於君,不可悔也!"秦伯曰,"若背其言,所不歸爾帑者有如河!"乃行。……… 既濟,魏人譟而還。秦人歸其帑。其處者爲劉氏。(文公十三年)

這是說,士會逃在秦國,晉人騙他回來之後,秦人把他的家眷送歸;但還有一部分留在秦國的,就不以士爲氏而以劉爲氏了。又:

> 范宣子曰,"昔匄之祖,自虞以上爲陶唐氏,在夏爲御龍氏,在商爲豕韋氏,在周爲唐杜氏,晉主夏盟爲范氏。"(襄公二十四年)

這是范宣子數自己的氏族系統,說他的家在虞前是陶唐氏,後歷夏商周三代均改氏。范宣子是士會之孫;因爲士會受封於范,遂以范爲氏了。又:

> 蔡墨………對曰，"………有夏孔甲擾於有帝，帝賜之乘龍，河漢各二，各有雌雄，孔甲不能食而未獲豢龍氏。有陶唐氏既衰，其後有劉累，學擾龍於豢龍氏，以事孔甲，能飲食之。夏后嘉之，賜氏曰御龍，以更豕韋之後。龍一雌死，潛醢以食夏后，夏后饗之。既而使求之，懼而遷於魯縣。范氏其後也。"
>
> (昭公二十八年)

這是可以證實范宣子的話的。陶唐氏之後有劉累，已以劉爲氏了。其在夏所以爲御龍氏者，就爲劉累替孔甲豢龍。其處秦所以爲劉氏者，就爲復劉累之舊。

杜預左傳注於"在周爲唐杜氏"條注云：

> 唐，杜，二國名。殷末，豕韋國於唐。周成王滅唐，遷之於杜，爲杜伯。杜伯之子隰叔奔晉，四世及士會，食邑於范氏。

他所以說"唐，杜，二國名，"是根據賈逵注國語所云'武王封堯後爲唐杜二國"來的(正義引)。但既分爲二國，而乃謂成王滅唐，遷之於杜，則又似爲一國然；未詳其實。今姑依賈逵及杜預之說，爲左傳中這三段文字列一世系表(凡世數非直接的，用虛線次之)：

……唐氏

陶唐氏……御龍氏(劉累)……豕韋氏……

……杜氏(杜伯)——隰叔……士會{范氏(在晉者) / 劉氏(在秦者)

這似乎是很尋常的一件事，不值得大驚小怪。但因前端是陶唐氏，陶唐氏爲堯，後端是劉氏，劉氏爲漢，就顯出了"漢爲

堯後"的意義來了。自有此說,而漢家世系爲之伸展極長。史記高祖本紀只說高祖爲沛人,其父曰太公而已,到了東漢班固作漢書時,便不能那樣簡單了。漢書高帝紀贊云:

春秋晉史蔡墨有言,"陶唐氏旣衰,其後有劉累,學擾龍,事孔甲,范氏其後也。" 而大夫范宣子亦曰,"祖自虞以上爲陶唐氏,在夏爲御龍氏,在商爲豕韋氏,在周爲唐杜氏,晉主夏盟爲范氏。" 范氏爲晉士師,魯文公世奔秦,後歸於晉;其處者爲劉氏。

劉向曰,"戰國時,劉氏自秦獲於魏。秦滅魏,遷大梁,都於豐。故周市說雍齒曰,'豐,故梁徙也。'"

是以頌高祖云,"漢帝本系,出自唐帝。降及於周,在秦作劉。涉魏而東遂爲豐公。" 豐公,蓋太上皇父,其遷日淺,墳墓在豐鮮焉。

及高祖即位,置祠祀官,則有秦晉梁荆之巫,世祠天地,綴之以祀,豈不信哉!

由是推之,漢承堯運,德祚已盛。斷蛇著符,旗幟上赤,協於火德。自然之應,得天統矣!

在這一贊裏,把左傳中的三段記事融成一片,而又採劉向之說,說明士會留秦的一系從秦轉魏,又遷於豐。高祖之祖爲豐公,也舉出來了。他所以說"高祖即位,置祠祀官,則有秦,晉,梁,荆之巫,"顏師古引應劭注云:

先人所在之國,悉致祠巫祝,博求神靈之意也。

又引文穎注云:

巫,掌神之位次者也。范氏世仕於晉,故祀祠

有晉巫。范會支庶留秦爲劉氏,故有秦巫。劉氏隨魏都大梁,故有梁巫。後徙豐,豐屬荆,故有荆巫也。

這樣一解釋,於是封禪書中所載的諸國之巫便都爲漢室先人的神靈所依。漢之世系歷代凡六,其先人所在跨國凡四,眞可謂源遠流長了!可是高祖所置的祠祀官尚有九天巫,河巫,南山巫,武帝所置的尚有粤巫,爲什麼就和漢的先人不發生關係了呢?

假使左傳所載都爲信史,則司馬遷一時疏漏,賴劉向班固等查明補正,豈非快事。不幸左傳是一部很有問題的書,其出現頗不光明。經清代幾個今文學家研究,確爲劉歆改頭換面之作(詳下"春秋左氏傳的著作人問題"章)。其材料固有甚早的,亦有甚後的。故此書之染有濃厚的漢代色彩,自無足怪。

但左傳中漢爲堯後的記載,固已不待清代學者提出今古文問題,而早爲經師所不信。東漢初,賈逵云:

五經家皆無以證圖讖明劉氏爲堯後者,而左氏獨有明文。(後漢書賈逵傳)

這就是說:言劉氏爲堯後的只有左傳和圖讖,五經家則從無是說。左傳編於劉歆之手;圖讖起於哀平之間:這一說的來源也就可想而知。

又孔穎達左傳正義云:

炫(隋劉炫)於"處秦爲劉"謂非丘明之筆;"豕韋唐杜"不信元愷(杜預)之言。己之遠祖數自譏訐。(襄二十四年)

可見劉炫寧可自己失掉堯的子孫的光榮,而必指斥"其處

者為劉氏"一語為非左傳的本文。但孔穎達雖笑劉炫的識訐遠祖,實在他自己對於這一語也是不信的。他說:

> 伍員屬其子於齊,使為王孫氏者,知已將死,豫令改族。……… 士會之帑在秦不顯,於會之身復無所辟,傳說"處秦為劉氏,"未知何意言此。討尋上下,其文不類,深疑此句或非本旨。蓋以為漢室初興,損棄古學,左氏不顯於世,先儒無以自申。劉氏從秦徙魏,其源本出劉累,插注此辭,將以媚於世。明帝時,賈逵上疏云,"五經皆無證圖讖明劉氏為堯後者,而左氏獨有明文。" 竊謂前世藉此以求道通,故後引之以為證耳。(文公十三年)

他的意思,以為"其處者為劉氏"一句是本來沒有的。只因漢室初興的時候不重古文學,而左氏為古文,遂致不顯於世;先儒插入此句,見得漢為堯後之文為左氏所獨有,好使君主見了喜歡,讓左氏出頭。他這個假設,由我們看來,有一半對。"其處者為劉氏"之語,插進的痕迹顯然:秦人既歸士會之帑了,為什麼還有"處者,"為什麼處者要改氏? 孔氏說此句出於先儒插注,這是對的。但古文學却非漢室初興時所有,漢為堯後之說亦不能出現於漢初,孔氏這一猜把時代猜早了。

我的意思,以為左傳中這三段文字,魏壽餘誘士會一段除末句外自是不假;至范匄和蔡墨的兩段話則殊不可信,非漢為堯後之說已發生時不會出現。

等到緯書起來,漢為堯後之說早成熟了,所以又有一則新的故事,云:

> 堯之長子監明早死,不得立。監明之子封於

劉。 朱又不肖而弗獲嗣。(尚書中候;古微書引。)

於是劉累之所以氏劉之故也說明了。不但如此,在下面一段裏,漢高祖的父親和母親的名字也出現了。

> 劉媪夢赤鳥如龍,戲己,生執嘉。執嘉妻含始游雒池,赤珠上刻曰,"玉英,吞此者爲王客。"以其年生劉季爲漢王。(春秋緯握成圖;史記高祖本紀正義及御覽皇親部引。)

大家看呵! 劉媪不是漢高祖的母親而是他的祖母了! 然則,太公是他的父親還是他的祖父呢?

綜合以上的記載,我們可以畫出一個"漢爲堯後的世系表"來,結束這宗西漢末,東漢初的公案:

堯—監明—劉氏…劉累…豕韋氏…
　　…唐氏
　　…杜氏(杜伯)—隰叔…士會—劉氏…豐公—執嘉—漢高祖

XIII. 王莽自大司馬做到皇帝的經歷

西漢一代,與外戚相終始。不過當全盛時代,外戚雖強,也不敢推倒皇室。到了元成之際,漢室益衰,大家引領而望新受命的天子出來之情也愈亟,勢燄赫奕的外戚自然起意了。

且說宣帝時廷尉史王禁獻其女政君入掖庭,爲太子奭所幸,生驁(即成帝)。宣帝崩後,太子即位,是爲元帝,驁立爲太子,政君立爲皇后。王禁也封爲陽平侯;他死後,長子鳳嗣位。元帝崩,成帝立,尊皇后爲皇太后,以王鳳爲大司馬大將軍領尚書事,益封五千戶,王氏就興盛了。王鳳專政十一年,

死了;弟王音代其位。王音專政七年,死了;弟王商代其位。王商專政三年,死了;弟王根代其位。綏和元年(西元前八),王根辭職,薦他的姪子王莽自代。綜計成帝一朝(前三二——七),政權始終不出王氏之手。在這漢運已衰的空氣中,王氏就取得了代興的資格。

劉向是漢室的忠臣,看見這種情形,生氣得很。他曾上封事極諫道:

> 今王氏一姓,乘朱輪華轂者二十三人。……… 大將軍秉事用權,五侯驕奢僭盛,…………行汙而寄治,身私而託公。依東宮之尊,假甥舅之親,以為威重。尚書,九卿,州牧,郡守,皆出其門,筦執樞機,朋黨比周。……… 游談者助之說,執政者為之言。排擯宗室,孤弱公族。……… 內有管蔡之萌,外假周公之論。兄弟據重,宗族磐互。歷上古至秦漢,外戚僭貴未有如王氏者也。………
>
> 物盛必有非常之變先見,其為人微象。孝昭帝時,冠石立於泰山,仆柳起於上林,而孝宣帝即位。今王氏先祖墳墓在濟南者,其梓柱生枝葉,扶疏上出屋,根垂地中。雖立石起柳,無以過此之明也。事勢不兩大,王氏與劉氏亦且不並立。……… 陛下為人子孫,守持宗廟,而令國祚移於外親,降為皂隸,縱不為身,奈宗廟何!(漢書劉向傳)

漢書中未記此疏年月,但通鑑則載於陽朔二年(前二三)。如果司馬光是有所據的,那還是成帝即位後十年內的事呢。

在那時,王氏已經是"朋黨比周,宗族磐互"了,已經有"游談者爲之說,"且"假周公之論"了,其祖墓上已有梓柱的祥瑞了,在事勢上已經"與劉氏不並立"而使劉向直言"國祚移於外親"了。所以王氏的篡漢,是前定的事實,所不可知者,是何人行篡位的大典及其篡位的方式將如何而已。

王莽是王太后的姪子,但因他的父親曼早死,沒有封侯。那時他的兄弟輩都以輿馬聲色佚游相高,他獨孤貧恭儉,師事沛郡陳參,受禮經,勤身博學,被服如儒生。他的叔父王商覺得他有學行,上書願分戶邑封他,遂於永始元年(前一六)封爲新都侯,國南陽新野之都鄉千五百戶。他爵位愈尊,節操愈謙,名譽極好。他繼王根爲大司馬二年,成帝崩,無子,以元帝庶孫欣嗣位,是爲哀帝。哀帝即位後,自有他的外家,所以丁傅諸家起來當權,王莽退處了六年。哀帝崩,王太后即日至未央宮,收取璽綬,遣使者馳召莽,復拜爲大司馬,迎立九歲的中山王爲皇帝,是爲平帝。從此以後,王莽的政權就鞏固了。

王莽二次得權之後,漢書說他:

> 於是附順者拔擢,忤恨者誅滅。王舜王邑爲腹心。甄豐甄邯主擊斷。平晏領機事。劉歆典文章。孫建爲爪牙。豐子尋,歆子棻,涿郡崔發,南陽陳崇,皆以材能幸於莽。莽色厲而言方,欲有所爲,微見風采。黨與承其指意而顯奏之。莽稽首涕泣,固推讓焉。上以惑太后,下用示信於衆庶。

因爲王莽有了這樣一個堅固的團體,所以他能發辦起許多新事業來,使得他的名望日高,得到民衆的熱烈的信仰。

平帝即位的第一年(西元一),他就示意益州塞外蠻夷,自

稱越裳氏,重譯至漢廷,獻白雉一,黑雉二。他爲什麽要這樣呢? 因爲在尙書大傳裏有下面一段話:

> 交趾之南,有越裳國。周公居攝六年,制禮作樂,天下和平。越裳以三象重譯而獻白雉。………成王以歸周公。公曰,"………吾何以獲此賜也?"其使請曰,"吾受命吾國之黃耇,曰'久矣天之無別風淮雨("烈風淫雨"之誤),意者中國有聖人乎? 有則盍往朝之!'"(御覽七百八十五引)

他爲要自比於周公,故重演這越裳氏重譯而獻白雉的佳話。於是羣臣盛陳莽功德,致周成白雉之瑞千載同符。他們說,"周公及身而託號於周,莽宜賜號曰安漢公,益戶疇爵邑。"王莽謙讓數四,終於受了。這是他二次得政後的第一次升級。

我們看本篇第九章,可以知道西漢之季是災異說極盛的時代,西漢的國運就被這災異說打擊得奄奄欲絕。現在王莽得政,卻有祥瑞來了,這是民衆的視聽上的一個極大的改變,足以喚起他們的光明的希望的。可是以前的災異說是漢受其殃,現在的祥瑞說却非漢得其利,因爲鼓吹這一說的人本只爲自己打算啊!

平帝二年(西元二),王莽欲燿威德,厚遺黃支國(在南海中,去京師三萬里)王,令遣使貢獻,於是黃支國獻犀牛。他又使使者風匈奴單于,上書慕化,單于從之,上書言"幸得備藩臣,竊樂太平聖制(時莽奏令中國不得有二名),臣故名囊知牙斯,今謹更名知。"又越巂郡有黃龍游江中。夏間,王莽奏太后,說,"幸賴陛下德澤,間者風雨時,甘露降,神芝生,蓂莢,朱草,嘉

禾,休徵同時並至,"可見那時的祥瑞連駢而來,正同元成間的災異連駢而出一樣。到元始五年(西元五),莽加九命之錫,在太后的策書中說,"天符仍臻,元氣大同,麟鳳龜龍衆祥之瑞七百有餘,"可知那時在幾天之中即有一個祥瑞出現了。

王莽一方面博求禎祥,一方面制禮作樂。自宗廟,社稷,封國,車服,刑罰之制,以及吏民養生,送終,嫁娶,奴婢,田宅,器械之品,莫不有所更定。這因他是禮家出身,所以要把所有的禮制都用己意改過,使其成爲極整齊的一大套。這確是一代的大手筆,而他也更像那位"思兼三王以施四事"的周公了。

因爲他的權勢這樣高,功業這樣大,所以稱頌他的功德的人非常多。漢書王莽傳中還保存得一整篇奏書,是張竦爲陳崇(就是上邊所說的"以材能幸於莽"的陳崇,他那時做大司徒司直)所草的。這篇文字用了許多經書上的詞句來稱美王莽,結論云:

> 是故成王之於周公也,度百里之限,越九錫之檢,開七百里之宇,兼商奄之民,賜以附庸殷民六族。………今陛下既知公有周公功德,不行成王之褒賞,遂聽公之固辭,…………誠非所以爲國也。臣愚以爲宜恢公國,令如周公。…………

於是王莽的封國有擴大的要求了。

平帝四年(西元四)四月,王莽女立爲皇后。太保王舜(即上邊"爲腹心"的王舜)等奏言:

> 春秋列功德之義。太上有立德,其次有立功,其次有立言,惟至德大賢然後能之。其在人臣,則

生有大賞,終爲宗臣,殷之伊尹,周之周公是也。

又人民上書者八千餘人,咸曰:

伊尹爲阿衡;周公爲太宰。周公享上公之賞。宜如陳崇言!

於是王莽又益封地,稱宰衡,位上公了。這是他二次得政後的第二次升級。

他受了宰衡,辭了封地。因此一辭,又把古代的佳話復演起來了。史記周本紀說:

西伯(周文王)陰行善,諸侯皆來決平。於是虞芮之人有獄不能決,乃如周。入界,耕者皆讓畔,民俗皆讓長。虞芮之人未見西伯,皆慙,相謂曰,"吾所爭,周人所恥,何往爲! 祇取辱耳!"遂還,俱讓而去。諸侯聞之,曰,"西伯蓋受命之君!"…………

詩人道西伯,蓋受命之年稱王而斷虞芮之訟。(按,此指詩大雅緜篇中的"虞芮質厥成,文王蹶厥生"兩句。)

因此,又有王舜的奏書:

天下聞公不受千乘之土,辭萬金之幣,………莫不鄉化。蜀郡男子路建等輟訟慙怍而退。雖文王卻虞芮何以加! 宜報告天下!

文王的德化,使得虞芮之人不訟而去,爲其受命之徵,則王莽的德化能使路建們輟訟慙怍而退,不也是受命之徵嗎?

就在這一年(平帝四),王莽奏起明堂,辟雍,靈臺,爲學者築舍萬區,作市常滿倉,制度甚盛。羣臣又奏言:

昔周公奉繼體之嗣,據上公之尊,然猶七年制度乃定。夫明堂,辟雍,墮廢千載莫能興。今安漢

公起於第家,輔翼陛下,四年於茲,功德爛然。公以八月載生魄庚子奉使朝用書,臨賦營築。越若翊辛丑,諸生庶民大和會,十萬衆並集。平作二旬,大功畢成。唐虞發舉,成周造業,誠亡以加。宰衡位宜在諸侯王上!

這幾句話,在經典上也是有根據的。尚書云:

惟三月哉生魄,周公初基,作新大邑于東國洛,四方民大和會,侯甸男邦采衛,百工播民和,見士于周。(康誥篇首錯簡)

………乙卯,周公朝至于洛,則達觀于新邑營。………越七日甲子,周公乃朝用書,命庶殷侯甸男邦伯。厥既命殷庶,庶殷丕作。(召誥)

王莽起明堂等新建築的方式即是周公營洛邑的方式,他不但像周公,簡直是周公復生了。

這時,吏民以莽不受新野田而上書者前後四十八萬七千餘人,及諸侯王公列侯宗室見者皆叩頭言,"宜亟加賞於安漢公。" 王莽苦辭,願畢制禮作樂之事。但太后下詔不許,令議"九錫"之儀。於是公卿大夫博士議郎列侯九百二人皆曰:

帝者之盛,莫隆於唐虞,而陛下任之。忠臣茂功,莫著於伊周,而宰衡配之。所謂異時而興,如合符者也。謹以六藝通義經文所見,周官禮記宜於今者,爲九命之錫。臣請命錫!

於是五年夏,太后臨前殿,親錫他綠韍,袞冕,鸞路,龍旂………許多貴重的東西。這是他二次得政後的第三次升級。

王莽這樣一幹,一時天下頓呈昇平的氣象。他因爲西方的羌人還沒有表示,又遣中郎將平憲等多持金幣,騙他們獻地內屬。平憲等去後,果得美滿結果。他們奏言:

羌豪良願等種人口可萬二千人,願爲內臣,獻鮮水海允谷鹽池,平地美草皆予漢民,自居險阻處爲藩蔽。問良願等降意,對曰,"太皇太后聖明,安漢公至仁,天下太平,五穀成熟,或禾長丈餘,或一粟三米,或不種自生,或繭不蠶自成。甘露從天降,醴泉自地出。鳳皇來儀,神爵降集。從四歲以來,羌人無所疾苦,故思樂內屬。宜以時處業,置屬國領護。

他們所說的"或禾長丈餘,或一粟三米,"在經典中也是有根據的。尚書大傳云:

成王之時,有三苗貫桑葉而生,同爲一穗,其大盈車,長幾充箱。民得而上諸成王。(尚書歸禾序正義引)

又書序曰:

唐叔得禾,異畝同穎,獻諸天子。王命唐叔歸周公於東,作歸禾。

周公既得命禾,旅天子之命,作嘉禾。

所以這也是王莽和周公千載同符的一件事。自良願等獻地內屬,王莽又立了一個西海郡。他又以經義正十二州名。

王莽的勢力和聲望到了這等地步,他不做皇帝再做什麽,所以漢的宗室泉陵侯劉慶上書,就直捷痛快地說:

周成王幼少稱"孺子,"周公稱攝。今帝富于

春秋，宜令安漢公行天子事如周公！

周公行天子事有根據嗎？他們說是有的。其一在大誥。據書序說：

武王崩，三監及淮夷叛；周公相成王，將黜殷，作大誥。

則大誥是周公所作。而這篇的開頭卻說：

王若曰，"猷，大誥爾多邦，………"

不說"周公曰"而還說"王若曰，"可見這個"王"即是周公了。其二在康誥。據書序說：

成王既伐管叔蔡叔，以殷餘民封康叔，作康誥，

則康誥是成王時書。而這篇的開頭說：

惟三月哉生魄，周公初基，作新大邑于東國洛。………王若曰，"孟侯，朕其弟，小子封！………"

康叔封是成王的叔父，此間乃云"王若曰，朕其弟，"可見這個"王"必非成王而是周公了。其三在洛誥。篇末說：

惟周公誕保文武受命，惟七年。

可見周公攝政稱王之期凡歷七年。其四在明堂位：

昔者周公朝諸侯于明堂之位，天子負斧依南鄉而立。………武王崩，成王幼弱，周公踐天子之位以治天下。六年，朝諸侯於明堂，制禮，作樂，頒度量而天下大服。七年，致政於成王。成王以周公為有勳勞於天下，是以封周公於曲阜，地方七百里，革車千乘，命魯公世世祀周公以天子之禮樂，

這一段話與洛誥之文對看，即顯出"周公誕保文武受命，惟七年"的意義，而周公的稱王乃得了一個積極的證明。其五在

尚書大傳:

> 周公攝政,一年救亂,二年克殷,三年踐奄,四年建侯衛,五年營成周,六年制禮作樂,七年致政成王。
>
> (尚書康誥正義等引)

此文雖沒有踐位稱王之文,但看"攝政""致政"的話,則其行天子事已甚顯明。自有此文,而周公在這七年間所做的事乃可屈指而數了。此外的根據當然還有,我們另篇討論吧。(周公的眞事實及其稱王說之由來,當于另作"尚書中的周初史料"一文中論之。)

劉慶既有這等提議,羣臣當然說"宜如慶言!"

然而王莽行了天子事,將置平帝於何地呢? 於是平帝就不得不於這年的十二月裏夭亡了。(平帝之崩,漢書平帝紀及王莽傳俱言其病,但翟義傳中所錄的翟義檄文則謂是王莽毒殺。通鑑從之。) 在平帝未死時,漢書說:

> 平帝疾,莽作策請命於泰畤,戴璧秉圭,願以身代。藏策金縢,置于前殿,敕諸公勿敢言。

這種辦法,也是周公的態度。尚書金縢篇云:

> 既克商二年,王(武王)有疾弗豫。……… 周公………乃自以為功,為三壇同墠;為壇於南方北面,周公立焉,植璧秉圭,乃告太王王季文王。史乃冊祝曰,"……… 以旦代某之身!………" 公歸,乃納冊于金縢之匱中。……… 諸史與百執事對曰,"………公命我勿敢言。"

總而言之,凡是周公的故事,他都學會了而且做盡了。

平帝十四歲死。那時元帝世絕,宣帝曾孫有五十三人,

玄孫有二十三人，但從王莽的卜相之下，只有玄孫中最幼的廣戚侯子嬰最吉，所以他就嗣位了。

就在這一月裏，前煇光謝囂奏武功長孟通浚井得白石，上圓下方，有丹書著石，文曰"告安漢公莽爲皇帝。"於是王舜等共令太后下詔曰：

………玄孫年在襁褓(按，只有二歲)，不得至德君子，孰能安之！安漢公莽輔政三世，………遂同殊風，至于制作，與周公異世同符。今前煇光囂，武功長通上言丹石之符。朕深思厥意，云"爲皇帝"者，乃攝行皇帝之事也。………其令安漢公居攝踐祚，如周公故事！………

於是羣臣奏言：

太皇太后聖德昭然，深見天意。………禮明堂記曰，"周公朝諸侯於明堂，天子負斧依，南面而立，"謂周公踐天子位六年，朝諸侯，制禮作樂，而天下大服也。………書逸嘉禾篇曰，"周公奉鬯立于阼階，延登，贊曰，'假王莅政，勤和天下，'"此周公攝政，贊者所稱。成王加元服，周公則致政。書云，"朕復子明辟。"周公常稱王命，專行不報，故言我復子明君也。臣請安漢公居攝踐祚，服天子韍冕，背斧依于戶牖之間，南面朝羣臣，聽政事。車服出入警蹕，民臣稱臣妾，皆如天子之制。郊祀天地，宗祀明堂，共祀宗廟，享祭羣神，贊曰"假皇帝。"民臣謂之"攝皇帝。"………其朝見太皇太后，帝，皇后，皆復臣節。………

太后一一答應了，於是王莽便做了事實上的皇帝了。這是

他踏上皇帝位的第一步。

漢的宗室固有勸王莽行天子事的劉慶,但也有怕王莽移漢祚的劉崇。他在居攝元年起兵討莽,不幸敗了。羣臣復奏:

> 劉崇等謀逆者,以莽權輕也,宜尊重以塡海內。

權重做了攝皇帝,可謂已經登峯造極了,再要加重應當怎麽辦呢? 於是太后詔莽,朝見太后稱"假皇帝。" 本來見了太后是稱"臣"的,現在也稱起"假皇帝"來了。這是他踏上皇帝位的第二步。

居攝二年九月,東郡太守翟義立嚴鄉侯劉信爲天子,移檄郡國,言莽毒殺平帝,欲絕漢室。郡國響應,累十餘萬。這次聲勢浩大,不比劉崇了。所以莽很惶懼,晝夜抱孺子嬰告禱郊廟,放大誥作策。這篇大誥是很可笑的一篇文章,完全脫了尙書裏的大誥的調而寫成的(因爲那時的經師說,大誥是周公伐武庚管蔡時所作,翟義劉信的討王莽正與武庚管蔡的畔周公情形相類)。原文太長,今摘鈔幾段如下:

> 惟居攝二年十月甲子,攝皇帝若曰:…… 熙,我念孺子若涉淵水,予惟往求朕所濟度奔走,以傅近奉承高皇帝所受命。……… 天降威明,用寧帝室,遺我居攝寶龜。太皇太后以丹石之符,迺紹天明意,詔予卽命居攝踐祚,如周公故事。………
>
> 反虜故東郡太守翟義擅興師動衆,曰,"有大難于西土,西土人亦不靖,"於是動。嚴鄉侯信誕敢犯祖亂宗之序。天降威,遺我寶龜,固知我國有呰災,使民不安,是天反復右我漢國也。………

予不敢僭上帝命。……… 太皇太后肇有元城沙鹿之君,陰精女主聖明之祥,配元生成,以興我天下之符,遂獲西王母之應,神靈之徵,以祐我帝室。……… 是以廣立王侯,竝建曾玄,俾屏我京師,綏撫宇內;博徵儒生,講道于廷,論序乖謬,制禮作樂,同律度量,混一風俗,正天地之位,昭郊宗之禮,定五時廟祧,咸秩無文,建靈臺,立明堂,設辟雍,張太學,尊中宗高宗之號。

昔我高宗崇德建武,克綏西域,以受白虎威勝之瑞。天地判合,乾坤序德,太皇太后臨政,有龜龍麟鳳之應,五德嘉符相應而備。河圖雒書遠自昆侖,出于重壄。古讖著言,肆今享實。此乃皇天上帝所以安我帝室,俾我成就洪烈也。烏虖,天用威,輔漢始而大大矣!………

予永念曰:天惟喪翟義劉信,若嗇夫,予曷敢不終予畝!……… 故予大以爾東征。命不僭差,卜陳惟若此!(漢書翟義傳)

他的運氣眞好,翟義等又給他打滅了。於是他的氣燄更高,自謂威德日盛,獲天人助。

居攝三年(西元八),他的母功顯君死了,意不在哀,令太后詔議其服。少阿羲和劉歆(即上面"典文章"的劉歆)與博士諸儒七十八人皆曰:

居攝之義,所以統立天功,………安輯海內也。……… 伊尹………居攝以興殷道,………周公………居攝以成周道。…… 今太皇太后比遭家之不造,……

> …孺子幼少,未能共上下。皇天降瑞,出丹石之符。是以太皇太后則天明命,詔安漢公居攝踐祚,將以成聖漢之業,與唐虞三代比隆也。
>
> 攝皇帝遂開秘府,會羣儒,制禮作樂,卒定庶官,茂成天功。聖心周悉,卓爾獨見,發得周禮以明因監,則天稽古而損益焉。……… 非聖哲之至,孰能若玆!………
>
> 今功顯君薨,…………攝皇帝以聖德承皇天之命,受太后之詔,居攝踐祚,奉漢大宗之後,…………不得顧私親。……… 攝皇帝當爲功顯君緦縗弁而加麻環經,如天子弔諸侯服,以應聖制。

王莽就照議行了。在這一段裏最重要的一句話,是"發得周禮以明因監。"周禮這部書,大家相信是周公致太平之迹,然而溯其來源則由于王莽的"發得。"在這樣崇拜周公的高潮之下,在周公的偶像這樣支配現實政治的時候,忽然發得了周禮一書以供他制禮作樂時的"因監,"這部書的出現不是很有些可疑嗎?

就是這一年,(居攝三),廣饒侯劉京言齊郡新井,車騎將軍千人扈雲言巴郡石牛,太保屬臧鴻言扶風雍石。這些符瑞的情狀,約略可於王莽奏太后書中見之:

> 陛下至聖,遭家不造,遇漢十二世三七之阸,承天威命,詔臣莽居攝,受孺子之託,任天下之寄。臣莽兢兢業業,懼於不稱。
>
> 宗室廣饒侯劉京上書,言"七月中齊郡臨淄縣昌興亭長辛當一暮數夢,曰,'吾天公使也。天公

使我告亭長,曰"攝皇帝當爲眞。" 即不信我此亭中當有新井。'誠長晨起視亭中,誠有新井,入地且百尺。"

十一月壬子,直建冬至,巴郡石牛,戊午(當是"扶風"之誤)雍石文皆到於未央宮之前殿。臣與太保安陽侯舜等視。天風起,塵冥。風止,得銅符帛圖於石前,文曰,"天告帝符,獻者封侯。承天命,用神令。"騎都尉崔發(即上面"以材能幸於莽"的崔發)等眡視。(顏注,"眡,古視字也。視其文而說其意也。")

及前孝哀皇帝建平二年六月甲子,下詔書,更爲太初元將元年。案其本事,甘忠可夏賀良讖書臧蘭臺。臣莽以爲"元將元年"者,大將居攝改元之文也。於今信矣!

尚書康誥,"王若曰,'孟侯,朕其弟,小子封,'"此周公居攝稱王之文也。春秋,"隱公不言即位,攝也。"此二經,周公孔子所定,蓋爲後法。孔子曰,"畏天命,畏大人,畏聖人之言。"臣莽敢不承用!

臣請共事神祇宗廟,奏言太皇太后,孝平皇后,皆稱"假皇帝,"其號令天下,天下奏事,毋言"攝"。以居攝三年爲初始元年,漏刻以百二十爲度。用應天命。臣莽夙夜養育,隆就孺子,令與周之成王比德,宣明太皇太后威德於萬方,期於富而教之。孺子加元服,復子明辟,如周公故事。

這是他根據了齊郡新井等符瑞,甘忠可們的讖書,以及周公孔子的經文而改定的制度。本來他號令天下及天下奏事

是稱"攝皇帝"的,現在則直稱"皇帝"了。本來漏刻以百爲度,哀帝再受命,用了甘忠可之說改以百二十爲度,不到兩個月又改回來;他這次的改制又照百二十改了。至改居攝爲初始,則是表明他已不是攝皇帝了。這是王莽踏上皇帝位的第三步。

他走了這三步,除他對太后們還稱"假"外,其他一切是眞皇帝了,於是有哀章的金匱策書,使他直接受漢高祖的禪讓。(見下面"王莽的受禪及其改制"章)

在這一章裏,可以知道王莽從大司馬做到皇帝是極有秩序的,他共升了六次級,費了八年功夫。在這八年中(西元一——八),他費了許多心思定了許多制度,顯現了許多符瑞,用了藝術的手腕把一個愁慘的舊國變成爲一個昇平的新國。

這一章和五德終始說無關,似乎又出了題外。但我們要明白王莽時的古史系統的改變,不得不先認清了這個所以改變的社會背景以及那時候的歷史觀念的方式。王莽是怎樣一個相信歷史而又歡喜自出心裁的人。他的目的是在做成皇帝,他的手段是在歷史中找出他做成皇帝的根據,所以他一切行動,悉以經(古史記載)爲標準。但經中所記的古事有限,在實用上一定不夠。爲要救濟這個缺憾,所以他只得"發得周禮以明因監"了,而書逸嘉禾篇更是一個應時代需要而發生的顯例。我們知道了這個,則根本改變古史系統的世經,自可知道它是在同一的時代使命之下出現的。

其次,王莽在未作皇帝之前一切模仿周公。他的歷史觀念,只是一個循環論。周公時有了許多文物,又有了許多

禎祥，他就可以攝政稱王；那麼，王莽只要有了周公的文物和禎祥，當然他也該居攝稱帝了。到做成皇帝之後，他又應一切模倣堯舜，堯典禹貢等老文章就是他的政治的新文章了。這種循環論最與五德終始說相合，所以他對於五德說下的歷史有一種大規模的改定，而他也成了舜的子孫。

又有一件事，我們應當先提一下。讖緯諸書，向來儒者均斥爲妖妄。但我們懂得了五德三統諸說，懂得了災異禎祥諸說，則這種妖妄之談正是應有的碩果，絲毫不足駭詫。讖緯書中，五德終始說的材料是很豐富的，我們要整理這種材料，不得不對於造成這種材料的時勢先看一遍。這就是我寫出這一章的宗旨。

下面兩章——今古文問題，春秋左氏傳著作時代的各家說——也是和五德終始說雖沒有直接關係而卻爲解決新式的五德終始說的先決問題的。

XIV. 今古文問題

那位爲王莽典文章的劉歆，曾在過去的學術界中掀起一回鉅大的風潮，卽是經書中的今古文之爭。這個問題成爲一個最大的癥結，直到現在還不能徹底解決。（此問題太大，不能在這篇中詳論，只得約略說一下，讀者諒之。）

劉歆的事蹟，依據漢書本傳及藝文志，大略如下：

他名歆，字子駿（哀帝建平元年改名秀，字穎叔，當以哀帝名欣，與"歆"音同，避嫌名之故），是劉向的少子。從小就通詩，書，能屬文。成帝時，召見，待詔宦者署，爲黃門郎。那時王莽亦爲黃門郎，兩個人很投契。河平（西元前二八—二五）中，成帝以書頗散

亡,使謁者陳農求遺書於天下,詔劉向歆父子及任宏尹咸等校之。劉向管的是經傳,諸子,詩賦三部分。但劉歆很喜博涉,即數術方技之類也無所不究。向死後,哀帝初即位,那時王莽爲大司馬,舉歆宗室有材行,遷侍中,奉車都尉,使他復領五經,卒父前業。歆於是總羣書而奏七略。這部書雖已亡,但漢書藝文志是從它出來的,我們還可看見一個大概。

向歆父子始皆治易。宣帝時,詔向受穀梁春秋,十餘年大明習。及歆校秘書,見"古文春秋左氏傳,"大好之。這是"古文"二字的起源,我們不可忽略過。

古文,是對今文而言的。漢代流傳的經書本子,當然用漢代的文字書寫。現在,劉歆從秘府裏尋出來的一部春秋左氏傳(左氏爲孔子的春秋經所作的傳)則是用古文字書寫的。這因左氏傳在漢代沒有通行,所以還保存得漢以前的原狀。在理論上,本講得過去。經書,在孔子時已有了,從孔子到漢約三百年,在這時期中爲經書作傳的人當然很多,也當然不盡在漢代通行。左氏傳倖留在秘府裏,有人把它表章,使得絕了二百年的學統可以復續,這是怎樣一件可喜的事!可是,我們不要忘了漢代是託古改制的時代,尤其是西漢之末,是周禮,逸書等等出現的時代(見上章),我們不能對于它作無條件的信任。

他尋出了春秋左氏傳之後,漢書本傳說他:

> 初,左氏傳多古字古言,學者傳訓故而已。及歆治左氏,引傳文以解經,轉相發明,由是章句義理備焉。

可見他對于左氏傳是曾經動過一番手的。本傳又說:

> 歆以爲左丘明好惡與聖人同,親見夫子;而公羊穀梁在七十子後。傳聞之與親見之,其詳略不同。歆數以難向,向不能非間也,然猶自持其穀梁義。

這可見他們父子二人對于春秋之學的意見不同,又可見劉向對于左氏傳中的春秋義是不贊成的。本傳又說:

> 及歆親近,欲建立左氏春秋及毛詩,逸禮,古文尚書,皆列於學官。

他要求立於學官的經傳,在左氏春秋之外,還有毛詩,逸禮和古文尚書三種。按漢書儒林傳云:

> 漢興,言易自淄川田生。言書自濟南伏生。言詩,於魯則申培公,於齊則轅固生,燕則韓太傅。言禮,則魯高堂生。言春秋,於齊則胡毋生,於趙則董仲舒。

這是漢武帝時的情形。那時經學派別,寥寥無幾,除詩有三派,春秋有二派外,餘均爲一家之言,無異說。到武帝能斥百家,獨尊儒術之後,各種新派別都起來了。班固儒林傳贊云:

> 自武帝立五經博士,開弟子員,設科射策,勸以官祿,訖于元始(平帝年號),百有餘年,傳業者寖盛,支葉蕃滋,一經說至百餘萬言,大師衆至千餘人,蓋祿利之路然也。
>
> 初,書惟有歐陽,禮后,易楊,春秋公羊而已。至孝宣世,復立大,小夏侯尚書,大,小戴禮,施,孟,梁丘易,穀梁春秋。至元帝世,復立京氏易。

可知宣元之世是經學分裂的時代。大約因爲"勸以官祿,"

故學者羣思自立門戶,希冀私學變成官學。但是他們只在議論上求勝利,想不出什麼新的方法。劉歆從小就受有很好的家學,稍長又博覽秘府藏書,他也希望自己的學說立於學官,竟被他發明了一個新塗徑。秘府中的書當然有用古文寫的,他就從這上得到暗示,覺得倘在今文經書之外別出許多古文經書,一定可使經學界中開出一個新面目。所以他在三家詩之外別出一種毛詩,在歐陽,夏侯書之外別出一種古文尙書,在大小戴禮之外別出一種逸禮,在公羊,穀梁春秋之外別出一種左氏春秋,這四種新經和新傳都是以"古文"爲標幟的。

他提出這個請求之後,本傳云:

> 哀帝令歆與五經博士講論其義,諸博士或不肯置對。歆因移書太常博士責讓之。

這一篇移書是今古文問題的第一次辯論,是學術史上的最重要的材料。原書全文錄入本傳,今摘鈔如下:

> 夫子沒而微言絕,七十子終而大義乖。重遭戰國棄籩豆之禮,理軍旅之陳,孔氏之道抑而孫吳之術興。陵夷至於暴秦,燔經書,殺儒士,設挾書之法,行是古之罪,道術由是遂滅。
>
> 漢興,去聖帝明王遐遠,仲尼之道又絕,法度無所因襲。時獨有一叔孫通,略定禮儀。天下唯有易卜,未有他書。至孝惠之世,乃除挾書之律。然公卿大臣絳灌之屬咸介胄武夫,莫以爲意。至孝文皇帝,始使掌故朝錯從伏生受尙書。尙書初出於屋壁,朽折散絕。今其書見在時師傳讀而已。

> 詩始萌芽。天下衆書往往頗出,皆諸子傳說,猶廣立于學官,爲置博士。在漢朝之儒,唯賈生而已。
>
> 至孝武皇帝,然後鄒,魯,梁,趙頗有詩,禮,春秋先師,皆起於建元之間。當此之時,一人不能獨盡其經,或爲雅,或爲頌,相合而成。泰誓後得,博士集而讀之。故詔書稱曰,"禮壞樂崩,書缺簡脫,朕甚閔焉!"時漢興已七八十年,離於全經固已遠矣。

這是說孔子所定的六經,在他死後,經過學者們的改變,戰國的兵亂,秦的燔燒,已經散失得不像樣子。漢興之後,還不把這件事放在心上,六經只有周易流傳,此外惟叔孫通略定了些禮儀。直到文帝時,晁錯始從伏生受尚書,但尚書只是朽折散絕的一堆竹簡。詩經是萌芽于文帝時,合成于武帝時的。春秋的先師,也是武帝建元之間剛有。所以現在(西漢之季)所有的六經,是漢興七八十年後東拼西湊而成的,已經不是當初的原本了。這段話雖非完全眞實(例如武帝詔書,史記儒林列傳所載的爲"禮廢樂崩,朕甚愍焉,"此間卻說"禮壞樂崩,書缺簡脫,朕甚閔焉,"爲要證明六經的不完全,不惜杜造了"書缺簡脫"一語增加進去),但當漢初創痍未復之際,不能馬上闡揚文化,以致經學的發達遲了數十年,加以道家壓抑儒家,六經的地位不高,學習的人不多,這是當然的現象,所以我覺得這些話大體是可信的。下面說:

> 及魯恭王壞孔子宅,欲以爲宮,而得古文於壞壁之中,逸禮有三十九,書十六篇。天漢之後,孔安國獻之。遭巫蠱倉卒之難,未及施行。及春秋左氏,丘明所修,皆古文舊書,多者二十餘通,藏於秘府,

伏而未發。

孝成皇帝閔學殘文缺,稍離其眞,乃陳發祕臧,校理舊文。得此三事,以考學官所傳,經或脫簡,傳或間編。傳問民間,則有魯國柏公,趙國貫公,膠東庸生之遺學與此同,抑而未施。

這是說魯恭王在孔子宅壁中發得逸禮和逸書五十五篇,都是用古文字寫的,孔安國把它獻給武帝,因巫蠱之難而未及施行。還有一部春秋左氏,數量很多,也是用古文字書寫的,一樣地擱在祕府裏。直到成帝詔劉向歆等校書,方得發見。拿這三部書去校對學官的本子,有的"經"是脫了簡的(缺了),有的"傳"是間了編的(亂了)。到民間去問,知道有柏公,貫公,庸生的學與此同,但都不曾得到政府的認可。在這裏,他沒有說到毛詩的來源。

這一段話很不可信。其一,史記魯共王世家無壞孔子壁得古文經事;司馬遷是尊信六藝的,他也曾講業齊魯之都,使有此事,不應不載。其二,司馬遷作孔子世家,云,"安國爲今皇帝博士,………早卒,"則當他作史記時,安國已死了;司馬遷且不及見巫蠱之難,而謂孔安國能看見嗎?其三,魯共王死于武帝元朔元年(西元前一二八),到征和二年(前九一)巫蠱事起,已歷三十六年了;漢武帝時很崇奬經學,如有此事發生,爲什麼要延遲到三十年後而始獻上呢?(還有許多牴牾處,見新學僞經考卷三上。)因爲他所說的話,時代與事實均不相合,而且上文說他治左氏時已經自己動過一番手,所以這一段話很可斷爲他的謊話。下面又說:

往者綴學之士不思廢絕之闕,苟因陋就寡,…

……信口說而背傳記,是末師而非往古。至於國家將有大事,若立辟雍,封禪,巡狩之儀,則幽冥而莫知其原。猶欲保殘守缺,挾恐見破之私意,而無從善服義之公心。或懷嫉妬,不考情實,雷同相從,隨聲是非。抑此三學,以尚書爲備,謂左氏爲不傳春秋,豈不哀哉!

今聖上……下明詔,試左氏可立不,……將以輔弱扶微。……今則不然,深閉固距而不肯試,猥以不誦絕之;欲以杜塞餘道,絕滅微學。……若必專己守殘,黨同門,妒道眞,違明詔,失聖意,以陷于文吏之誅,甚爲二三君子不取也!

這是痛罵那時的博士,只知道抱守家學的殘書,聽信末師的口說,就以爲眞理盡在於是。一到國家舉行大典,問他們儀制如何,就不知道怎麼回答。有什麼好東西出來,反要懷了嫉妬之心,結了朋黨,把它壓抑下去。所以尚書二十八篇明明不是全本,他們卻說是完全的;左氏明明是春秋的傳,他們卻說是不傳春秋的。

這是劉歆的一面之辭,對方的話可惜沒有整篇傳下來。今把漢書本傳及儒林傳,王莽傳所載的幾條錄下:

其言甚切,諸儒皆怨恨。是時名儒光祿大夫龔勝以歆移書,上疏深自罪責,願乞骸骨罷。及儒者師丹爲大司空,亦大怒,奏歆改亂舊章,非毀先帝所立。……歆由是忤執政大臣,爲衆儒所訕,懼誅,求出補吏,爲河內太守。(本傳)

歆白左氏可立,哀帝納之。以問諸儒,皆不對。

> 歆於是數見丞相孔光,爲言左氏以求助;光卒不肯。(儒林傳)

> 莽召問羣臣禽賊方略。……… 故左將軍公孫祿徵來與議。祿曰,"………國師嘉新公(劉歆)顚倒五經,毀師法,令學士疑惑。……… 宜誅………以慰天下。"(王莽傳)

要立幾部逸經逸傳於學官,使得大家對于孔子之道多明白些,這是好事。即使他太露鋒鋩,激起諸儒的妒忌,亦何至爲他們所怨恨,必欲把他置於死地而後快。這可見他的學說在經學上所起的變動必甚劇烈,其勢將把以前的經學家的地盤盡數打破,所以他們要和他拚命了。

哀帝既死,王莽復柄政。劉歆的同志既成了最有勢力的人,而且他自己又爲這最有勢力的人"典文章",於是他再不怕諸博士的反對了。班固儒林傳贊云:

> 平帝時,又立左氏春秋,毛詩,逸禮,古文尚書。

這雖不知道是哪一年的事,但那時已如了劉歆的願,把這四種書一齊立於學官了。這是漢代學術的一個大改變。

平帝四年,王莽奏起明堂,辟雍,靈臺,爲學者築舍萬區。劉歆那時官羲和,京兆尹。王莽使他治明堂,辟雍;有功,封紅休侯。又使他典儒林史卜之官,考定律歷。這時候,劉歆已成爲文化事業的中心人物,他可以用了自己的理想構成一個文化的系統,他決不會因已立了四種古文學的經傳就滿足的。

於是那時有一個大規模的學術運動發生。王莽傳說:

> 立樂經。益博士員,經各五人。徵天下通一

> 藝教授十一人以上,及有逸禮,古書,毛詩,周官,爾雅,天文,圖讖,鍾律,月令,兵法,史篇文字,通知其意者皆詣公車。網羅天下異能之士。至者前後千數。皆令記說廷中,將令正乖謬,壹異說云。

又平帝紀云:

> 徵天下通知逸經,古記,天文,歷算,鍾律,小學,史篇,方術本草及以五經,論語,孝經,爾雅教授者,在所爲駕一封軺傳,遣詣京師。至者數千人。

這一件事,王莽傳載于元始四年,平帝紀則載于五年,大約此事非一時可辦,四年徵遣,五年數千人集京師,乃令記說廷中耳。這件事情,手段非常毒辣,一方面把古文學的種子散播到民間,一方面又令今文學增加許多敵人,凡古文學家的眼光中感到的"乖謬"和"異說"都掃空了。這是用了利祿的引誘來統一學術思想的一個好方法。從此以後,今文學的勢力有減無增,古文學的勢力也就有增無減了。

在這兩段記載裏,我們可以知道那時除了劉歆傳中的四部經傳外,又立了樂經,周官,爾雅等書於學官。(這兩段中雖只說徵求通周官爾雅等的人,並沒有說把周官爾雅等立學,但藝文志在"周官經六篇"下已注明"王莽時,劉歆置博士,"推之爾雅等當亦如是。)

因爲有了這樣一個大運動,所以今古文的界限就確實建立,所有的經書都分成今學和古學了。其實所謂古學何嘗是眞的古學,只不過是王莽所需要之學,劉歆所認爲應行提倡之學而已。康長素先生以"新學僞經"名書,這是很不錯的。今依據漢書藝文志,列一"今古文總表。"(藝文志是出於七略的,七略是劉歆在哀帝時所奏的,似乎不能記及王莽時新出的古

文學書籍。但古代的書並無刻本,隨時可以增加。只要看王莽新發得的周禮,藝文志中也有,就可知道七略雖係哀帝時所奏,而亦不少王莽時新增入的材料了。)

經名	今文	古文
易經	施孟梁丘三家經十二篇	古文易經,民間費氏經與之同
尚書	大小夏侯經二十九卷,歐陽經二十二卷	古文經四十六卷(五十七篇)
詩經	齊魯韓三家經二十八卷	毛詩二十九卷
禮	后戴經七十篇,記百三十一篇	古經五十六卷,周官經六篇
春秋	公羊穀梁經十一卷,公羊傳十一卷,穀梁傳十一卷	古經十二篇,左氏傳三十卷
論語	齊二十二篇,魯二十篇	古二十一篇
孝經	長孫江后翼經一篇,十八章	古孔氏一篇,二十二章

這一個表所錄的古文經,比了上面的記載,又添出了易經,論語,孝經三種。自從添出了這三種,而後所有的經書便完全具備了古文了。

這三種裏,易經頗奇怪,只見於敍錄而不見於篇目中。敍錄云,"劉向以中古文易經校施孟梁丘經,或脫去'无咎,''悔亡;'惟費氏經與古文同。"可見古文的易經與今文的易經所差只在幾處脫字,其餘全同。至於和古文相同的費氏經,也但見于敍錄而不見于篇目。深疑此經的古文或尚無贋造之本,不過空寫幾個名詞而已。古論語,注云,"出孔子壁中。"孝經,敍錄云,"唯孔氏壁中古文爲異"。到許愼作說文序,云:

壁中書者,魯共王壞孔子宅而得禮記,尚書,春

秋,論語,孝經。

劉歆在移讓太常博士書中只說魯共王壞壁得逸禮和逸書,其七畧又多出了古論語和孝經。到這裏,又多出了春秋了。要不是許愼杜撰,也許仍是劉歆說的。古文經日有增益,孔家壁中的古簡冊也就日出而不窮,這是多麼滑稽的事情?

古文經既是這樣地整齊而且完備,但傳經的系統不完全,也是一個缺憾。所以他們又爲它造出許多傳授的源流來。漢書儒林傳云:

> 費直,字長翁,東萊人也。治易爲郎。……… 長於卦筮。亡章句,徒以彖,象,系辭十篇文言解說上,下經。琅邪王璜平仲能傳之。璜又傳古文尚書。
>
> 孔氏有古文尚書。孔安國以今文字讀之,因以起其家,逸書得十餘篇,蓋尚書滋多於是矣。……安國爲諫大夫,授都尉朝。而司馬遷亦從安國問故,遷書載堯典,禹貢,洪範,微子,金縢諸篇多古文說。都尉朝授膠東庸生。庸生授淸河胡常少子,……
> ……又傳左氏。常授虢徐敖,………又傳毛詩;授王璜,平陵塗惲子眞。子眞授河南桑欽君長。
>
> 毛公,趙人也,治詩,爲河間獻王博士授同國貫長卿。長卿授解延年。延年………授徐敖。敖授九江陳俠,爲王莽講學大夫。
>
> 漢興,北平侯張蒼及梁太傅賈誼,京兆尹張敞,太中大夫劉公子皆修春秋左氏傳。誼爲左氏傳訓故,授趙人貫公,爲河間獻王博士。子長卿,……
> …授淸河張禹少子。禹………授尹更始。更始傳

> 子咸及翟方進,胡常。常授黎陽賈護季君,…………授蒼梧陳欽子佚,以左氏授王莽,至將軍。而劉歆從尹咸及翟方進受。由是言左氏者本之賈護劉歆。

照這樣講,古文學派的淵源至長,學者甚衆,且有兩種是河間獻王已立博士的,它簡直是個"顯學,"爲什麼劉歆竟小覷它而稱它爲"微學?" 再說春秋左氏傳,自張蒼賈誼以來傳授不絕,河間獻王且爲立博士,何以傳了二百年,博士們還說它不傳春秋? 劉歆左氏之學是從尹咸們傳來的,師承歷歷可數,爲什麼本傳中說他因領校秘書而發見此書,又爲什麼說他始引傳文以解經? 又張蒼修左氏傳,爲什麼史記本傳中不說,但云"好書律術?" 賈誼作左氏傳訓故,爲什麼史記本傳也不提一字,但謂其"能誦詩,書;"連七畧裏也不載這部著作?…… 對於這些記載,實在可提出的問題太多了!

自清代重提今古文問題之後,作最嚴正的系統的批評的,首推康長素先生的新學僞經考。他自述其澈悟此問題之由來,有下列一段話,今錄之以終此章:

> 自劉申受,魏默深,龔定盦以來,疑攻劉歆之作僞多矣,吾蓄疑於心久矣。吾居西樵山之北,……讀書澹如之樓,……碧陰茂對,籐床偃息,……拾取史記,…………偶得河間獻王傳,魯共王傳讀之,乃無得古文經一事,大驚疑。乃取漢書河間獻王,魯共王傳對較史記讀之,又取史記漢書兩儒林傳對讀之,則漢書詳言古文事,與史記大反,乃益大驚大疑。

又取太史公自序讀之,子長自稱"天下郡國羣書皆寫副,集于太史公,太史公仍世父子纂其業,乃紬金匱石室之藏,厥協六經異傳,整齊百家雜語,"則子長於中秘之書,郡國人間之藏,蓋無所不見。其生又當河間獻王魯共王之後,有獻書開壁事更無所不知。子長對此孔經大事更無所不紀。然而史記無之,則爲劉歆之僞竄無疑也!…………

於是以史記爲主,徧考漢書而辨之。以今文爲主,徧考古文而辨之。徧考周秦西漢諸書,無不合者。雖間有竄亂,或儒學以外雜書有之,則劉歆採撷之所自出也。於是渙然冰釋,怡然理順,萬理千條,縱橫皆合矣。吾憂天下學者窮經之入迷途而苦難也,乃先撰僞經考,粗發其大端。(重刻僞經考後序)

我深信一個人的眞理卽是大家的眞理。僞經考這書,結論或有錯誤,但是這個中心思想及其考證的方法是不錯的。他雖沒有完工,但已指示我們一條繼續工作的路。讀者諸君如不信,不妨把他所說的各篇,照班馬異同的辦法,鈔出比較,看它們是不是在兩個時代潮流中對于聖人的經典的派別和數量有很衝突的記載?

XV. 春秋左氏傳著作時代的各家說

在劉歆本傳及其移書中,我們可以知道,他雖舉出了逸禮,古文尚書,春秋左氏三部書,但在這三部書中,他是側重春秋左氏的(1.傳言"歆治左氏,引傳文以解經。" 2.他以爲左丘明好惡

與聖人同,親見夫子,不似公羊穀梁之得於傳聞。 3.哀帝下詔,試左氏可立否。 4.傳中說他要立左氏,毛詩,逸禮,古文尙書四種,移書中只說逸禮,逸書,左氏三種,博士所駁只說古文尙書,左氏二種)。 我們現在研究五德終始說,也是以左氏爲最有關係。 所以先把左氏一書的來歷說明一下:

左氏這個人名,最早見於史記。(論語中亦有之,辨見後。)太史公自序云:

> 昔西伯拘羑里,演周易。 孔子厄陳蔡,作春秋。屈原放逐,著離騷。 左丘失明,厥有國語。 孫子臏脚,而論兵法。 不韋遷蜀,世傳呂覽。 韓非囚秦,說難,孤憤。 詩三百篇,大抵賢聖發憤之所爲作也。此人皆意有所鬱結,不得通其道也。

此等話之可信與否是另一問題,但他認左丘因失明的憤鬱而作一部書以發其憤,這一部書名爲國語,這是一件很清楚的事實。 又他排列次序,把左丘放在屈原之後,則也承認他是一個戰國時人。 漢書司馬遷傳引他的報任安書,書中也有這一段話,說到左丘的仍是"左丘失明,厥有國語"一語。但下文還說:

> 及如左丘明無目,孫子斷足,終不可用,退論書策以舒其憤,思垂空文以自見。

則左丘爲氏而明爲名,如壺丘子林,吾丘壽王,梁丘賀之類,是以地爲氏的。 又史記十二諸侯年表序云

> 於是譜十二諸侯,自共和訖孔子,表見春秋,國語,學者所譏盛衰大指著于篇。

又漢書司馬遷傳贊云:

> 司馬遷據左氏國語,采世本,戰國策,述楚漢春秋,接其後事,訖于大(天)漢。

可見司馬遷作的史記是根據左丘明的國語的,左丘明做的只是國語。

但十二諸侯年表序中還有一段,說:

> 孔子明王道,……西觀周室,論史記舊聞,興於魯而次春秋,………七十子之徒口受其傳指,爲有所刺譏褒諱挹損之文辭不可以書見也。
>
> 魯君子左丘明懼弟子人人異端,各安其意,失其眞,故因孔子史記具論其語,成左氏春秋。

然則左丘明竟是孔子同時人,或稍後于孔子的人。他作的書,名爲左氏春秋。他作書的宗旨,是因孔子作春秋時沒有把他的指意寫出來,只以口說給弟子傳下,他恐怕弟子口傳失眞,所以具論其語。照這樣說,左丘明作左氏春秋的用意是專爲輔翼孔子的春秋的。

又漢書司馬遷傳贊也說:

> 孔子因魯史記而作春秋,而左丘明論輯其本事以爲之傳,又纂異同爲國語。

又嚴氏春秋引觀周篇云:

> 孔子將修春秋,與左丘明乘如周,觀書於周史。歸而修春秋之經,丘明爲之傳,共爲表裏。(左傳序正義引)

則左丘明所做的又非左氏春秋,乃是孔子的春秋的傳了。他是孔子同時人,孔子的春秋經和他的春秋傳是同時做成的。至于國語這書,不過是作春秋傳時賸下來的一堆材料,

爲備稽考異同之用而已。

他們把左丘明與孔子的關係說得這樣密切,於是論語公冶長篇的一段話對於春秋經也就發生了意義:

子曰,"巧言,令色,足恭,左丘明恥之,丘亦恥之。匿怨而友其人,左丘明恥之,丘亦恥之。"

劉歆所謂"左丘明好惡與聖人同,親見夫子,"根據在此。既然左丘明與孔子的好惡相同,自然他們二人所作的春秋經傳,其意旨是十分符合的了。這比公羊穀梁之出于七十子後的,其價值高了多少?

照這樣說,現在流傳的春秋左氏傳,的確是左丘明在孔子時作的。一千九百年來,大多數人對于這個斷案毫不發生問題。但也有一小部分人在懷疑着。今無暇細檢,只就朱彝尊的經義考(卷一六九)中鈔出若干條看一下:

王接(晉人)曰,"左氏辭義贍富,自是一家書,不主爲經發。"

啖助(唐人)曰,"左氏傳自周晉齊宋楚鄭等國之事最詳。晉則每出一師,具列將佐;宋則每因興廢,備舉六卿。故知史策之文,每國各異。左氏得此數國之史以授門人,義則口傳,未形竹帛。後代學者乃演而通之,總而合之,編次年月以爲傳記。"

王晳(宋人)曰,"左氏……雖附經而作,然於經外自成一書,故有貪惑異說,采掇過當。至於聖人微旨,頗亦疏略。"

程子曰,"左傳非丘明作。'虞不臘矣'及'庶長'皆秦官秦語。"

劉安世(宋人)曰,"左氏傳於春秋所有者或不解,春秋所無者或自為傳。讀左氏者當經自為經,傳自為傳,不可合而一也,然後通矣。"

林栗(宋人)曰,"左傳凡言'君子曰,'是劉歆之辭。"

羅璧(宋人)曰,"左傳,春秋,初各一書。後劉歆治左傳,始取傳文解經。晉杜預注左傳,復分經之年與傳之年相附。於是春秋及左傳二書合為一。"

呂大圭(宋人)曰,"宗左氏者,以為丘明受經於仲尼,好惡與聖人同。觀孔子謂'左丘明恥之,丘亦恥之,'乃'竊比老彭'之意,則其人當在孔子之前。而左氏傳春秋,其事終於智伯,乃在孔子之後。"

羅喻義(明人)曰,"左氏原自為一書。後人分割附經。……… 宜還其舊。"

尤侗(清人)曰,"左氏之為丘明,自遷固以下皆信之,獨啖助趙匡立說以破其非。而王介甫斷左氏為六國時人者有十一事。據左傳紀韓魏智伯之事及趙襄子之謚,計自獲麟至襄子卒已八十年。夫子謂'左丘明恥之,丘亦恥之,'則丘明必夫子前輩。豈有仲尼沒後七八十年,丘明猶能著書者乎!"

從以上這些零碎話看來,可知自從西漢博士說了"左氏不傳春秋"之後,雖是古文學派佔了勝利,使得"左氏竟傳春秋,"但總遏不住有思想的學者的反對的聲浪。歸納以上許多人的說話,得下列諸點:

1 春秋經所有的,左傳中或沒有。左傳中所

有的,春秋經也多沒有。可見這是各不相關的兩部書。

2. 取左氏解春秋,始於劉歆。(書中的"君子曰,"都是劉歆的話。)至分經之年與傳之年相附,則始於杜預。不傳春秋的左氏經過這兩回的安置,遂與春秋合爲一物。

3. 左傳中記事,以周晉齊宋楚鄭等國爲最詳,可見左氏所得是這幾國的史策。至於加以演通,總合,編次年月以爲傳,這是後代學者的事情。

4. 左氏中最後的諡法命于獲麟後八十年,又用秦官秦語,作傳的人必不能與孔子同時,必非論語中所見的左丘明。

這幾點的觀察都很銳利,但可惜沒有一個人起來作系統的研究,說明作者的時代及此書的由來與其演變的。(王安石雖有斷左氏爲六國時人的十一事,似乎是一篇有系統的論文,但也失傳了。)直到清代中葉,劉逢祿作左氏春秋考證,始在左傳裡挾出許多劉歆的作僞的事實:有的本爲一篇,給他拆成兩篇;有的原書裏本來沒有,給他添了出來;有的本來一連多少年沒有記載,他卻把不相干的事情敷衍過去;有的爲了要維持"凡例"的信用,杜造出什麼事情來證明。(他的書只是隨文評說,沒有系統的敍述。我原想把他的論證鈔些出來,可是這樣一寫又要占許多篇幅,這章文字嫌太長了。好在下面所敍的康崔諸家是有系統的敍述的,劉氏的話也被引不少,故亦不妨缺去。)自從經過了他的一番分析的研究之後,左氏一書就不得復成爲春秋的傳了。可是爲了十二諸侯年表序中有"左氏春秋"之名,他依然相

信左丘明的書名應爲左氏春秋。他道:

> "左氏春秋,"猶晏子春秋,呂氏春秋也。直稱"春秋,"太史公所據舊名也。冒曰"春秋左氏傳,"則東漢以後之以訛傳訛者矣。………(卷上)

他對於論語中的左丘明的解釋,以爲他和作左氏春秋的是同名的兩個人。他道:

> 爲左氏春秋者,則當時夫子弟子傳說已異,且魯悼已稱謚,必非論語之左丘;其好惡亦大異聖人,知爲失明之丘明。猶光武諱秀,歆亦可名秀………也。(卷下)

自從劉氏做了這部考證之後,約莫過了九十年,康長素先生在他的新學僞經考裏重把這個問題提出。他以爲不但春秋左氏傳之名是僞造的,即左氏春秋之名亦爲僞造,左丘明只做得國語。他道:

> 按史記儒林傳,春秋祗有公羊穀梁二家,無左氏。河間獻王世家無得左氏春秋立博士事。馬遷作史多採左氏。若左丘明誠傳春秋,史遷安得不知。儒林傳述六藝之學彰明較著,可爲鐵案。…
>
> 漢書司馬遷傳稱司馬遷據左氏國語;………史記太史公自序及報任安書………凡三言左丘明,俱稱國語;然則左丘明所作,史遷所據,國語而已,無所謂春秋傳也。
>
> 歆以其非博之學,欲奪孔子之經而自立新說以惑天下,…………求之古書,得國語與春秋同時,可以改易竄附,於是毅然削去平王以前事,依春秋以

編年，比附經文，分國語以釋經而爲左氏傳。………託之河間，張蒼，賈誼，張敞名臣通學以張其名，亂之史記以實其書。……… 凡公穀釋經之義，彼則有之；至其敘事繁博，則公穀所無。遭逢莽篡，更潤色其文以媚莽；因藉莽力，貴顯天下通其學者以尊其書。證據符合，黨衆繁盛，雖有龔勝，師丹，公孫祿，范升之徒，無能搖撼。

蓋國語藏於祕府，自馬遷劉向外罕得見者，………歆故得肆其改竄。"顚綴移曲折，顚倒在短褐，"幾於無迹可尋。此今學所以攻之不得其源。今以史記，劉向新序，說苑，列女傳所述春秋時事較之，如少昊嗣黃帝之妄，后羿寒浞篡統，少康中興之誣，宣公之夫人爲夷姜而非烝，…………隱母聲子爲賤妾而非繼室，仲子非桓母，是皆歆誣古悖父竄易國語而證成其說者。（劉逢祿左氏春秋考證甚詳。）且國語行文舊體，如惠之二十四年則在春秋前，悼之四年則在獲麟後，皆與春秋不相比附。雖經歆改竄爲傳，遺跡可考 史記五帝本紀，十二諸侯年表皆云"春秋，國語，"蓋史公僅採此二書，無左氏傳也。………

或據史記十二諸侯年表云，"魯君子左丘明懼弟子人人異端，各安其意，失其眞，故因孔子史記，具論其語，成左氏春秋"以相難。則亦歆所竄入者，辨見前。（按前云，"考文翁孔廟圖，史記仲尼弟子列傳無左丘明名。且左傳稱悼四年，………則丘明在孔子後遠

矣。豈七十子學成德尊所存者不足據，而非弟子之丘明反足據乎!………'安意失眞'之說與七略同，其爲歆言無疑義矣。"見史記經說足證僞經考。)

國語僅一書而志(漢書藝文志)以爲二種，可異一也。其一，二十一篇，卽今傳本也；其一，劉向所分之新國語五十四篇：同一國語，何篇數相去數倍?可異二也。劉向之書皆傳於後漢，而五十四篇之新國語，後漢人無及之者，可異三也。蓋五十四篇，左丘明之原本也。歆既分其大半凡三十篇以爲春秋傳，於是留其殘賸，掇拾雜書，加以附益，而爲今本之國語，故僅得二十一篇也。考今本國語·周語，晉語，鄭語多春秋前事。魯語則大半敬姜一婦人語。齊語則全取管子小匡篇。吳語，越語筆墨不同，不知掇自何書。然則其爲左傳之殘餘而歆補綴爲之至明。歆以國語原本五十四篇，天下人或有知之者，故復分一書以當之，又託之劉向所分，非原本，以滅其迹。其作僞之情可見………

劉申受左氏春秋考證知左氏之僞，攻辨甚明；而謂"左氏春秋猶晏子春秋，呂氏春秋，…………"蓋尚爲歆寬亂之十二諸侯年表所惑，不知其卽國語所改。………　然………謂"楚屈瑕篇年月無考，固知左氏體例與國語相似，不必比附春秋年月也，"是明指左傳與國語相似矣。………　隱公篇"紀子帛莒子盟于密"證曰，"如此年，左氏本文盡闕。"………　桓公篇………"冬，曲沃伯誘晉小子侯殺之"證

> 曰，"即有此事，亦不必在此年；是年左氏文闕。"……
> ……莊公篇"元年"證曰，"此以下七年文闕；楚荊尸篇，伐申篇年月亦無考。"昭公篇"冬十一月，晉魏舒韓不信如京師"證曰，"此篇重定元年，僞者比附經文而失檢耳。"又觀各條，劉申受雖未悟左傳之撫於國語，亦知由他書所采附，亦幾幾知爲國語矣。（漢書藝文志辨僞上）

至於論語中的左丘明，康先生也以爲是劉歆加進去的。他說：

> 歆造古文以徧僞諸經，無使一經有缺；至於論語，孝經，亦復不遺。……… 自鄭康成雜合古今，則今本論語必有僞文。如"巧言，令色，足恭，左丘明恥之，丘亦恥之………"一章，必歆僞竄。
>
> 又何晏論語集解雜采古，今；采孔馬（古）之注則改包周（今）之本；用包周之說又易孔馬之經。今"巧言令色"一章，集解正引僞孔安國注，其爲古文論語尤爲明確。
>
> 歆以左丘明親見聖人，好惡與同，以仲尼弟子無左丘明，故竄入論語以實之。

這些都是很重要的創見。康先生本想把左傳拆散，歸還國語，成國語原本一書，已見于萬木草堂叢書目錄；但遺稿中竟沒有，這是一件很可惜的事。

用了這付眼光去看關於左丘明的史料，則僅有太史公自序及報任安書中所說的爲可信；其他如十二諸侯年表序，

論語公冶長篇所言,皆出僞竄,其僞竄之故是爲裝點左傳的來歷,抬高左傳的地位。劉歆"始引傳文以解經"既明見于本傳,"左丘明好惡與聖人同"又出于他的口述,他爲爭立左氏傳又這等出力,當時儒者又因此事恨之刺骨:足見他對于左氏傳的成立有極大關繫,我們把改變國語爲左傳的責任歸到他身上,實在算不得寃枉。

崔觶甫先生(適)是繼續康先生的工作的人。他著有春秋復始,又著有史記探源。著春秋復始的宗旨,是要根據公羊傳,春秋繁露,及何休解詁等尋出孔子作春秋的原意;凡穀梁傳,左氏傳的經義和紀事盡從刊落。他以爲穀梁亦是古文學,是劉歆先作了,爲左氏傳作驅除的,凡漢書裏所說的武帝宣帝時穀梁傳授的系統及其立學的經過,皆出僞造。(這又是一個新問題,但與本篇無甚關係,恕我不談了。)他說,公羊傳原名是春秋傳,是眞正的,惟一的春秋傳;自從有了穀梁,左氏,劉歆才替它加上公羊傳的名字。所以現在應當以眞正的春秋傳來治春秋之學,來恢復春秋的原始狀態。他對于左氏傳等的總批評,是:

> 傳(公羊傳)於"紀子伯""宋子哀"皆曰"無聞焉爾,"以明不發經之義。是凡有傳者皆塙有所據,此眞春秋之信史也。此可雪"口說流行"之誣矣。(七略詆傳爲口說流行。)左丘明乃三家分晉後人,博采異聞,不擇信否而雜錄之,此眞口說流行者也。本不與春秋之事相比附。其相比附者,多與古史記相刺謬。如"齊仲孫"是慶父而非湫;"秦伯罃"是穆公,非康公;宣公是文公弟,非文公子;

繆姜是成夫人,非宣夫人;……季札讓國,非讓謁與夷昧,乃不受乎闔閭;晉靈公即位,自能用將,漏言殺陽處父,則非在母抱之時;令狐之役,秦自伐晉,非送公子雍,趙盾無欲立公子雍之事。……… 左氏國語反是,是固周末之異聞,非春秋之信史也。

劉歆得之,以爲事實既不相同,義理更可立異,而復雜取傳記,附以臆說,僞造左穀二傳,藉以破壞春秋,爲莽飾非,爲己文過之詭計。凡與公羊傳義略同者率其常義;傳之精義,穀梁削除之以孤其援,左氏反對之以篡其統。如王氏世卿,故左穀盡去譏世卿之文。新室篡漢,故左穀始終不見一篡字。此歆之爲莽飾非也。春秋崇正,則擅造醜語以誣之,如穀梁詆隱公探先君之邪志,左氏誣孔父以艶妻賈禍之類。春秋惡詐,則多陳陰謀以矯之,如穀梁誣公子友給殺莒挐,左氏謂先軫請執宛春以怒楚,欒枝使輿柴僞遁之類。此歆之爲己文過也。好聖人之所惡,惡聖人之所好,顧謂好惡與聖人同,幾以隻手掩天下之目者二千年,甚矣其禍經也!

這種話是站在今文學家的地位上說的,他先承認了公羊傳所記的全是眞確的事實,而後以左氏傳等校之,凡不合於公羊傳者皆視爲非信史。我們則不能這樣,公羊傳一書無論是否孔子的眞傳,我們只能先把它放在傳說的地位,與左氏傳等作同等的研究,而後定其可信的程度。所以崔先生的這種簡易的建設的工作,我們不能認爲滿意。但是他在破壞一方面,則我覺得可信的很多。如公羊傳譏世卿而左穀

不譏，公羊傳言纂而左穀無一纂字，分明有兩股不同的時代潮流在激盪，造成了涇渭之判。

春秋復始的末一卷是專辨左氏傳所記於春秋中無所繫屬的，與先秦古書相刺謬的，及其自相矛盾的，分爲"鑿空，""誤析一事爲二事，""分野，""互體"四章。除"誤析一事爲二事"或是國語原文之誤外，其餘都是劉歆的竄亂。

崔先生著史記探源的宗旨，在刪去史記中的竄亂之文，回復它的眞相。史記是一部"厥協六經異傳，整齊百家雜語"的書，是古書的一個總滙。劉歆當漢末新初，旣經把古書古學重新整理，作大規模的改變，則這個總滙羣書的史記也不由得不隨着改變。所以史記的受竄亂也不亞於國語等。他立志澄淸這些東西，故細心研讀史記，把其中有新學的色彩的指出刪掉。其卷一爲序證，先列出幾個去取的標準，如下：

甲，春秋——史記之文，凡與左氏傳同，有眞出自左丘明者，列國世系及政事典章之屬是也。其出自劉歆的有下五類：(一)終始五德，(二)十二分野，(三)變象互體，(四)告則書，(五)官失之。

乙，尙書——劉歆僞造古文尙書，本與今文尙書別行；自馬融鄭玄用古文之學而釋今文之經，晉出古文又僞造二十五篇，其書獨傳，於是今文尙書不復可見。幸而史記作在未有古文經的時代，還保存得許多眞今文的經和經說，雖則漢書儒林傳寃枉它，說"司馬遷從安國問故，遷載堯典…………諸篇多古文說。"惟百篇書序則是劉歆僞造而羼入

的,如為符瑞作的嘉禾,為禪讓作的舜典,都是跟着王莽時代的要求而出現的。

丙,漢書——漢書作於史記之後,當然有許多鈔錄史記之文。但有許多反是史記倒轉來鈔錄漢書的,這或因補缺,或因續貂。司馬遷自序本說他所叙的事"至于麟止,"即指武帝元狩元年的獲麟。故凡元狩元年以後之事,悉據漢書補入。

丁,補缺——史記本有亡缺,元成間褚少孫補了幾篇,別人也有妄續的。

以上四項,丙丁與劉歆無關,乙與本章亦無關,今所應注意的是甲。他說:

史記儒林傳曰,"言春秋,於齊魯自胡母生,於趙自董仲舒。"太史公自序曰,"昔孔子何為而作春秋哉?余聞之董生"云云。是太史公之於春秋,一本於董生,即一本於公羊。其取之左氏,乃國語也。自序曰,"左丘失明,厥有國語,"可證是時無所謂左傳也。

劉歆破散國語,並自造誕妄之辭與釋經之語,編入春秋逐年之下,託之出自中秘書,命曰春秋古文,亦曰春秋左氏傳。今案其體有四。一曰"無經之傳,"姑即隱公篇言之,如三年冬"鄭伯之車僨於濟"是也。夫傳以釋經,無經則非傳也,是國語也。二曰"有經而不釋經之傳。"凡傳以釋經義,非述其事也。如五年九月"初獻六羽,"公羊傳曰,"何以書?譏始僭諸公也,"是釋其義也。左傳

但述羽數,此與經同述一事耳,豈似傳體! 以上錄自國語居多。……… 三曰"釋不書於經之傳,"如元年四月"費伯帥師城郎,不書,非公命也。" 夫不釋經而釋不書於經,則傳書者不當釋黃帝何以無典,傳詩者不當釋吳楚何以無風乎! 彼傳不然,則此非傳也。 四曰"釋經之傳務與公羊氏,董氏,司馬氏,劉向之說相反而已。" 如隱三年書"尹氏卒,"譏世卿,爲昭二十三年立王子朝張本也。 宣十年書"齊崔氏出奔,"譏世卿,爲襄二十五年弒其君光張本也。……… 左氏改"尹"爲"君,"謂之隱公之母;於崔氏之出奔曰"非其罪也。" 凡以避世卿之譏,袒庇王氏而已。 此皆劉歆所改竄。 故公孫祿劾其"顛倒五經,毀師法,"班固曰"歆治左氏傳,其春秋意已乖"也。

這段話非常的精當。 他已把劉歆强國語就春秋及其杜撰春秋和左傳的義例的方法和類別告給我們,我們正可繼續加功,使得全部左氏傳都經過這一番分析,而把這兩個主人——左丘明和劉歆——的東西還給了兩個主人。

他指出劉歆增竄的五事,其一爲終始五德。 這是和本篇最有關係的一段文字。 其中的主張雖有爲我所不敢贊同的(如說終始五德之說爲劉歆所造,託始于鄒衍),但大部分的意思我都承受。 下面討論世經時,將本其意以爲說。 至於這段文字,擬留在本篇之末"批評五德終始說者的見解"一章中詳論之,茲不贅。

距今四年前(一九二六),瑞典高本漢先生(Bernhard Karl-

gren) 所作的論左傳之眞僞及其性質一書在瑞典哥敎保大學出版。不久,卽由陸侃如衛聚賢兩位先生譯成漢文,名左傳眞僞考,三年前在新月書店出版。書首冠有胡適之先生的提要與批評。

這部書分爲上下兩篇,上篇從歷史證據上討論左傳的眞僞,下篇從助詞的文法分析上研究左傳的性質。歷史的證據,因爲今古文問題及經義異同問題太複雜了,材料的眞僞也太難定了,所以從我們看來不能十分滿意。文法的分析,則是中國古書上破天荒的工作,創獲非常多,大足指示我們今後努力的方向。

高先生對于康先生的話頗不信任,以爲他是一個政客而兼傳敎的人,其主張有點新聞紙的味兒。這種態度,與崔先生認左傳所紀事與公羊傳不同的爲晚周異聞而非信史者頗相類。我們以爲劉歆與康有爲的功過應當分開看。劉歆爲適應時代的需要而造僞書是一件事;他取了眞古史作他造僞書的材料又是一件事。康有爲爲適應時代需要而提倡孔敎,以爲自己的變法說的護符,是一件事;他站在學術史的立場上打破新代出現的僞經傳又是一件事。我們不能從他們的兩件政治性的工作——簒位與變法——上面否定他們的兩件學術性的工作——表章古史和打破僞書。學問的目的與手段,本來可有兩種不同的成就,例如星占術爲了迷信的需要而發生,結果卻造成了純科學的天文學。康有爲果然是個政客,但前於他的劉逢祿,後於他的崔適,則明明都是學者,他們爲什麼要說同樣的話呢?所以康先生在研究今古文問題上,乃是一個上承劉氏而下開崔氏的人,

與他的從政和傳教沒有關係。

這書的下篇分爲三部分:

> 1.從文法上證明左傳不是魯國人做的;
>
> 2.用書經,詩經,莊子,國語等比較左傳文法,證明左傳有特殊的文法組織,不是作僞者所能虛構的;
>
> 3.用左傳的文法來比較"前三世紀的標準文言,"證明左傳是前四五世紀的作品。

適之先生對于這三部分的批評,以爲第三部分含有些感情作用,他希望把此書抬到前四五世紀去,所以因了它和前三世紀的標準文言的不同而有此斷語。然而言語除了時代性之外還有地方性。孟子是前三世紀的人,但孟子一書乃是用魯國方言寫的而不是前三世紀的標準文言,他也承認。何以見得左傳的作者不能在前三世紀仍用他自己的方言著書呢? 第二部分,因爲尙書,詩經等都不是可以攏統地算作一種單純的作品的,所以他認它們爲自成文法系統的作品是一個錯誤。但他的比較研究的結果,說道:

> 在周秦和漢初書內,沒有一種有和左傳完全相同的文法組織的。最接近的是國語,此外便沒有第二部書在文法上和左傳這麼相近的了。

這是大可幫助今文家的主張的。今文家說劉歆割裂國語,造爲春秋左氏傳,今本的國語只是劉歆割裂的殘餘;如今他從文法的比較上證明這"兩部書的文法組織很是相同,"豈非添了一個有力的證據。第一部分把左傳的語言假定作"左語,"又把論語孟子的語言假定作"魯語,"選了七種助詞作爲比較的標準((1)"若"與"如,"(2)"斯"字作"則"字解,(3)"斯"字作

"此"字解，(4)"乎"字作"於"字解，(5)"與"字作疑問語尾，(6)"及"與"與，"(7)"於"與"于")，結果是都不同，左傳的語言決不是魯語。這是他的最大的成功。(爲節省篇幅起見，恕我對于適之先生之文不引原文，只作概括的敍述。)

在這方面的研究上，可以完全打破史記十二諸侯年表中僞竄的"魯君子左丘明"一句話。這句話看似平常，其實春秋左氏傳一個名詞的基礎就建築在上邊。左丘明因爲是魯人，故與孔子相接近。孔子的春秋因爲口授于弟子，弟子們將安其意而失眞，故左丘明要"因孔子史記(春秋)"而成左氏春秋(春秋左氏傳)。這顯而易見與劉歆所謂"左丘明好惡與聖人同"是一鼻孔出氣的。只因它不說左氏傳而說左氏春秋，所以還能騙人。如今把這"魯"字去掉了，左丘明已決不是魯人了，這句話也就失其存在的理由了。

高先生雖因今古文問題的糾纏，在審擇歷史材料上有些太寬泛的地方，但其證明左傳是焚書以前存在的，而不主張此書從孔門產出及其與魯國有何關係，則甚可把傳統的記載打破，而與今文家的說話互相印證。

總上所說，我以爲左傳與春秋的應該分家已是確定的事實。惟如何從左傳中析出其與春秋併家的時代所增入的部分，使得它可以回復爲一部古史，則有待於我們的努力者尚多。本篇之作，就是想從歷史方面提出一個在左丘明作書時所不曾有的問題而在現今的左傳中卻有豐富的材料的，用了漢新間的時勢來證明這些材料的由來。

XVI. 王莽的自本

禮記郊特牲有云:

> 諸侯不敢祖天子;大夫不敢祖諸侯。而公廟之設於私家,非禮也,由三桓始也。

這是儒家的階級思想,他們要使天子,諸侯,大夫…………的階級分明。因爲這樣,所以諸侯的祖只能推到始封者,而不能推到始封者之父(天子);大夫的祖只能推到始命者,而不能推到始命者之父(諸侯)。

王莽固然是禮家出身,不過他想做皇帝,便顧不得這些了。於是他打破禮教的束縛而發表他的自本。(顏師古注"自本"曰,"述其本系,"不知當時書名是不是這兩個字,今姑以書名待之。)漢書元后傳云:

> 莽自謂黃帝之後,其自本曰:"黃帝姓姚氏,八世生虞舜。舜起嬀汭,以嬀爲姓。至周武王,封舜後嬀滿於陳,是爲胡公。十三世生完,完字敬仲,犇齊,齊桓公以爲卿,姓田氏。十一世,田和有齊國。三世,稱王。至王建,爲秦所滅。項羽起,封建孫安爲濟北王。至漢興,安失國,齊人謂之王家,因以爲氏。
>
> "文景間,安孫遂,字伯紀,處東平陵。生賀,字翁孺,爲武帝繡衣御史,逐捕魏郡羣盜,…………翁孺皆縱不誅;它部御史…………至斬萬餘人。………翁孺以奉使不稱,免。嘆曰,'吾聞活千人,有封子孫。吾所活者萬餘人,後世其興乎!'
>
> "翁孺既免,而與東平陵終氏爲怨,迺徙魏郡元城委粟里,爲三老。魏郡人德之。元城建公曰,

'昔春秋沙麓崩,晉史卜之曰,"陰爲陽雄,土火相乘,故有沙麓崩。後六百四十五年,宜有聖女興。其齊田乎?"今王翁孺徙,正直其地,日月當之。元城郭東有五鹿之虛,即沙麓地也。後八十年,當有貴女興天下云。'"

在這一篇文字裏,我們可以知道幾件事實:

1.王莽有兩個祖先是古帝(黃帝,舜),又有幾世是周代的諸侯(陳),又有幾世是戰國時的王(齊);直至漢興,始爲平民。他是一個極久遠的貴族。

2.王賀捕盜,所活萬餘人,有興兆。

3.王賀徙居元城,即春秋時沙麓故地;而春秋時沙麓崩,晉史在占卜上已知道六百四十五年之後將有田氏聖女興的事。

王莽有了這樣一個高貴的世系,又有兩個興盛的豫兆,他就被證明爲有做皇帝的資格了。

於是,我們試把這篇話研究一下:

其一,他說"黃帝姓姚氏,"這是我們以前所沒有聽見過的,我們以前只從國語裏知道黃帝姓姬:

昔少典娶于有蟜氏,生黃帝,炎帝。黃帝以姬水成,炎帝以姜水成;成而異德,故黃帝爲姬,炎帝爲姜。(晉語四)

黃帝之子二十五人,其同姓者二人而已。……惟青林氏同于黃帝,故皆爲姬姓。(同上)

又從史記中知道黃帝姓公孫:

黃帝者,少典之子,姓公孫。(五帝本紀)

可是現在他又姓了姚，他便有三個姓了。

其二，他說"黃帝…………八世生虞舜，"這確與帝繫所謂：

> 黃帝產昌意。昌意產高陽，是為帝顓頊。顓頊產窮蟬。窮蟬產敬康。敬康產句芒。句芒產蟜牛。蟜牛產瞽瞍。瞽瞍產重華——是為帝舜及產象敖

相合。但國語（包左傳）中卻尚有一個幕：

> 有虞氏禘黃帝而祖顓頊……… 幕，能帥顓頊者也，有虞氏報焉。（魯語上）

> 陳，顓頊之族也。……… 自幕至於瞽瞍無違命，舜重之以明德。（左傳昭八年）

如果把幕插入帝繫的世系裏，豈不成了九世嗎？

其三，他說"舜起嬀汭，以嬀為姓，"這是又有問題的。堯典中固說"釐降二女於嬀汭，嬪於虞，"似乎舜有姓嬀的可能。但楚辭中說：

> 舜閔在家，父何以鱞？堯不姚告，二女何親？（天問）

左傳也說：

> 少康………… 逃奔有虞，…………虞思於是妻之二姚而邑諸綸。（哀公三年）

史記也說：

> 帝舜曰，"咨爾費，贊禹功，…………爾後嗣將大出！"乃妻之姚姓之玉女。（秦本紀）

可見戰國秦漢間人都以舜為姓姚。現在舜的姚姓送與黃帝，而自己則改姓為嬀了，這豈非一件奇突的事。但他所以

這樣說,也有他的道理。史記云:

> 陳胡公滿者,虞帝舜之後也。昔舜為庶人時,堯妻之二女,居於嬀汭,其後因為氏姓,姓嬀氏。(陳杞世家)

這可見司馬遷以為舜後即改姓為嬀的。又左傳云:

> 舜重之以明德,寘德於遂,遂世守之。及胡公不淫,故周賜之姓,使祀虞帝。(昭八年)

可見左傳的作者以為周初封胡公時是賜姓為嬀的。王莽以為舜後之陳既可姓嬀,則舜亦自可姓嬀了。(吾友丁山先生疑"姚"與"嬀"本一字而傳訛為二,以"為"之古文為"𤔲,"如寫作"㛂,"則與"姚"形體相似。若然,王莽的話也講得通了。)

其四,自胡公至田安,時代較近,有史書可憑,沒有問題。惟王氏是否濟北王之後,還有一點小疑問。王符潛夫論云:

> 周室衰微,吳楚僭號,下歷七國,咸各稱王。故王氏,王孫氏,公孫氏,…………國自有之。(志氏姓)

> 周靈王之太子晉,…………其嗣避周難於晉,家於平陽,因氏王氏。(同上)

然則王氏的來源並非單元,凡是王國之後都可姓王。王莽不姓田氏而姓王氏,固有出於田齊的可能性,卻無出於田齊的必然性。潛夫論又云:

> 漢高祖徙諸田關中。……… 及莽,自謂本田安之後;以王家,故更氏云。(同上)

加上"自謂"二字,言下也頗有不信任的意思。

其五,他以春秋時沙麓崩為王氏將興之兆,這是顯然的讕言。按春秋僖公十四年:

秋八月辛卯，沙麓崩。

它沒有說明在哪一國。公羊傳云，“沙鹿者何？河上之邑也。”“河上，”占的地方太廣了，究竟是哪裏呢？穀梁傳云，“林屬於山爲鹿；沙，山名也，”說得更空洞了。可知公穀二傳的作者實在沒有知道它在哪裏。到了左傳，始說：

秋八月辛卯，沙鹿崩。晉卜偃曰，“期年將有大咎，幾亡國。”

它已指定沙鹿爲晉國之地，晉當承其咎了。所謂“期年將有大咎，”蓋指僖十五年晉惠公與秦戰於韓被獲的事。疑左傳的作者看了下一年之經而定爲晉的咎徵，因以沙鹿爲晉地的。在這裏，也沒有齊田之聖女將興的卜說。(或曰，康氏定左傳爲劉歆改國語而成，你已相信他的話了。但康氏又說劉歆的改作左傳，主助莽篡。現在王莽以沙鹿崩爲王氏之瑞，而左傳無之，可見左傳不是助莽篡位的書了。它既不是助莽篡位的書，則必不出於劉歆的改作了。我說，左傳的出現由於劉歆，這是我相信的。但左傳的材料，性質甚爲複雜，有的是國語原文，有的是他種古書之文而爲劉歆所採，有的是劉歆所肊增，有的是劉歆以後的人所增，原不可一概而論。即劉歆所肊增者，有的是爲解釋經文而增，有的是爲發揮他自己意見而增，有的是爲適應漢末新初的時勢而增，也不可一概而論。且劉歆所增的，或因不合於東漢時的功令，或因不適於東漢人的脾胃，以致被刪或被改，也是可有的事。此等事皆有待於我們的詳細考核。康氏的話，只可作一個提議或一個發凡，完工的日子正遠着呢。所以我們現在對於左傳的話，不可用了一種簡單的標準去下評判。本篇中有的取它，有的駁它，並非沒無標準，乃是希望以不同的評判尋出多種的標準。至於研究的精密，自非今日之事。)這大約是王莽因自己

家裏住在沙鹿,(不是晉的沙鹿)故就春秋經文附會爲此。

綜上所說,可知自本中晉史之言,曰"陰爲陽雄,"曰"宜有聖女興,"明是王太后握了政權之後所造。曰"土火相乘,"也明是漢爲火德之說已興之後所造。曰"後六百四十五年,"按魯僖公十四年當西元前六百四十六年,至漢哀帝末年(西元前一)恰當此數。這一年,即是"王太后至未央宮收取璽綬,遣使者馳召莽,拜爲大司馬,與議立嗣,太后臨朝稱制,委政於莽"之年,王氏代漢的局面到這時可謂已成就了。

王莽的自本,我們審查之後,它的眞意義可以宣布了。此書的主要之點凡三。一,他爲黃帝之後,黃帝的土德是表現在他的名號上的,永遠不變的,故他亦應據有土德。二,他爲舜後,漢爲堯後,舜是受堯的禪讓的,所以他們應把這禪讓的故事復演一回。三,"陰爲陽雄,"故他應藉了姑母的力量而得國;"土火相乘,"故他應以土德代漢的火德。禪讓的次序這樣定了,五德相生的次序又這樣定了,他尙能不做皇帝嗎! 他不做皇帝,是上天所不許的了! 於是世經系統中的人物就一一跳躍而出,各各坐在他的新座位上,古代的歷史就爲之作全部的改觀了!

XVII. "炎帝神農氏"

上面講過,眭孟曾說"漢爲堯後,有傳國之運,"劉向父子又因說卦傳之文而尋出漢爲火德的道理,我們姑且承認這是昭帝和成帝時的眞事實吧。把他們所說的合起來,應如下式:

(火)　堯——漢

現在又出現了王莽的一個系統,說他自己是土德,又是黃帝和舜的苗裔。把這一說與上一式合攏來,應如下式:

(火)　　　　　堯——漢

(土)　黃帝——舜——王莽

這是何等合適的事情!火生土,是固定的了。堯禪舜,又是固定了的。那麼,漢的禪讓給莽,自然也是前定的事了。所感到的缺陷,只是王莽的祖先有黃帝和舜在五德終始中兩次輪到土德,連自己共有三次,而漢的祖先則只有一堯,其在五德終始中輪到的火德,連了自己只有兩次。所以堯的前邊,應當補上一位纔是。

說到這裏,就有一個疑問起來了。帝繫篇及史記中所寫的古帝王的世系,是:

黃帝—┬玄囂——蟜極——帝嚳——帝堯
　　　└昌意——顓頊——窮蟬——敬康——句芒——蟜牛——瞽瞍——帝舜

舜固是黃帝之後,堯亦何嘗不是黃帝之後呢!舜以黃帝之後而與黃帝同爲土德,何以堯爲黃帝之後而另成爲火德呢?這是王莽所沒法解答的。我猜想,他所以要請黃帝不姓姬而姓姚,或者存心要把黃帝拉到舜一邊來,使得堯與舜不同祖,而成爲:

(?姓)　　?——堯——漢

(姚姓)　黃帝——舜——王莽

的局面。他也許要把姬姓送給堯的祖呵!

王莽前的朝代是漢,虞舜前的朝代是唐,那是無疑問的。黃帝以前的朝代是什麼呢?照騶衍的原始的五德終始說,黃帝已在天地剖判之際了,黃帝以前更沒有帝了。但據騶

衍以後的記載，若呂氏春秋，若淮南子，若春秋繁露，若易繫辭傳，…………則黃帝之前尙有神農氏。既經這樣，漢的系統就可照了王莽的系統而寫爲：

(火)　神農氏——堯——漢

了。可是神農氏之爲火德，遠不及黃帝之爲土德的旗幟鮮明，未免不像，這將怎麼辦？於是他們又想到了炎帝。炎帝的火德，寫在字面上，比黃帝的土德還要清楚。只是以前人都說黃帝炎帝爲同父昆弟，他們是同時人，並不能劃分兩個時代。如何可以把表示黃帝前一代的"神農氏"和表示火德的"炎帝"兼而有之呢？於是勇於造僞史的漢人就把這兩位漠不相關的古人生生地合起來了，"炎帝神農氏"一名就出現了，戰國秦漢間陸續出現的神農事蹟全給炎帝收受了！這時的炎帝，再不是國語中的炎帝，再不是淮南子中的炎帝，也再不是史記中的炎帝了。

"炎帝神農氏"一名不太長嗎？他們（王莽及助王莽造僞史以篡位的人）說，不妨。舜爲有虞氏，已見於檀弓等書了。堯爲陶唐氏，也見於左傳及史記了。黃帝名曰軒轅，五帝德及史記也寫明了。用這些名氏來配"炎帝神農氏，"就可不嫌此名之特長，且可泯滅其拼湊的痕迹。於是劉王兩家的世系再經一次的遂寫，而成爲：

(火)　炎帝神農氏——帝堯陶唐氏——漢

(土)　黃帝軒轅氏——帝舜有虞氏——新（王莽以新都侯起，故國號當曰新。）

這何等地整齊好看！漢之所以必禪新，新之所以必繼漢，看了這一個世系表及其五德之運，再有什麼理由可以反對呢！

千餘年來,大家對於"炎帝神農氏"一名安之若素,所有的歷史書上都這樣寫了。但是這種偸天換日的手段固然可以欺騙一班庸衆,終於騙不了一二思考精密的學者。三國時,譙周作古史考,就以爲炎帝與神農各是一人(左傳正義引)。可惜這書已佚,無從知道他的理由。到淸代中葉,崔述作補上古考信錄,很痛快地說:

> 史記五帝本紀曰,"軒轅氏之時,神農氏世衰,諸侯相侵伐,暴虐百姓,而神農氏弗能征。"又曰,"炎帝欲侵陵諸侯;軒轅乃修德振兵,以與炎帝戰於阪泉之野。三戰,然後得其志。"夫神農氏旣不能征諸侯矣,又安能侵陵諸侯?旣云世衰矣,又何待三戰然後得志乎?且前文言衰弱,凡兩稱神農氏,皆不言炎帝。後文言征戰,凡兩稱炎帝,皆不言神農氏。然則與黃帝戰者自炎帝,與神農氏無涉也。其後又云,"諸侯咸尊軒轅爲天子,代神農氏,"又不言炎帝。然則帝於黃帝之前者自神農氏,與炎帝無涉也。
>
> 封禪書云,"古者封泰山,禪梁父者七十二家,而夷吾所記者十有二焉。神農封泰山,禪云云。炎帝封泰山,禪云云。"夫十有二家之中旣有神農,復有炎帝,其爲二人明甚,烏得以炎帝爲神農氏也哉!………
>
> 要之,自司馬遷以前未有言炎帝之爲神農者,而自劉歆以後始有之。

這眞是一個理直氣壯的駁詰,可惜不能起劉歆於地下而面

質之。

XVIII. 全史五德終始表的三難題

火德與土德既具備了這三次終始中的帝統,於是全部的歷史應當一切依照了這個方式而配置在三次終始裏了。

以前我們曾引班固郊祀志贊和荀悅漢紀,說劉向父子從說卦傳的"帝出乎震"一句話上尋出一個新的歷史系統,這個系統是:"包羲氏始受木德;其後以母傳子,終而復始;自神農黃帝下歷唐虞三代而漢得火。" 我們姑且相信,這是劉向生存時和他的兒子劉歆所共倡的學說。照這一說排下去,應爲:

	(第一次終始)	(第二次終始)	(第三次終始)
(木)	伏羲	堯	秦
(火)	神農	舜	漢
(土)	黃帝	夏	
(金)	顓頊	商	
(水)	帝嚳	周	

如此,從伏羲的木德開頭,依次循環,到漢而爲火德,本也說得過去。可是,這個系統對於王莽的自本是不合適的。試抽出火土二德,作一表以比較之:

假定的劉向終始說	從王莽的自本排列的漢新世系
(火) 神農——舜——漢	(火) 炎帝神農氏——堯——漢
(土) 黃帝——夏	(土) 黃帝————舜——新

然則照了前一說,漢雖火德,其所承之運乃舜而非堯;新雖土

德.其運乃不能承舜而承夏了。這和後一說太扞格了!

所以,爲王莽設想,一定要捨去這個簡易的"全史五德終始表"而別創一個,使得可與他的自本之說相合。他們那時所規擬的草稿,我們雖無從看見,但不妨試擬一個:

	(第一次終始)	(第二次終始)	(第三次終始)
(木)	1. ?——	6. ?——	11. ?
(火)	2. 炎帝神農氏——	7.堯——	12.漢
(土)	3. 黃帝——	8.舜——	13.新
(金)	4. ?——	9. ?	
(水)	5. ?——	10. ?	

這樣一排,立刻有許多問題起來:

其一,炎帝以前尚空一位,請誰坐?

其二,自黃帝至堯,尚空三位,請誰坐?

其三,自舜至漢,中空三位,請誰坐?

這又須他們大大地費一番考慮的功夫了!

第一問題似乎最易解決。炎帝既與神農合爲一人,那麽儘可請神農以前的天子作炎帝以前的天子。神農以前的天子,誰呢? 這是一想就想得出來的,是伏羲,因爲在莊子,淮南子,封禪書,戰國策,易繫辭傳等書裏都早已告知我們了。所以這第一位就請伏羲氏坐了下去。但是伏羲氏只是伏羲氏,他沒有複沓的稱號。如何可以照"炎帝神農氏"的辦法,加上兩字,還是一個未決的問題。

第二問題就困難了。從祭法裏,從五帝德和帝繫裏,從管子封禪篇和史記五帝本紀裏看五帝的系統,從黃帝到堯,中間只有顓頊和帝嚳兩代。這兩個人如何可以坐滿三個

位子呢? 這是一個極難解決的問題。

第三問題也不容易解決。自舜至漢的中間,實際上有夏,商,周,秦四代,但只有三個位子。前面一個問題嫌位子太多,這一個問題卻嫌太少了。能擠一個過去嗎? 不行,有王莽的自本在中間擋着。

第一問題缺少一個尊號,第二問題多出一個位子,第三問題缺少一個位子,這是王莽們重定五德終始表時所苦心焦思的三個難題。

XIX. 夏商周的新德及秦的閏統問題

現在,我們先從第三問題講起吧。

自虞至漢的中間,實際上有四代,但只留得三個位子,豈不是要"二桃殺三士"了嗎? 好在這是請坐的而不是搶坐的,權在請坐的人的手裏,由得他進退。所以他們仍用張蒼的老法子,把秦剔了出去。這樣一來,第九位爲夏,第十位爲商,第十一位爲周,就指定了;夏爲金德,商爲水德,周爲木德,也分配好了。

可是,以前講五德的人都說夏爲木德,商爲金德,周爲火德;其符瑞有青龍,銀山,赤烏等等。現在因湊付五德系統而使夏的木德變成了金德,商的金德變成了水德,周的火德變成了木德,人家若問他們有什麼佐證時將何以回答呢? 因爲這樣,所以有替他們各各造出些新符瑞的需要。

不幸那時的書亡佚太多,我們不能直接看見他們替夏商周造出的新符瑞。(世經中引有考德,顏師古注謂是考五帝德之書,其中對於五德之運當有不少新說,可惜失佚了。) 猶幸讖緯書中

頗有這一類的話。讖緯是發源於西漢末而盛行於東漢的，把王莽們手造的歷史保存在裏邊是很可能的事。現在鈔出幾條看一下：

> 禹，白帝精，以星感。修紀山行見流星，意感栗然，生姒戎文禹。（太平御覽卷八十二引尚書緯帝命驗）

> 周文王爲西伯。季秋之月甲子，赤雀銜丹書入豐鄗，止於昌戶；乃拜稽首受取，曰，"姬昌，蒼帝子。亡殷者紂也。"（太平御覽卷二十四引尚書中候）

> 夏，白帝之子。殷，黑帝之子。周，蒼帝之子。（禮記大傳正義引春秋緯元命苞）

照這樣講，夏商周的五德之運便適應於五行相生的系統了。（他們於周的符瑞所以還肯說"赤雀"者，因爲那時今文泰誓列於尚書，其中明言赤烏，壓沒不了，故姑存之，列之於不重要的地位。）

夏金，殷水，周木，既已定了，可是秦的水德的證據也太多，始皇本紀有之，封禪書有之，歷書有之，要完全推翻這件事實倒也不便。於是想出一個"閏位"的辦法來，說秦雖水德，但是他的水德是介於周木和漢火之間的，失了他的固有的行次，所以不久敗滅。又說他是"任知刑以強"的，只能算"伯（霸），"而不能算"王。"於是秦的一代就不爲正統而爲閏統，不爲"秦王"而爲"秦伯"了。

閏統的辦法有沒有先例呢？他們看國語，有這樣一段：

> 昔共工氏棄此道也，………欲壅防百川，墮高堙庳以害天下。……… 禍亂並興，共工用滅。（周語下）

看淮南子，又有這樣兩段：

> 昔者共工與顓頊爭爲帝，怒而觸不周之山；天

柱折，地維絕。……… 地不滿東南，故水潦塵埃歸焉。

（天文訓）

昔共工之力，觸不周之山，使地東南傾，與高辛爭爲帝，遂潛於淵，宗族殘滅，繼嗣絕祀。（原道訓）

他們想：共工與水既是這樣有關係，當然可以把他算做水德了。他的氣力可以觸不周之山而使地東南傾，其任力而不任德也可知了。他與顓頊或高辛爭爲帝，以致宗族殘滅，可見他的帝業是沒有成功的。這三個條件都與秦相符合，自然可把共工作爲秦的先例。但"木火之間"從天地剖判以來共有三次：秦已坐定第三次了，共工應該放在第一次或第二次呢？第二次在堯前，他們或者以爲堯典中的共工是堯的臣子，爲堯所流，又無叛逆的憑據，不應與國語和淮南子中的共工混同（漢書古今人表就分作兩人），所以把這爭帝不成的共工放到第一次去。但如此，他的時代又遠在顓頊和高辛之前，不能與他們爭爲帝了。好在這是小節，不妨歸之於古史傳說的紛歧。至於有大關係的五德次序，是定得妥當了。

然而，秦是統一天下的，共工若從沒有做過帝王，將不足與秦相配，所以也須把他說成一個統一天下的君主。但若竟把他說成"王天下，"那又違背了閏統的決定了。必得把他說成似王非王，然後可與"秦伯"對舉。於是他們創造些新證據，如下：

共工氏之伯九有也，其子曰后土，能平九土。

（魯語上）

共工氏有子曰勾龍，爲后土。（左傳昭公二十九年）

共工氏以水紀，故爲水師而水名。（左傳昭公十

七年)

如此,則共工氏自身是"伯九有"的,與秦極似。其子句龍又是"能平九土"的,多少與統一天下有些關係。至於"爲水師而水名,"其開國規模又已定了,其爲水德是無疑的事了。所差的,不過只成了"伯"而已。(此數條何以爲僞竄,當於下邊月令中的五帝五神一章中詳論之。)

第一次五德終始的木火之間,有以水德居閏統的共工。第三次,又有秦伯。第二次呢?世經中沒有說明。但我把它細讀幾遍,纔知道作者並沒有忘記。世經云:

> 帝嚳………爲木德。帝摯繼之,不知世數。……
>
> 帝堯………爲火德。

可見它是以帝摯爲第二次終始中的閏統的。帝摯這人,古書中說起得很少。帝繫云:

> 帝嚳卜其四妃之子而皆有天下。上妃………曰姜嫄氏,產后稷。次妃………曰簡狄氏,產契。次妃曰陳鋒氏,產帝堯。次妃曰陬訾氏,產帝摯。

史記五帝本紀云:

> 帝嚳崩而摯代立。帝摯立不善,崩,而弟放勳立。

帝繫的兄堯而弟摯,與史記的兄摯而弟堯雖有不同,且皆以嚳摯與堯看作帝統的三傳。現在世經卻說"帝摯繼之,不知世數,"直以帝摯自有其若干世,可以當得一代。帝摯在嚳木堯火之間爲閏統,豈不是與共工及秦甚相類嗎?(所差的,只是沒有說明他是水德。)

這三次五德終始中的閏統都定了,我們可以畫出一個

表來了:

終始之次 / 正統與閏統	第一次	第二次	第三次
木	伏羲氏	帝嚳	周
閏 水	共工	帝摯(水?)	秦
火	炎帝神農氏		漢

其實,什麽共工和帝摯,都不過作秦的閏統的陪襯而已;而秦之所以爲閏統,也不過被王莽的自本所擠,致虞之後,漢之前,只留得三個位子,不夠兼容四代,只得用了閏統之名來敷衍它一下罷了。

XX. "少昊金天氏"

第三問題患在地位之寡,他們想出閏統的辦法把秦安頓了。第二問題患在地位之有餘,既不能把一個人拆做兩個人(兩個人併作一個人則可,如炎帝神農氏),只得補一位進來。但這補進來的一位應當是誰呢?

他們於是翻出帝繫篇一瞧(這是我的猜想),知道顓頊是黃帝之孫,帝嚳是黃帝之曾孫,堯是黃帝之玄孫,從黃帝到堯共有五代,卻只有四帝,大可補入"黃帝之子"一帝來填滿這個空白,而成爲:

(土)	黃帝	全史五德終始表中	第三位
(金)	黃帝之子(未定其人)	,,	第四位
(水)	顓頊	,,	第五位
(木)	帝嚳	,,	第六位
(火)	堯	,,	第七位

這樣一安排,就開了兩種新紀錄。其一,顓頊與嚳,向來都附屬於黃帝土德之內的,現在一爲水德,一爲木德,都自占了五德之運。其二,新添了一個金德的天子,在黃帝之後,顓頊之前。

但,黃帝之子,國語中說有二十五人,其知名的有夷鼓,青陽,蒼林氏三人;加上帝繫所記,又有玄囂,昌意二人。就算用了司馬遷的"其一曰玄囂,是爲青陽"的說法,其知名的尙有四人。這帝位應當送給誰呢?他們在高文典册中找來找去(也是我的猜想),結果在周書(今稱逸周書)嘗麥解裏找得一段文字:

> 昔天之初,誕作二后,乃設建典,命赤帝分正二卿,命蚩尤於宇,少昊以臨四方,司□□上天末成之慶。蚩尤乃逐帝,爭於涿鹿之河,九隅無遺。赤帝大懾,乃說於黃帝,執蚩尤,殺之於中冀。……乃命少昊淸司馬鳥師以正五帝之官,故名曰質,天用大成,至於今不亂。

他們想,少昊名淸,又當黃帝之時,或者就是黃帝之子靑陽吧?他有"天用大成,至於今不亂"的大功,也可說是具備了爲帝的資格了。他們又在國語(今在左傳)裏找到一段文字:

> 昔帝鴻氏有不才子,掩義隱賊,好行凶德,……天下之民謂之渾敦。少皞氏有不才子,毀信廢忠,崇飾惡言,…………天下之民謂之窮奇。顓頊氏有不才子,不可教訓,不知話言,…………天下之民謂之檮杌。此三族也,世濟其凶,增其惡名,以至於堯;堯不能去。(左傳文公十八年)

他們想，少皞氏列於帝鴻氏和顓頊氏的中間，如果帝鴻氏可以解爲黄帝（後來賈逵鄭玄和杜預都釋帝鴻爲黄帝；但我們在山海經中知道帝鴻爲帝俊之子，非黄帝），則少皞氏在黄帝與顓頊的中間，非有天下之主而何，非後於黄帝而先於顓頊的有天下之主而何！於是這第四位就給少昊氏（“昊”與“皞”通）坐定他現成地享有了金德之運。

他們既經請了少昊插入五帝的組合裏而有成爲“六帝”的趨勢，在古史界中是怎樣一件大事。可是關於少昊的材料太少，他既沒有給戰國人鼓吹過，也沒有經秦漢人的宣傳，這個地位如何可以站得住呢？於是他們的偷天換日的手段又施展了。

第一，他們在國語裏加進了一段顓頊受帝位於少皞的故事。在鈔錄這一段文字之前，我們先須讀一讀史記的太史公自序：

> 昔在顓頊，命南正重以司天，北正黎以司地。唐虞之際，紹重黎之後，使復典之，至於夏商，故重黎氏世序天地。其在周，程伯休甫其後也。當周宣王時，失其守而爲司馬氏。司馬氏世典周史。

這原是司馬遷自敘其世系，誇揚其門第之言。但給劉歆一班人瞧見了，就把這段文字改頭換面，寫成下面一段文字：

> 昭王問於觀射父曰，“周書所謂‘重黎實使天地不通’者，何也？若無然，民將能登天乎？”對曰，“非此之謂也。古者民神不雜。民之精爽不攜貳者，…………則明神降之，在男曰覡，在女曰巫，是使制神之處位次主而爲之牲器時服。而後使先聖之

後之有光烈而能知山川之號,高祖之主,宗廟之事,…………而敬恭明神者以爲之祝。使名姓之後能知四時之生,犧牲之物,…………上下之神,氏姓之出,而心率舊典者爲之宗。於是乎有天地神民類物之官,是謂五官,各司其事,不相亂也。民是以能有忠信,神是以能有明德。…………

"及少皞之衰也,九黎亂德;民神雜糅,不可方物;夫人作享,家爲巫史。……… 禍災荐臻,莫盡其氣。顓頊受之,乃命南正重司天以屬神,命火正黎司地以屬民,使復舊常,無相侵瀆,是謂'絕地天通'。其後三苗復九黎之德,堯復育重黎之後不忘舊者使復典之,以至於夏商,故重黎氏世叙天地而別其分主者也。

"其在周,程伯休父其後也。當宣王時,失其官守而爲司馬氏;寵神其祖以取威於民,曰,'重實上天,黎實下地'。遭世之亂而莫之能禦也。………"(楚語下)

這一大段文字的來源共有三處。其一是尚書呂刑,抽取了裏邊的"乃命重黎絕地天通"一語而大做文章。其二是史記自序,整段地鈔進去,可謂熟讀司馬氏家譜。其三是山海經的大荒西經,摘了"帝令重獻上天,令黎邛下地"一語,說是出於司馬氏的宣傳。其他巫啊,史啊,祝啊,宗啊,說得非常透徹,這是因爲劉歆在王莽持政時做了"羲和,"又"治明堂,"又"典儒林史卜之官,"這些典制是他很熟諳的緣故。他主張"絕地天通,"或者他有感於王莽時圖讖之盛,競作符命封侯,

以致人心不安,覺得"神人雜糅"的不及"絕地天通"的好,也未可知。

我們何以知道這一段文字是假造的呢? 這有幾種理由。太史公自序之言如果是司馬遷鈔自國語,則九黎亂德,重黎正之,三苗亂德,重黎之後又正之,這正是司馬氏先代的兩件光榮的功績,自序裏爲何忘了? 重上天,黎下地,也是司馬氏家傳的兩件神聖的故事,自序裏爲何也忘了? 這還不奇,顓頊之王天下,受自少皞,國語之文明白如此,何以五帝本紀裏竟缺了少皞一代? 這還不奇,巫覡祝宗這些制度,國語裏口口聲聲說是古代確定的。故前云"各司其序,不相亂也,"下即云"少皞之衰,九黎亂德,"亂,即亂此巫覡祝宗所司之序也。下又云"三苗復九黎之德,"則又亂此矣。下又云"堯復育重黎之後不忘舊者,使復典之,"(史記無"不忘舊者"四字),則又復此矣。這樣的一個自古以來確定的制度,這樣的一個亂了兩回又復了兩回的舊典,在古代宗教史上是何等重要的材料,爲什麼司馬遷作封禪書時卻不錄一字呢? 爲什麼班固作郊祀志時又完全收進了呢? 此無他,司馬遷在劉歆前,還不知道有這些事;而班固生劉歆後,耳濡目染已久,不得不上他的老當罷了。(崔觶甫先生因疑五德終始說出於劉歆所造,故以封禪書爲"妄人錄漢書郊祀志。" 其實,五德終始說源遠流長,證據繁多,其變遷之跡亦自可尋,必不能把它一起卸在劉歆的肩上。至封禪書不錄郊祀志,則這一條乃是一個確證。歷書中有這段話,自然是僞竄的了。)

第二,他們在左傳裏又加進了一段郯子說祖德的故事。在鈔錄這一段文字之前,我們也應把左傳中幾段零碎話先

讀一下：

> 任，宿，須句，顓臾，風姓也，實司太皞與有濟之祀。（僖二十一年）

> 武王克商，成王定之，選建明德以藩屏周。……分魯公以大路大旂，……因商奄之民，命以伯禽，而封於少皞之虛。（定四年）

任國在今濟寧縣，宿與須句都在今東平縣，顓臾在今費縣（據春秋大事表），距魯都（今曲阜縣）均不逾二百里。看左傳此文，這幾個小國的先祖有名太皞的，有名有濟的。成王封伯禽為魯公，其地為少皞的舊墟。少皞與太皞名義相承，也有為東方小民族的一個先祖的可能。所以劉歆們又在左傳中插入一段。

> 秋，郯子來朝，公與之宴。昭子問焉，曰："少皞氏鳥名官，何故也？"郯子曰，"吾祖也，我知之！昔者黃帝氏以雲紀，故為雲師而雲名。炎帝氏以火紀，故為火師而火名。共工氏以水紀，故為水師而水名。……我高祖少皞摯之立也，鳳鳥適至，故紀於鳥，為鳥師而鳥名。鳳鳥氏，歷正也。玄鳥氏，司分者也。伯趙氏（伯勞），司至者也。青鳥氏，司啓者也。丹鳥氏，司閉者也。祝鳩氏，司徒也。鴡鳩氏，司馬也。鳲鳩氏，司空也。爽鳩氏，司寇也。鶻鳩氏，司事也。五鳩，鳩民者也。五雉為五工正，利器用，正度量，夷民者也。九扈（青雀）為九農正，扈民無淫者也。自顓頊以來不能紀遠，乃紀於近，為民師而命以民事，則不能故也。"（昭公十七年）

郯國在今郯城縣,離曲阜二百餘里。曲阜如眞爲少皞之虛,郯子也未嘗沒有爲少皞子孫的可能。可是這一段話,實在不能使人相信。他說少皞立於黃炎之後,可見他確認少皞是有天下者的一代。下面又說"自顓頊以來,"可見他又以少皞置於顓頊之上,和國語中的"顓頊受之"有同樣的意義。總之,他實定少皞爲黃炎以後,顓頊以前之一代,在這段文字中已明白寫出;這在劉歆之前是沒有人主張過的。至於一大批"鳥官,"掌歷法的獨多,且地位也特高,大概因爲劉歆自己通明歷法,且任羲和之官,借以自重也。

這段文字的根據在哪裏?我以爲也出在嘗麥解。那篇說,"乃命少昊清司馬鳥師以正五帝之官,"即是"以鳥名官"一事的來源。那篇說"故名曰質,"質之去聲爲摯,也即是"少皞摯"一名的來源。

自從國語中有了"及少皞之衰也,………顓頊受之"的一段紀載,左傳中又有了"少皞摯之立也,鳳鳥適至,故紀於鳥;………自顓頊以來,不能紀遠"的一段紀載,而後少皞之爲顓頊以前的天子,乃得了堅實的基礎。

但是,漢人雖愚,歷史的系統裏忽然跑進了一個嶄新的"古帝,"也不會立時信奉的,所以東漢初年的賈逵(他的父賈徽是劉歆的弟子;他傳父業,故爲古文學專家)對章帝說,

> 五經家皆言顓頊代黃帝,而堯不得爲火德。左氏以爲少昊代黃帝,即圖讖所謂帝宣也。如令堯不得爲火,則漢不得爲赤。其所發明,補益實多。
>
> (後漢書卷三十六本傳)

即此可知當時的經學家還不肯承認黃帝顓頊之間曾有少

皡一代,賈逵們要維持這個偶像猶須借重於圖讖中不同名的帝,更須借了"堯不得爲火則漢不得爲赤"的威嚇的話來聳動漢帝的聽聞。又可見賈逵所云"其所發明,補益實多"者,卽左傳中"發明"了"漢爲堯後"和"顓頊繼少昊後"諸說之後,其補益於漢家的五運歷數者乃甚多也。

到了東漢的中葉,這個新古帝的偶像依然沒有得到普徧的承認。所以張衡於順帝時曾條上司馬遷班固所敘與典籍不合者十餘事,其一事云:

> 帝系,"黃帝產青陽昌意。"周書曰,"乃命少皡行清,"清卽青陽也。今宜實定之。(後漢書卷五十九本傳,章懷太子注引衡集)

可知少皡卽青陽這一件事,經劉歆學派宣傳了一百餘年,還不曾得到"實定。"

自從古文學派戰勝了今文學派,把今文家的遺說剗除略盡,然後這個新古帝的偶像在初成立時所受的各方攻擊的痕迹看不見了。自從通學者起來,雜糅今古,亂攪一陣,然後這個新古帝的來源也弄糊塗了。攻擊的痕迹既看不見,來源又弄糊塗,於是這件事纔"實定"了!幾個作史的人和無數讀史的人習非成是,以爲這是固有的事實,再沒有懷疑的聲浪了!這樣平安地把人騙了一千七百餘年,直到康長素先生作新學僞經考,始發其覆,他道:

> 考五帝無少皡之說。……按〔逸周書嘗麥解〕蚩尤爲古之諸侯,而少皡與蚩尤爲二卿,同受帝命,則少皡亦古之諸侯,與蚩尤同,非五帝,更非黃帝之子甚明。

> 劉歆欲臆造三皇,變亂五帝之說,以與今文家為難,因躋黃帝於三皇而以少皞補之;…………又懼其說異於前人,不足取信,於是竄入左傳,國語之中。…………而不知其猶有逸周書遺文不能彌縫也。夫出於一己者則較若畫一,偶見他書者輒判然不同,其為己所私造尚待辨耶!
>
> 歆又竄之史記曆書中曰,"少皞氏之衰也,"即國語楚語之文。史記紀五帝用大戴禮世本之說;若左傳國語有少皞事,史公於二書素所引用,何以遺之? 其為僞竄,益無疑矣。如謂本紀據大戴,不兼他書,則八愷等說固兼左傳矣。如左國有少皞,斷無不兼及也。(文十八年"少皞氏有不才子,"與縉雲氏並稱。縉雲氏非古天子,則少皞未可據以為天子;殆即逸周書所稱之類。五帝本紀亦有此語,今皆不必斷為竄僞。)
>
> (史記經說足證僞經考)

劉歆如果看見這篇駁文,他應當痛悔當時疏忽,忘記把帝繫,五帝德和五帝本紀一起改竄了! (也許他曾想到改竄,只為"五帝"之名所限,不便改成六帝,因而縮手,亦未可知。)

黃帝的氏為軒轅,帝堯的氏為陶唐,上面已說過了。顓頊和帝嚳的氏是什麼呢? 五帝德說,"顓頊………曰高陽………帝嚳………曰高辛。" 帝繫說,"蟜極產高辛,是為帝嚳;………昌意產高陽,是為帝顓頊。" 則顓頊當為高陽氏,帝嚳當為高辛氏可知。(顓頊是否為高陽,帝嚳是否為高辛,這是很有問題的。但這不是世經所負的責任,因為在世經之前早已這樣說了。這些問題,將來作五帝德及帝繫姓考時當詳細討論,今不及。) 自黃

帝至帝堯五代中,別人都有了氏號,惟獨少昊沒有。這也須替他配上一個纔好。

要尋一個"口口氏"來配少昊,古書裏多得很,僅僅莊子一書已可找出二十個來,要湊湊場面原不為難。但少皡的得居於古帝中第四位,以金德王,事出偶然,毫無的據,容易給人窺破。他們感到應當替他找出"以金德王"的根據的需要,所以不在古書裏檢出一個"口口氏,"而逕自杜撰了一個"金天氏,"使得他的金德直接從名氏上表現出來,像炎帝黃帝的從帝號上表現出他們的火德土德一樣,於是"少皡金天氏"一個名字就成立了!(他們尙爲他想出許多金德的證據,下邊再詳敍。)

這個整齊的名字造成之後,如何插入古書裏呢?好在左傳是他們的勢力範圍,可以隨意增訂的,他們便在昭元年傳內淡淡地着了一筆:

> 昔金天氏有裔子曰昧,爲玄冥師。

又在昭二十九年傳中寫道:

> 少皡氏有四叔,曰重,曰該,曰修,曰熙,實能金木及水。使……修及熙爲玄冥。世不失職,遂濟窮桑。

讓這兩段文字以"玄冥"一名的聯絡,"世不失職"一事的呼應,見出"少皡氏"就是"金天氏,"而金天氏一名在古文籍中也就得到了根據。

這個譁名一直沿用下去,沒有被人戳穿。到崔述作補上古考信錄,始略略指出其破綻:

> 金天氏之名見於春秋傳,但云"裔子爲玄冥

> 陽"而已，未言爲少皞也………少皞氏之子雖嘗爲玄冥，然烈山氏之子柱爲稷，周棄亦爲稷；顓頊氏之子黎爲火正，高辛氏之子闕伯亦爲火正：則玄冥一官亦不必少皞氏之子孫而後可爲也。

因爲他沒有抓住這件事情的中心問題（這個中心問題必待清末幾個研究今古文問題的人出來纔會明白），所以他的駁詰的力量只能打在這一說的表面。

XXI. "太昊伏羲氏"

第三，第二問題都解決了。第一問題本已解決了一半（神農氏前爲伏羲氏），現在要找補一半也不算困難。

他們想，少皞之外不是還有一個太皞嗎？就從這個名字上看，已可知其在少皞之前。少皞既作了天子，他也未便向隅。既經伏羲氏上面缺着一個尊號，請他去頂補就是了。於是"太皞伏羲氏"一個名字又成立了！

但他們想，"庖犧氏之王天下，"繫辭傳中早已寫明，至太皞則但爲任宿諸國的祖先，書本上還沒有他作天子的明文；馬上推戴，似乎嫌鹵莽些。於是又在郯子的"鳥名官"一答內加了一句：

> 太皞氏以龍紀，故爲龍師而龍名，

顯見得他是和黃帝們一樣地有天下的；而且太皞紀龍，少皞紀鳳，亦正遙遙相應。至於太皞和伏羲兩名的連絡，也就在這"龍"字上生發。試看：

> 易曰，"天垂象，見吉凶，聖人象之。河出圖，雒出書，聖人則之。"劉歆以爲虙羲氏繼天而王，受

河圖,則而畫之,八卦是也。禹治洪水,賜雒書,法而陳之,洪範是也。(漢書五行志)

河以通乾出天苞;洛以流坤吐地符。河龍圖發;洛龜書感。(周易正義引春秋緯)

伏犧氏王天下,龍馬出河,遂則其文以畫八卦,謂之"河圖。"(僞孔安國尚書顧命傳)

燧人氏沒,宓犧代之。受龍圖,畫八卦,所謂"河出圖"者也。有景龍之瑞。(宋書符瑞志上)

伏羲受龍圖而畫八卦,太皞爲龍師而龍名,這是何等地符同阿! 可是尋求這一說的源頭,還是出在劉歆的書中。劉歆一倡了伏羲受河圖之說,於是緯書,尚書傳,符瑞志等便跟着他宣傳了,太皞與伏羲就合併而不可分了。然而,我們回顧前於劉歆的易繫辭傳,只有說:

包犧氏……仰則觀象於天,俯則觀法於地,觀鳥獸之文與地之宜,近取諸身,遠取諸物,於是始作八卦。

何嘗有受河圖,得龍瑞之說! 卽此可見伏羲時龍馬負圖出河之說是爲證實"太皞氏以龍紀"一事之用的,而太皞氏的以龍名官又是由少皞氏的以鳥名官比例而來的。(劉歆固然只說了"受河圖,"沒有說"龍負河圖,"但漢書引他的說話原是不完全的,且稍後於劉歆的緯書就已說"河龍圖發"了,在他支配之下的左傳也說"太皞氏以龍紀"了,他編入三統歷的世經已把太皞與伏羲合作一人了,則龍負河圖之說自有發於劉歆的可能。)

太皞卽伏羲,自從有了此說之後,似乎也沒有人懷疑過。惟崔述以爲應當分作兩人,他在左傳郯子的話中指出太皞

列於黃炎之後,與伏羲列在黃炎之前者不同。但左傳這一段,世經已說明是"逆數,"且它以太皞,少皞,共工,炎帝入於歷史系統,除世經之外更無是說;這段文字與世經相為表裏甚是明顯,實不足以駁世經。除此之外,崔氏再有一個較為可信的理由:

> 蓋自史記以前,未有言庖羲風姓,為龍師者,亦未有言太皞畫八卦,作網罟者。然則庖羲氏之非太皞也明矣。(補上古考信錄卷下)

XXII. "全史五德終始表"的定本

三個難題都解決了,古史系統已用了五行系統排列好了,古帝王的名氏也已在一個模型裏製造出來了,於是他們的"全史五德終始表"可以寫定了:


(木)	1.太皞伏羲氏	6.帝嚳高辛氏	11.周
(閏水)	共工	帝摯	秦
(火)	2.炎帝神農氏	7.帝堯陶唐氏	12.漢
(土)	3.黃帝軒轅氏	8.帝舜有虞氏	13.新
(金)	4.少皞金天氏	9.伯禹夏后氏	
(水)	5.顓頊高陽氏	10.商	

上面說過,漢書郊祀志贊以為這個新的五德終始系統是劉向父子排成的,其所持的理由是說卦傳上的一句話。贊云:

> 劉向父子以為"帝出於震,"故包羲氏始受木德;其後以母傳子,終而復始。自神農黃帝,下歷唐

虞三代,而漢得火焉。……… 昔共工氏以水德間於木火,與秦同運,非其次序,故皆不永。

現在我們既知道八卦的方位及其在五行上的分配,又知道世經的"全史五德終始表"的排列式,於是我們可以替這一段贊語補繪一個圖,如下:



這就是歷史系統在陰陽和五行上的根據！所謂"天統，"所謂"自然之應，"就是這件東西！

這一個圖，他們造成功的時候，一定拊掌稱快道，"新室的代漢有了歷史的根據了，證明得千眞萬確了！誰敢反抗的，即是'威侮五行，'應當'恭行天罰，勦絕其命！'"

於是他們宣布他們所作的世經。

不過，這個"西洋鏡"已給我們拆穿了；我們知道它構造的層次，我們認識它拼合的痕迹，我們領會它創立的宗旨。我們也有一個圖，現在就跟着他們的圖一起宣布了罷！

相生的五德終始	木	閏水	火	土	金	水	木	閏水	火	土	金	水	木	閏水	火	土
新的系統				黃帝						帝舜						新
漢的系統			炎帝						帝堯						漢	
湊成五德相生的系統	伏羲氏		神農氏		少皞	顓頊	帝嚳									
湊成古帝的複名	太皞			軒轅氏	金天氏	高陽氏	高辛氏		陶唐氏	有虞氏						
夏以後的次序											夏	商	周			
共工閏統的來源		共工						帝摯						秦		

〔說明〕1.紅綫圈，表示舊有的系統。//，表示本相聯合的兩個系統。

2.藍綫圈，表示假定國語（左傳的前身）所本有的。

3.黃綫圈，表示閏統。

XXIII. 世經的評判

世經中的五德終始的系統的來源,我們旣已明瞭,就可進而評判它的全文。

這一篇裏,有的是引用人家的話,有的是作者自己說的話。我們固然知道它所引的話半是自說自證,但也不妨開出一個單子,看它所依據的書籍共有多少種:

1. 春秋左氏傳
2. 易繫辭傳
3. 祭典(即小戴禮記中的祭法。)
4. 考德(顏師古注,"考德,考五帝德之書也。" 此書大約東漢時已佚,故他書中不見徵引。按,逸周書第四十二篇爲書德,但序云"武王秉天下論古施□而□位以官,作考德。" 如序文不誤,則篇題之"書德"應爲"考德"之誤。這一篇未知是否即世經所本,可惜也亡了,無從質證。)
5. 春秋外傳(即國語。)
6. 帝系(即大戴禮記中的帝繫。)
7. 書經
8. 書序
9. 周書(即逸周書。)
10. 禮記
11. 春秋
12. 史記(自書序至此五書,因與五德終始說無甚關繫,本篇未錄。)
13 著紀(漢書藝文志有漢著記百九十卷;顏師古注,

"若今之起居注。")

此外關於歷法的引用書籍,有殷歷,春秋歷,三統歷等。(尚有四分歷。按,四分歷爲漢章帝時李梵等所造,當是班固作律歷志時所增入。)

世經的作者取漢的世系於著紀;取商周秦的世系於書經,書序,周書,禮記,春秋,史記;取唐虞夏的世系於帝系;取唐以上的世系於左傳,國語,易傳,祭典,考德。其自己說的,則是五行相生的次序,及何以此書有而彼書無的解釋。

現在,我們單把它的唐以上的世系所根據的材料審查一下。繫辭傳中"庖犧氏之王天下也"一章,說的是觀了卦象而制器的故事。但這一章的學說的基礎,建築於說卦傳的物象上和九家易的互體和卦變上。說卦傳爲漢宣帝時所出,已見上文。九家易則是京房一派的易學。必須用了這些學說來講,纔能把這一章的故事講通。所以我很疑心這是京房學派所作,插入繫辭傳的。(我曾作"論繫辭傳中觀象制器的故事"一文,登燕大月刊第六卷第三期。)在那時,後期五帝說正流行着,所以作者就採取了這一個歷史系統作爲易學系統。左傳,國語,爲劉歆一輩人所僞竄,尤其是世經所引的"少皞摯之立也"和"少皞之衰,顓頊受之"這兩章,爲要湊成新的五德終始系統而造作,上面也已說過了。祭法一篇,本是鈔襲魯語而成(見崔述經傳禘祀通考),其所謂"共工氏伯九域"即用魯語的話。那時春秋內外傳(他們日左傳爲春秋內傳,國語爲春秋外傳)全在劉歆的掌握之中,要怎樣增改就怎樣增改。共工之所以得列入古史系統,只因他曾有爭爲帝的傳說,恰與秦相近似,可以作爲閏統的先例。故秦既爲水,他

亦只得爲水；秦既爲伯，他亦只得爲伯。故"爲水師"及"伯而不王"諸說必出於重排五德終始表之後。國語之文是劉歆改的，祭法之文本是鈔錄展禽論祭海鳥一章的，他改了國語這一章（實際上不是改，是增加。只要把"非是族也，不在祀典"之句直接"黃帝能明民共財，"删去有烈山氏和共工氏一段，就是原本的樣子。當於下邊月令中的五帝五神一章中詳論之），併把祭法改了，是很容易的事。考德一書，除了這裏所引的一語之外，別處再也沒有見過。這書既考五帝之德而又特著少皞，與舊說不同，足徵其亦出於王莽劉歆們的手筆。總此而論，世經中唐以上的世系所根據的五部書是沒有一部可靠的，這些材料是都出於西漢末葉的。

世經中，可以提出的問題尚多。今把上面所鈔的世經文字逐段寫出，加以評判：

> 春秋昭公十七年，"郯子來朝。"傳曰，"昭子問少昊氏鳥名何故，對曰，'吾祖也，我知之矣！昔者黃帝氏以雲紀，故爲雲師而雲名。炎帝氏以火紀，故爲火師而火名。共工氏以水紀，故爲水師而水名。太昊氏以龍紀，故爲龍師而龍名。我高祖少昊摯之立也，鳳鳥適至，故紀於鳥，爲鳥師而鳥名。'"言郯子據少昊受黃帝，黃帝受炎帝，炎帝受共工，共工受太昊，故先言黃帝，上及太昊。稽之於易，炮犧神農黃帝相繼之世可知。

這一段話頗迷蒙了許多人的眼。以崔述那樣精密的人亦信左傳爲實錄而以世經爲曲解。他以爲它們是兩個系統：

（左傳的系統）黃帝——炎帝——共工——太昊——少昊，

（世經的系統）太昊——共工——炎帝——黃帝——少昊。

他又以爲就太昊少昊兩個名字看,就可知道是相承的兩帝。(補上古考信錄云,"太皞少皞不同姓,若其時又不相及,則何爲皆以'皞'名? 而太皞紀官爲龍,少皞紀官爲鳳,亦似相比然者"。) 這單就左傳和世經的文字上着眼固然如此;但我們知道了世經的系統的構成的經過,知道了少昊是爲塡滿一個空位用的,太昊是爲補成伏羲氏的尊號用的,又知道了共工的閏統和水德以及其介於木火之間是爲作秦的先例用的,則左傳這段文字實與世經一鼻孔出氣,必非較早的材料。太昊與少昊的不相承,並非他們不該相承,乃是爲五德系統所牽制而無法相承。至於左傳何以要用逆數,則以少昊共工二代的出現以及太昊與伏羲氏合名的出現甚不光明,倘也照了世經寫了,或者更要起人懷疑,所以偸偸摸摸,在左傳中插下這種"似非而是"的材料,來惑亂學者的耳目。就使有人出來打破世經的系統,也不能連帶打破左傳的系統。左傳的系統不破,則太昊少昊和共工還是列於古帝王的系統中,世經的歷史還能保持其一部分的信用。這是他們作僞技術的高超!

郯子所說的五種紀官法,大約只有黃帝一種是較早的傳說,史記中說黃帝"官名皆以雲命,爲雲師,"左傳中也有縉雲氏(史記集解引應劭說,黃帝的夏官爲縉雲)。至炎帝的火官由他的火德來,共工的水官由他的水德來,本極顯明。太昊的龍官,由於伏羲氏得龍負的河圖而畫八卦來,上面已說明了。少昊的鳳,也正與太昊的龍相輝映。故此四種官中,水火爲五德,龍鳳爲符瑞。

太昊帝: 易曰,"炮犧氏之王天下也。" 言炮犧繼天而王,爲百姓先首。德始於木,故爲帝太昊。作罔罟以田

漁,取犧牲,故天下號曰炮犧氏。

這除了"太昊帝"一名之外,幾乎完全取自繫辭傳。以前把無懷氏或燧人氏放在伏羲氏之前的系統,他一概不睬,好像司馬遷作五帝本紀不睬黃帝以前似的。但司馬遷雖不睬黃帝以前,還說黃帝繼神農氏爲天子,承認黃帝以前尙有帝王;他則說"炮犧繼天而王,爲百王先首,"直認伏羲爲開天闢地的人了。司馬遷作史,以五帝德的系統爲其系統,劉歆們作史,以繫辭傳的系統爲其系統,不使古史伸展過長,這都算得他們的斷制謹嚴。

祭典曰,"共工氏伯九域。"言雖有水德,在火木之間,非其序也。任知刑以彊,故伯而不王。秦以水德,在周漢木火之間。周人遷其行序,故易不載。

這幾句話,實已把共工氏的閏統由秦比例而來的意思說明了。繫辭傳中只說觀象制器的故事;共工如未制器,傳中本應無名。此云"周人遷其行序,故易不載,"可見作者看繫辭傳爲正則的古史,凡繫辭傳所沒有的必爲尋出其所以缺去的理由,這眞可謂"牛頭不對馬嘴。"(但卽此可知,繫辭傳中這一章文字在那時是極有勢力的。)至"周人遷其行序,"怎樣遷法,他沒有說,這又使我心癢難爬了!

共工這一名,後來都以世經關係分作兩人,一置在炎帝前,一置在堯時。我以爲只是一個。堯典說:

帝曰,"疇咨若予采?"驩兜曰,"都,共工方鳩僝功!"帝曰,"吁,靜言庸違,象恭滔天!"

帝曰,"咨,四岳,湯湯洪水方割,蕩蕩懷山襄陵,浩浩滔天,下民其咨,有能俾乂?"僉曰,"於,鯀

哉!"……帝曰,"往欽哉!"九載,績用弗成。

這兩段文字,以前的人都分開講:治洪水者只是鯀而共工不與。然則"共工方鳩僝功,"鳩的是什麼功呢?他們也說不出來。按,周語說:

> 昔共工棄此道也,…………欲壅防百川,墮高堙庳以害天下,…………禍亂並興,共工用滅。其在有虞,有崇伯鯀播其淫心,稱遂共工之過,堯用殛之於羽山。

可見在那時的傳說中,共工的工作也是治水,他的治水的方法是墮山以壅川;後來鯀治水時又用他的方法,所以績用弗成,給堯殛了。把這一段話與堯典所說的合看,似堯典中的"方鳩僝功"卽指"墮高堙庳"之事。故堯說他"象恭滔天,"與下文的"浩浩滔天"正相應。疑堯典的作者本說共工治水不成而致洪水滔天之禍,堯乃詢四岳以治水之人而得鯀,終於一樣地失敗:但以文義較晦,不易看清楚耳。

因為共工為鯀前治水的人,民間對於他有一種水的傳說,故淮南子天文訓說他與顓頊爭為帝,"地維絕;地不滿東南,故水潦歸焉"(此與天問所云"康回馮怒,地何故以東南傾?"者類同)。又原道訓中說他與高辛爭為帝,"遂潛於淵"(此與左傳所云"鯀化為黃熊,其神入於羽淵"者類同)。至本經訓則云:

> 舜之時,共工振滔洪水以薄空桑,龍門未開,呂梁未發,江淮通流,四海溟涬,民皆上丘陵,赴樹木。舜乃使禹疏三江五湖,…………鴻水漏,九州乾。

直以洪水之災為共工所發出。共工既與水的關係這樣深,於是劉歆們派他為水德,廁入太昊與炎帝之間,又在左傳郯

子的話中埋伏了僞證,算作古帝王的一代,而與堯典中的共工分了家。但他在治水或鬧水的傳說中雖有勢力,而在帝王系統中則除了左傳和世經之外卻再沒有憑藉,他在這一點上是得不到民衆的傳說作後盾的,所以後來編古史的人對於他的霸統就常常忘記或删卻了。

炎帝:易曰,"炮犧氏沒,神農氏作,"言共工伯而不王,雖有水德,非其序也。以火承木,故爲炎帝。教民耕農,故天下號曰神農氏。

這條中,關於神農氏(除炎帝)的材料也都取自繫辭傳。因爲繫辭傳中把神農氏緊接炮犧氏,劉歆們恐人誤會,故對於共工的閏統復作一次解釋。

黃帝:易曰,"神農氏沒,黃帝氏作。"火生土,故爲土德。與炎帝之後戰於阪泉,遂王天下。始垂衣裳,有軒冕之服,故天下號曰軒轅氏。

這一條把繫辭傳的"垂衣裳"與"軒轅"的名詞作一個八股文的搭題。又把史記的"與炎帝戰於阪泉"改作"與炎帝之後戰於阪泉。"這"之後"二字大可注意,因爲炎帝已從一個人變成了一代了!(此與史記言"神農氏世衰"者正相同。)

少昊帝:考德曰,"少昊曰清。"清者,黃帝之子青陽也。是其子孫名摯立。土生金,故爲金德。天下號曰金天氏。周遷其樂,故易不載,序於行。

這段話說得非常蹊蹺。旣說"少昊曰清,淸者黃帝之子青陽,"是少昊爲黃帝之子無疑。乃又說"是其子孫名摯立,"那麼,王天下的少昊又是青陽的子孫而非黃帝之子了。前後兩句話中,爲什麼會得這樣衝突?我想,這至少有兩個理

由。其一,是要把一個人名變成一個代名,因爲一個人在五德中占有一德,似乎這五德之運轉得太快了。他要使得少昊一名,自黃帝之子以至青陽的子孫都用爲稱號,有如炎帝或神農氏一樣。其二,黃帝之子青陽,向不說爲有天下,一旦令其繼黃帝即位,難免給人破壞;所以油滑一點,說得模棱兩可。倘使有人出來反對,便可分辨道,"我只說青陽的子孫作天子,本沒有說是黃帝之子呵!"

> 顓頊帝:春秋外傳曰,"少昊之衰,九黎亂德;顓頊受之,乃命重黎。"蒼林昌意之子也。金生水,故爲水德。天下號曰高陽氏。周遷其樂,故易不載,序於行。

這一條裏,把顓頊說爲"蒼林昌意之子,"也是一個創聞。黃帝的兒子,國語中有夷鼓,青陽,蒼林氏,帝繫中有玄囂,昌意,它們說的本來各不相關。自史記說"玄囂,是爲青陽,"而玄囂與青陽併作了一人。這裏說"蒼林昌意之子,"而蒼林氏與昌意又併成了一個。假使依照"炎帝神農氏"的辦法,顓頊的父親大可被稱爲"昌意蒼林氏"了。只可憐賸下一個夷鼓,不再有弟兄和他併家了!

> 帝嚳:春秋外傳曰,"顓頊之所建,帝嚳受之。"清陽玄囂之孫也。水生木,故爲木德。天下號曰高辛氏。帝摯繼之,不知世數。周遷其樂,故易不載。周人禘之。

世經對於上古史的系統,一以易繫辭傳爲主,凡爲繫辭傳所沒有的,必爲尋出其所以不載的原因。共工以水德介於木火之間,非其次序,故云"周人遷其行序,故易不載。"少昊,顓頊,帝嚳,於五行之序沒有差錯了,而繫辭傳也沒有,則云"周遷其樂,故易不載。"但繫辭傳所記只是觀象制器的故事,

與行序和樂有什麼關係呢？ 而且遷了行序和樂，難道就可革掉他們的世次，不承認他們曾經王天下嗎？ "周人禘嚳，" 魯語和祭法都說了，這裏也說了。 嚳爲周之自出，用了最尊重的祭禮去祭他，然而竟革掉他的世次，消滅他在歷史上的地位，這是什麼道理？ 願劉歆有以語我來！

這一條於帝嚳之下寫"帝摯繼之，不知世數，"似乎作者特別愼重，多聞闕疑。 其實不然。 從前把古代看得很短，故騶衍們排五德符應，夏以前只共占一德；而帝繫中排帝王世次，自五帝的首一代至末一代，總共不過九世。 但經過西漢二百年的醞釀，這古史系統定須放長了。 劉歆們既肩了重定古史系統的責任，不得不實現此放長的一義。 放長的辦法有二，一以一德拆成數德，一以一世拆成數世；如此，便可顯出其占有的時間之長。 爲了一德拆成數德，故自黃帝至堯舜，雖在一族，亦各有其五德之運。 爲了一世拆成數世，故此篇於黃帝則云"與炎帝之後戰於阪泉，"見得炎帝傳了若干世纔到黃帝。 於少昊則云"黃帝之子青陽，是其子孫名摯立，"見得黃帝傳了若干世纔到少昊。 於顓頊則云"少昊之衰，顓頊受之，"見得少昊傳了若干世纔到顓頊。 於帝嚳則云"帝摯繼之，不知世數，"見得帝摯傳了若干世纔到帝堯。（下條於帝堯云，"高辛氏世衰，天下歸之，"亦卽此意。） 可是，漏洞總是掩蓋不盡的。 顓頊既爲蒼林昌意之子，無論蒼林昌意是不是一個人，顓頊總是黃帝之孫。 從黃帝到少昊已歷若干世了，少昊之後又歷若干世，而顓頊始得卽天子之位，他何以這樣老壽，眼看他的姪子，姪孫，曾姪孫，玄姪孫⋯⋯⋯⋯一世一世地過去呢？ 既曰帝摯繼帝嚳不知世數了，既曰高辛氏世衰，

天下歸堯了,那麼堯之距嚳亦甚遠矣,爲什麼又云"帝嚳四妃,陳豐生帝堯,"堯還是嚳的兒子呢? 故卽用世經之文自相對勘,也是七穿八洞的。於此可見製造假古董實在不是一件容易的事,雖以劉歆的才能也不能不露出破綻來。

世經自堯以下,除了五德的次序以外,大都沿用舊史,用不着在本篇中批評了。(夏商周的年數仍有問題,但這是三統歷的問題,將來當於三統說下的政治和歷史中詳論之。)

這篇文字,是中國上古史材料中最重要的一件。二千年來的傳統的上古史記載以及一班人的上古史觀念,誰敢不受它的支配! 雖是從我們的眼光裏看出來是七穿八洞的,但要是我們生早了若干年,我們便未必能看出;就使看出了也未必敢這樣說。這便叫作權威,叫作偶像!

世經,我說是劉歆作,或者有人要不信,以爲這是劉歆的三統歷所引,如何便把創作的責任也歸給了他。但五行相生的五德終始說下的歷史系統,班固的漢書,荀悅的漢紀,都說爲"劉向父子"所立。劉向有三個兒子,長子伋,中子賜,少子歆,伋和賜在政治和學術上都不占地位。劉向固然可以創立相生的五德終始說,但决不能創立世經的歷史系統。因爲世經的歷史系統是從王莽的自本上出發的,其基礎實建築於王氏代劉氏上。劉向對於王鳳等的擅權已經痛哭流涕了,如何肯幫助王莽去取得代漢的符應! 何况成帝末年,向已死了(見漢書禮樂志),他又怎能豫爲王莽留下這代漢的符應呢! 所以用了相生的五德終始說作成世經的歷史系統,這是劉向所不知道的,想不到的。劉向旣不能作,伋和賜在政治和學術上也都不占地位,賜又早卒,然則只有爲王

莽典文章的劉歆是有著作的資格了。何況左傳之文與此書相爲表裏，左傳乃是經過劉歆的筆削的，正可作爲旁證呢。至班固們對於此書的著作人，何以不說爲劉歆而說爲"劉向父子，"我以爲他們是上了劉歆的當。劉歆因爲他的父親是當時學術界的碩望，所以他發表自己的主張時要利用他的父親的牌子做擋箭牌。並且這樣一來，使世經的歷史系統的出現提前了若干年，也可騙人相信，王之代劉，實爲前定之事，並不是王莽作了攝皇帝之後而始爲即眞之謀了。

或者又有人要駁我，說：班固們所說的"劉向父子，"只是說他們創立相生的五德終始說下的歷史系統而已，何曾說他們所創立的乃是世經的歷史系統。如有此駁，我將答說：班固所謂劉向父子所創立的新學說實即是世經的歷史系統。試列表以明之：

漢書郊祀志贊	世經
包羲氏始受木德。	炮犧氏………爲百王先首，德始於木。
其後以母傳子，終而復始。	以火承木，故爲炎帝。黃帝爲土德。少昊爲金德。顓頊爲水德。帝嚳爲木德。帝堯爲火德。
自神農黃帝下歷唐虞三代而漢得火焉。	漢高祖皇帝………繼周。木生火，故爲火德。

昔共工氏以水德間於木火,與秦同運,非其次序,故皆不永。	共工………雖有水德,在火木之間,非其序也,…………故伯而不王。 秦以水德,在周漢木火之間。

即此可知,班固作郊祀志贊時所舉的劉向父子的新學說確指世經而言。 我們既知道劉向必不能立世經的系統,其長子和次子又沒有創立此新學說之可能,則世經的著作人不是劉歆再有什麼人呢?

XXIV. 王莽的受禪及其改制

古帝王的系統定了,世經公佈了,於是王莽就動手收拾漢家的天下了。 漢書王莽傳說.

> 梓潼人哀章學問長安,素無行,好爲大言。 見莽居攝,卽作銅匱爲兩檢:署其一曰"天帝行璽金匱圖,"其一署曰"赤帝行璽某傳予黃帝金策書,"——某者,高皇帝名也。 書言王莽爲眞天子,皇太后如天命。 圖書皆書莽大臣八人,又取令名王興,王盛,章因自竄姓名,凡爲十一人,皆署官爵爲輔佐。……… 昏時,衣黃衣,持匱至高廟,以付僕射。 僕射以聞。
>
> 戊辰,莽至高廟,拜受金匱神嬗。 御王冠,謁太后. 還坐未央宮前殿,下書曰,"予以不德,託於皇初祖考黃帝之後,皇始祖考虞帝之苗裔,而太皇太后之末屬。 皇天上帝隆顯大佑,成命統序,符契圖

> 文,金匱策書,神明詔告,屬予以天下兆民。赤帝漢氏高皇帝之靈承天命,傳國金策之書。予甚祗畏,敢不欽受! 以戊辰直定,御王冠,即眞天子位,定有天下之號曰新。其改正朔,易服色,變犧牲,殊徽幟,異器制,以十二月朔癸酉爲建國元年正月之朔。以鷄鳴爲時。服色配德上黃。犧牲應正用白。使節之旄旛皆純黃;其署曰'新使五威節,'以承皇天上帝威命也!"

那時漢與新的禪讓,並非孺子嬰傳授與王莽,乃是漢高祖傳授與王莽,也即是赤帝傳授與黃帝。故哀章所作之銅匱,題爲"赤帝行璽邦傳予黃帝金策書,"莽受嬗後所下書,亦云"赤帝漢氏高皇帝之靈承天命,傳國金策之書,"又云"予復親受金策於漢高皇帝之靈。"這或者因禪讓之事須由漢高祖承天命爲之,方見鄭重,或因孺子嬰太幼,不足行禪讓之事,或因哀章的銅匱上這樣署了便這樣幹,皆未可知。我們在這條上,可以知道當時人的信仰,凡以火德王的都可稱爲赤帝,以土德王的都可稱爲黃帝;而五德相生,帝王的嬗讓是以"圖書"爲其信物的。(這與"河圖洛書"很有關係,詳下'讖緯書中的受命"章。)

王莽得國之後,第一件事就是改制。他的改制的方式,和漢武帝一樣:是把三統說與五德說混合用的。他在三統說中自居於白統,在五德說中自居於土德。他爲要自居於土德費了很大的氣力,把古史系統完全改變,已見上文。至於白統,則是承接漢的黑統而來,他完全收受傳統的見解,絲毫不曾費力。我們可以列出一個表來,顯明他的改制的意

義:

三統說			五德說		
白統的事項		王莽的改制	土德的事項		王莽的改制
正朔	歷正日月朔於營,斗建丑。(繁露)	以十二月朔癸酉爲建國元年正月之朔。	服色	土氣勝,故其色尙黃。(呂氏春秋)	服色配德上黃。
朝正	親黑統,故日分鳴晨,鳴晨朝正。(繁露)	以雞鳴爲時。	徽幟	(以始皇爲水德,其旄旌節旗皆上黑比例之,則土德之旄旌節旗當上黃。)	使節之旄幡皆純黃。
犧牲	郊牲白。(繁露)	犧牲應正用白。			

這可謂最守法度的改制,在歷史上最有根據的改制了。

他的第二件事,是封國和命官。王莽傳云:

> 始建國元年正月朔,…………順符命去漢號焉。…………莽乃策命孺子曰,"咨爾嬰! 昔皇天右乃太祖,歷世十二,享國二百一十載,歷數在於予躬。詩不云乎,'侯服於周,天命靡常。' 封爾爲定安公,永爲新室賓。往踐乃位,毋廢予命!" 又曰,"其以平原,安德,漯陰,鬲,重丘凡戶萬,地方百里,爲定安公國,立漢祖宗之廟於其國,與周後並,行其正朔服色,世世以事其祖宗。………" 讀策畢,莽親執孺子手流涕歔欷曰,"昔周公攝位,終得'復子明辟。' 今予獨迫皇天威命,不得如意!" 哀嘆良久。
>
> (中敍封四輔,三公,四將軍,文多不錄。在這十一人中,劉歆的官爵是國師,嘉新公;哀章是國將,美新公。)
>
> 策曰,"………帝王之道,相因而通;盛德之祚,百

世享祀。予惟黃帝,帝少昊,帝顓頊,帝嚳,帝堯,帝舜,帝夏禹,皋陶,伊尹,咸有聖德假於皇天,功烈巍巍,光施於遠。予甚嘉之,營求其後,將祚厥祀。惟王氏,虞帝之後也,出自帝嚳;劉氏,堯之後也,出自顓頊。"於是封姚恂爲初睦侯,奉黃帝後。梁護爲脩遠伯,奉少昊後。皇孫功隆公千,奉帝嚳後。劉歆爲祁烈伯,奉顓頊後。國師劉歆子疊爲伊休侯,奉堯後。嬀昌爲始睦侯,奉虞帝後。山遵爲褒謀子,奉皋陶後。伊玄爲褒衡子,奉伊尹後。漢後定安公劉嬰位爲賓。周後衞公姬黨更封爲章平公,亦爲賓。殷後宋公孔弘,運轉次移,更封爲章昭侯,位爲恪。夏後遼西姒豐,封爲章功侯,亦爲恪。四代古宗,宗祀於明堂,以配皇始祖考虞帝。周公後褒魯子姬就,宣尼公後褒成子孔鈞,已前定焉。

這個封爵系統即是世經的歷史系統,少昊一代在詔書裏公布了,而且他也有了後代了。他所謂漢"享國二百一十載,"即是谷永說的"涉三七之節紀。"他所謂"予獨迫皇天威命,"即是眭弘(?)說的"漢家,堯後,有傳國之運,"也即是自本中的晉史說的"土火相乘。"漢命不得不終,新又不得不興,這是五德三統的運行中所必有的事實,他哪裏是篡位呢!

不過,在這一篇詔書裏,又有奇突的問題發生了。從帝繫看,從史記看,堯爲帝嚳之子,舜爲顓頊六世孫,甚明白。就是世經,它雖把年代伸長了許多,但對於帝繫之說還沒有打破。爲什麼王莽的詔書裏卻說,"惟王氏,虞帝之後也,出自帝嚳;劉氏,堯之後也,出自顓頊,"而以皇孫功隆公千奉帝嚳

後,劉歆爲祁烈伯(這當是另一個劉歆,那個劉歆已封爲嘉新公了;下面封劉疊爲伊休侯,別之曰"國師劉歆子,"即因此),奉顓頊後,竟把他們祖孫父子的關係倒了轉來呢? 這或者因漢在新前,漢祖堯在新祖舜前,故堯的上代亦應在舜的上代之前,或者要在堯舜禪讓之外更使顓頊帝嚳禪讓一次,以見漢新兩代的祖先無不在禪讓的型式之中,遂有此改定,皆未可知。(這是專屬世系而不屬五德的一個改變。)

他的封國是依照三統說的。繁露云,"下存二王之後以大國,使稱客而朝,"故他封漢後劉嬰爲定安公,周後姬黨爲章平公,位爲賓。繁露云,"絀王謂之帝,封其後以小國,"當新朝時,三王是"新,漢,周,"周的前一代應爲五帝,其裔孫應封小國了,故他說"殷後宋公孔弘,運轉次移,更封爲章昭侯。"我們現在可把他所封的古帝王之後列爲一表,總看一下:

(1)	黃帝	姚恂	侯		
(2)	少昊	梁護	伯		
(3)	顓頊	劉歆	伯		
(4)	帝嚳	王千	公		
(5)	帝堯	劉疊	侯		
(6)	虞帝	嬀昌	侯		
(7)	夏	姒豐	侯	恪	宗祀明堂,配虞帝。
(8)	殷	孔弘	侯	恪	宗祀明堂,配虞帝。
(9)	周	姬黨	公	賓	宗祀明堂,配虞帝。
(10)	漢	劉嬰	公	賓	宗祀明堂,配虞帝。

在此表內,以近古數代列爲賓恪,配事虞帝,是應用春秋家的"親,故"之義的。 其以二王後(周,漢)封公,二王以前封侯,最前

數代封伯,則是應用春秋家的"親,疏"之義的。至於黃帝之後不封伯而封侯,帝嚳之後不封侯而封公,各升一級者,當以黃帝與帝嚳俱爲王莽所自認的直系的祖先之故。如果不升級,則同時應封伯者三,應封侯者五,應封公者二,其中或暗寓了"三皇,五帝,三王"的意義也未可知。因爲照繁露的說法,漢應以顓頊爲五帝的首一帝;現在運轉次移,帝嚳當然升補顓頊的地位。帝嚳既爲五帝之首,則其前之黃帝,少昊,顓頊自應列爲三皇了。(周禮及王莽傳中俱有"三皇五帝"之文,但均未列舉其人。這或者因與舊說太不合,未宣布,或宣布之後旋失傳了,均未可知。)

他即位後的第三件事情,是定宗系。王莽傳云:

> 莽又曰,"予前在攝時,建郊宮,定祧廟,立社稷。神祇報況,或光自上復於下,流爲烏;或黃氣熏烝,昭燿章明,以著黃虞之烈焉。自黃帝至於濟南伯王(顏師古注,"莽之高祖名遂,字伯紀,故謂之伯王"),而祖世氏姓有五矣。黃帝二十五子,分賜厥姓,十有二氏。虞帝之先,受姓曰姚。其在陶唐曰嬀,在周曰陳,在齊曰田,在濟南曰王。予伏念皇初祖考黃帝,皇始祖考虞帝,以宗祀於明堂,宜序於祖宗之廟。其立祖廟五,親廟四;后夫人皆配食。郊祀黃帝以配天,黃后(顏注引孟康曰,"黃帝之后也")以配地。……… 姚,嬀,陳,田,王氏,凡五姓者,皆黃虞苗裔,予之同族也。………… 其令天下上此五姓名籍於秩宗,皆以爲宗室;………其元城王氏,勿令相嫁娶(顏注,"元城王氏不得與四姓昏娶,以其同祖也"),以別族理親焉。" 封陳

崇爲統睦侯,奉胡王(顏注引孟康曰,"追上陳胡公")後;田豐爲世睦侯,奉敬王(孟康曰,"追王陳敬仲")後。………遣騎都尉囂等分治黃帝園位於上都橋時,虞帝於零陵九疑,胡王於淮陽,陳敬王於齊臨淄,愍王(通鑑卷三十七云,"莽以濟北王安爲濟北愍王,"則此愍王爲田安,非齊湣王。——王莽傳於劉快敗死事下,引莽語,稱齊湣王爲"濟南愍王,"則莽亦書湣爲愍。顏注於本條下引服虔曰"齊愍王,"殊嫌混淆)於城陽宮,伯王於濟南東平陵,孺王(顏注,"莽之曾祖名賀,字翁孺,故謂之孺王")於魏郡元城。

又地皇元年:

望氣爲數者多言有土功象。………莽乃博徵天下工匠,…………壞徹城西苑中建章,承光…………凡十餘所,取其材瓦以起九廟。……… 一曰黃帝太初祖廟,二曰帝虞始祖昭廟,三曰陳胡王統祖穆廟,四曰齊敬王世祖昭廟,五曰濟北愍王王祖穆廟,凡五廟不墮云。六曰濟南伯王尊禰昭廟,七曰元城孺王尊禰穆廟,八曰陽平頃王戚禰昭廟,九曰新都顯王戚禰穆廟。殿皆重屋。太初祖廟東西南北各四十丈,高十七丈;餘廟半之。

這兩段文字大可補綴前引自本的不足。他把"姚,嬀,陳,田,王"五個氏姓的人合爲一家了,宗廟和園陵都經過一番系統的整理了。我們現在可以集合以上的種種材料,爲他列出一個比較詳盡的世系圖來:

祖先	黃帝	帝嚳	虞帝	胡公滿	田敬仲完	田和	王建	田安	王遂（字伯紀）	王賀（字翁孺）	王禁（字稚君）	王曼（字元卿）
世次			黃帝八世孫		胡公十三世孫	敬仲十一世孫	田和八世孫	建孫	安孫	遂子	賀子	禁子，莽父
氏姓	姚		嬀	陳	田	田	田	田	王	王	王	王
追王之號				胡王	敬王			愍王	伯王	孺王	頃王	顯王
廟號	太初祖		始祖	統祖	世祖			王祖	尊禰	尊禰	戚禰	戚禰
九廟次序	祖廟一		祖廟二	祖廟三	祖廟四			祖廟五	親廟一	親廟二	親廟三	親廟四
奉後者	姚恂	王千	嬀昌	陳崇	田豐							
奉後者之封爵	初睦侯	功隆公	始睦侯	統睦侯	世睦侯							

這種開國排場，比了漢高祖時絢爛了多少，闊綽了多少！他何等地具有做皇帝的資格啊！

他的第四件事情，是爲漢立宗廟。王莽傳云：

> 以漢高祖爲文祖廟。莽曰，"予之皇始祖考虞帝受嬗於唐。漢氏初祖唐帝，世有傳國之象。予復親受金策於漢高皇帝之靈，惟思褒厚前代，何有忘時。漢氏祖宗有七，以禮立廟於定安國。其園寢廟在京師者，勿罷，祠薦如故。………

他對待漢室這樣優厚，既可消弭劉氏的反抗，又可顯出自己的以正得國。堯典中說：

> 帝曰，"格汝舜！詢事考言，乃言厎可績，三載。

> 汝陟帝位。" 舜讓于德弗嗣。正月上日,受終于文祖。
>
> 二十有八載,帝乃殂落。………月正元日,舜格于文祖。

這文祖大約是堯的祖廟(史記五帝本紀云,"文祖者,堯太祖也,"這是一個較早的解釋),禪舜的典禮在此舉行,舜正式即位的典禮亦在此舉行。王莽既承祖德,以舜自比,所以就稱漢高祖爲文祖,表示其色色符合唐虞。我們現在相信,歷史是不能複演的,但在漢代,尤其在五德終始說之下,若是不能複演便不成其爲歷史了!

他的第五件事情,是禁止剛卯及金刀。王莽傳中記他的詔書云.

> 予前在大麓,至於攝假,深惟漢氏三七之阸,赤德氣盡,思索廣求,所以輔劉延期之術靡所不用。故作金刀之利,幾以濟之………赤世計盡,終不可強濟。皇天明威,黃德當興,隆顯大命,屬予以天下。今百姓咸言皇天革漢而立新,廢劉而興王。夫"劉"之爲字,"卯金刀"也。正月剛卯,金刀之利,皆不得行。(顏注引服虔曰,"剛卯,以正月卯日作,佩之,長三寸,廣一寸,或用玉,或用金,或用桃,著革帶佩之。金刀,莽所鑄之錢也"。)博謀卿士,僉曰,"天人同應,昭然著明。"其去剛卯,莫以爲佩。除刀錢,勿以爲利。承順天心,快百姓意。

他在攝政之時,爲要延長漢的壽命,所以作了金刀錢以厭勝之。不料赤德終盡,黃德終興無可挽回。現在既已即位,自

應承順天心,把漢家制度一切換過。 劉卯的"卯,"金刀的"金刀,"就是漢帝的姓(劉),自然應在除去之列了。

他的第六件事情,是宣傳他的符命於天下。 王莽傳云

秋,遣五威將王奇等十二人班符命四十二篇於天下,——德祥五事,符命二十五,福應十二,凡四十二篇。 其德祥言文宣之世,黃龍見於成紀新都,高祖考王伯墓門梓柱生枝葉之屬。 符命言井石,金匱之屬。 福應言雌雞化爲雄之屬。 其文爾雅,依託皆爲作說,大歸言莽當代漢有天下云

總而說之曰,"帝王受命,必有德祥之符瑞,協成五命(顏注,"五命,謂五行之次相承以受命也"),申以福應,然後能立巍巍之功,傳於子孫,永享無窮之祚。 故新室之興也,德祥發於漢三七九世之後(顏注引蘇林曰,"二百一十歲,九天子也"),肇命於新都,受瑞於黃支,………申福於十二應。 天所以保祐新室者,深矣,固矣!

"武功丹石,出於漢氏平帝末年。 火德銷盡,土德當代;皇天眷然,去漢與新,以丹石始命於皇帝。皇帝謙讓,以攝居之,未當天意。 故其秋七月,天重以三能文馬。 皇帝既謙讓未即位,故三以鐵契,四以石龜,五以虞符,六以文圭,七以玄印,八以茂陵石書,九以玄龍石,十以神井,十一以大神石,十二以銅符帛圖,申命之瑞寖以顯著,至於十二,以昭告新皇帝。

"皇帝深惟上天之威不可不畏,故去攝號,猶

尙稱假,改元初始,欲以承塞天命,克厭上帝之心。然非皇天所以鄭重降符命之意,故是日天復決其以勉書(顏注引孟康曰,"哀章所作策書也。"然按下文有"至丙寅暮,漢氏高廟有金匱圖策"之語,則勉書與哀章所作策書自是二事;王莽傳中不載勉書事,可見這件故事已失傳了)。又侍郎王盱見人衣白布單衣,赤繢方領,冠小冠,立於王路殿前,謂盱曰,'今日天同色,以天下人民屬皇帝'(顏注曰,"同色者,言五方天神共齊其謀,同其顏色也")。盱怪之。行十餘步,人忽不見。至丙寅暮,漢氏高廟有金匱圖策;高帝承天命,以國傳新皇帝。明旦,宗伯忠孝侯劉宏以聞。乃召公卿議,未決,而大神石人談曰,'趣新皇帝至高廟受命,毋留!'於是新皇帝立登車,之漢氏高廟受命。受命之日,丁卯也。丁,火,漢氏之德也。卯,劉姓所以爲字也。明漢劉火德盡而傳於新室也。

"皇帝謙謙,既備固讓,十二符應迫著,命不可辭,懼然祗畏,葦然閔漢氏之終不可濟,亹亹在左右之不得從意,爲之三夜不御寢,三日不御食。延問公侯卿大夫,僉曰,'宜奉如上天威命。'於是乃改元定號,海內更始。

"新室既定,神祇歡喜,申以福應,吉瑞累仍。詩曰,'宜民宜人,受祿於天。保右命之,自天申之,'此之謂也。"

五威將奉符命,齎印綬,…………乘乾文車,駕坤六馬,背負鷩鳥之毛,服飾甚偉。每一將,各置左,右,

前,後,中帥,凡五帥。衣冠,車服,駕馬,各如其方面色數。將持節,稱太一之使。帥持幢,稱五帝之使。莽策命曰,"普天之下,迄於四表,靡所不至!"其東出者至玄菟,樂浪,高句驪,夫餘;南出者隃徼外,歷益州;…………西出者至西域;…………北出者至匈奴庭。

這樣大規模的宣傳,使得新式的五德終始說散播全國,成爲共同的信仰。世經的系統所以能成爲後世的正則的歷史,和這一次的宣傳當有甚深的關係。而王莽受皇天的種種壓迫以及他得到許多實物的符瑞,也給與後世以甚大的影響。

又有一個笑柄,我們不要忘記。"黃龍見於成紀,"本是漢代定爲土德的符瑞。但到這時,漢既改爲火德了,土德給王莽據了,這個符瑞也就被他搶過去了!

此外關於五德說的,再有幾件零碎的事。

其一,始建國二年(西元一〇),他更號平帝后(他的女兒)爲"黃皇室主。"顏師古注云,"莽自謂土德,故云黃皇。室主,若漢之稱公主。"如此,則王莽不但自稱爲黃帝,亦且自稱爲黃皇。

其二,始建國五年(一三),他要東巡狩,下書曰,"歲在壽星,塡在明堂,倉龍癸酉,德在中宮。觀晉掌歲,龜策告從。其以此年二月建寅之節東巡狩,具禮儀調度。"顏注引晉灼曰,"莽自謂土也,土行主塡星。癸德在中宮,宮又土也。國語,晉文公以卯出酉入過五鹿得土,歲在壽星。……… 莽欲法之以爲吉祥。"因爲他是土德之帝,故出行時常以土德的

星象爲其標準。

其三,天鳳元年(一四),太傅平晏從吏過例掖門,僕射苛問不遜,戊曹士收繫僕射。顏注引應劭曰,"莽自以土行,故使太傅置戊曹士;士,椽也。"這與左傳中所記的炎帝共工們紀官的方法很相類,我們可以說"王莽氏以土紀,故爲土師而土名"了。

其四,就是這一年,他令天下小學,戊子代甲子爲六旬首,冠以戊子爲元日,昏以戊寅之旬爲忌日。顏注云,"元,善也。"這因戊爲土德之日,土德既王,"戊"自當取"甲"的地位而代之,而冠婚之禮亦自當視戊日爲定了。

其五,天鳳三年(一六),長平館西岸崩,邕涇水不流,毀而北行。……羣臣上壽,以爲河圖所謂"以土塡水,"匈奴滅亡之祥也。這因王莽自居土德,匈奴在北方,北爲水屬,故岸崩壅水不流,即是王莽尅匈奴的象徵。

其六,天鳳六年(一九),他令太史推三萬六千歲歷紀。明年,改元曰地皇,從三萬六千歲歷號也。這"地皇"的年號與"黃皇"的名號是一律的,都是表示其爲土德之王。

其七,地皇元年(二〇),杜陵(漢宣帝陵)便殿廢藏的乘輿虎文衣出自樹立外堂上,良久乃委地。王莽知道了,心厭這事,下書曰,"寶黃廝赤,其令郎從官皆衣絳。"顏注引服虔曰,"以黃爲寶,自用其行氣也。廝赤,廝役賤者皆衣赤,賤漢行也。"他要貴的人穿黃而賤的人穿赤,以表示其貴新而賤漢的意思,這是"易服色"的一個變例。

其八,地皇三年(二二),霸橋災。莽惡之,下書曰:

夫三皇象春,五帝象夏,三王象秋,五伯象冬。

伯者繼空續乏以成歷數，故其道駮。……… 迺二月癸巳之夜，甲午之辰，火燒霸橋，從東方西行，至甲午夕，橋盡，火滅。……… 其明旦即乙未，立春之日也。予以神明聖祖黃虞遺統受命，至於地皇四年爲十五年，正以三年終冬。絕滅霸駮之橋，欲以興成新室，統壹長存之道也。……… 其更名………霸橋爲長存橋。

從霸橋火災上，他會發出這樣一大篇議論。今分析之，有下列二義：(1)他以霸橋之"霸"釋作五伯之"伯，"而謂伯者繼空續乏以成歷數，本應在絕滅之列。(這與世經所云"共工氏伯而不王"諸語可相印證。)(2)他以皇帝王霸分配春夏秋冬，霸橋災之翌日正爲立春，而地皇三年正是冬之終，故從此以後，霸道可絕而皇道可興。這些話的意義，與黃皇地皇之號是一致的，可以證明他不安於"王，"且不甘於"帝，"直要作"皇"咧！

其九，就是這一年，他爲關東歲荒民飢，開山澤之防，下書云，"諸能采取山澤之物而順月令者，其恣聽之，勿令出稅，至地皇三十年如故，是王光上戊之六年也。"顏注引孟康曰，"戊，土也，莽所作歷名。"按，王莽前令太史推三萬六千歲歷紀，六歲一改元，地皇是這個歷紀中的第一個年號，王光上戊是這個歷紀中的第六個年號，故王光上戊之六年當地皇之三十年。這些豫擬的年號，我們雖只看見兩個，而這兩個都是充滿着土德的氣息的，其他也可以推知了。

這些故事，都是我們在王莽傳裏尋出來的。其它爲本傳所失載而有關於五德終始說的當必不少，將來自有陸續發見的希望。現在先把王莽所作的臬量(故宮博物院藏有一

器)銘辭鈔出,做一個例:

> 黃帝初祖,德帀於虞。虞帝始祖,德帀於新。歲在大梁,龍集戊辰,戊辰直定,天命有民。據土德受,正號卽眞。改正建丑,長壽隆崇。同律度量衡,稽當前人。龍在己巳,歲次實沈,初班天下,萬國永遵。子子孫孫,享傳億年。

這是始建國元年(西元九)班行天下的器。在那時,他很快樂地說:初祖黃帝的德循環而至於虞,始祖虞帝的德循環而至於新,他遂以戊辰直定之日據土德受天命而有民了。他旣取得這種種做皇帝的資格,所以就正號卽眞,又改正建丑,又同律度量衡以"稽當前人"了(前人,指虞帝)。這一篇堂皇冠冕的文章,可以看作王莽的自贊。在這篇自贊裏,已包括了本篇第七章至第二十四章的一切。他們的慘淡經營和我們的逐漸推翻,都不知費去了若干心血,卻只爲這寥寥八十個字,眞可爲一歎也!

總合以上的記載,可知王莽之所以做得成皇帝及其做了皇帝之後的改制,他共有三種方法:

> 第一,援引古帝王爲祖先,以見其有作帝王的身分。在這一個方法之下,造成了他的自本及其所建立的九廟。
>
> 第二,援引唐虞的禪讓爲漢新的禪讓,使得因歷史的複演而成其帝業。在這一個方法之下,造成了他爲虞後及其受禪的事實。
>
> 第三,援引五行相生說,自居於土德,以承火德

之運。在這一個方法之下,造成了種種的符瑞及沙麓崩等的故事。


這三個方法反映到漢室,也出了許多新事物:

第一,王氏旣有很長的世系,漢氏亦當有很長的世系以相配。於是漢的一個長系統的歷史記載(左傳中的三段記載,及漢出於顓頊之說,堯子監明封於劉之說,高祖之祖爲豐公,父爲執嘉之說……)就於此時出現了。

第二,王氏爲虞後,漢氏自當爲堯後。"漢氏初祖唐帝,世有傳國之象"這類話也就出現了。(我對於眭弘的話,終究疑它經過後來的潤飾,因爲這句話出在昭帝之世無甚意義,出於王莽時則與"王爲虞後"之說天然合拍。漢書是東漢時作的,說不定這件材料已給新室增改過了。)

第三,王氏旣爲土德,漢氏自必改爲火德以合於相生的次序。"漢高祖皇帝伐秦繼周"(不言繼秦),以及"赤帝子斷蛇著符"諸說就出現了,"赤帝行璽邦傳予黃帝"的金策書也由天上送下來了。(漢爲火德,在王莽前已有此傾向,例如甘忠可所倡之漢再受命說是託於"赤精子之讖"的。但若沒有王莽的一番澈底的改造,則必不能成爲確定的事實。)

我們根據以上之說,可以畫出一個簡單的"漢新對當圖,"以申明這二代的世系,世系的代次,及其五德歷數的由來,藉作本章的結束:



這篇文字,開頭寫時並不希望寫得很多,因為在我的意想中以為這個題目下的事情是可以一說就明白了的。哪知寫下去時,愈寫愈覺得裏邊的情形複雜;一件材料,如不作多方面的說明,即不能得真實的瞭解,而要作多方面的說明便不得不費了很大的氣力用很多的文字去寫。要不是楊振聲先生屢次催我,並派人來鈔,逼得我不能不寫,在短時間之內我是寫不成的了。我非常感激楊先生的好意,使得我能把這個問題澈底研究一下。

但是,寫到這一章,在全文中只佔得一半,而在我的時間方面,在清華學報的出版方面,都不能允許我再寫下了。我只得暫止於此。賸下的一半,當慢慢地做去,登入下期的清華學報。

現在先把懸擬的目錄發表如下:

XXV.　漢再受命說的復活,

XXVI.　光武帝的受命及其改制,

XXVII.　公孫述的受命，

XXVIII.　讖緯的發生時代，

XXIX.　讖緯中的五帝說，

XXX.　讖緯中的感生說，

XXXI.　讖緯中的受命說，

XXXII.　讖緯中的符瑞說，

XXXIII.　袁術的受命，

XXXIV.　魏蜀吳三國的受命與改制，

XXXV.　東漢一代的三皇五帝說，

XXXVI.　少昊插入五帝系統的大成功，

XXXVII.　明堂制度的演變，

XXXVIII.　左傳中的社稷五祀，

XXXIX　月令中的五帝五神，

XL.　淮南子中的五帝五神，

XLI.　海外經中的四神，

XLII.　洪範五行傳中的五帝五神，

XLIII.　王莽在長安所立的神祠，

XLIV.　光武帝在洛陽所立的神祠．

XLV.　五德終始說的餘波，

XLVI.　五德終始說的年表，

XLVII.　歷來批評五德終始說者的見解，

XLVIII.　自序。

本期中發表的文字及這個目錄，都請讀者們嚴格地批評。這是中國歷史上的一個很大的問題，必不是我一個人用了幾個月的力量所能研究完成的。

又，這期發表的文字不能稱爲上篇，因爲自第七章"世經的出現"起，必須到三十六章"少昊插入五帝系統的大成功"止，始可告一段落。將來全文告成，當爲重定次第，以原始的五德說爲上篇(如三統說亦加入，則以五德說爲上篇之上，三統說爲上篇之下)；劉歆改定的五德說爲中篇之上，五帝五神爲中篇之下；年表等爲下篇。

又本篇初着手時原擬寫得簡單些，故對於"五行說的來源"一個大問題未作詳細的探討；近來日本學者關於此問題研究甚詳，亦未採錄。將來得暇，當改作。

十九年五月十日，頡剛記。

國文中之倒裝賓語

楊樹達

國文中賓語之位置居外動詞或介詞之後者,常也;然有倒裝者。今詳述之。

1　疑問代名詞爲賓語時,必居動介之前。

內省不疚,夫"何"憂何懼?論語

終南"何"有?　有條有枚。詩秦風終南

寡人有子,未知其"誰"立焉。左傳閔二年

吾"誰"欺?　欺天乎!論語

王者"孰"謂?　謂文王也。公羊傳隱元年

問臧"奚"事?　則挾策讀書。莊子駢拇

以上居外動詞之前者

"何"由知吾可也?孟子梁惠王上

"誰"爲爲之?史記自序

水"奚"自至?呂氏春秋貴直

"曷"爲先言王而後言正月?　王正月也。公羊傳隱元年

以上居介詞之前者

唯介詞"于","於","爰"三字介紹疑問代名詞時,爲例外,不倒置。

哀我人斯,"于何"從祿?詩小雅正月

彼人之心,"于何"其臻?又菀柳

此日而食,"于何"不臧?又十月之交

吾"于何"逃聲哉?列子湯問

民衣霧,主吸霜,間可倚杵"于何"臧?易緯是類謀

異類衆夥,"于何"不育?左太冲蜀都賦

四海之議,'於何"逃責。任彥昇爲齊明帝讓宣城郡公表

"於何"致德而問業焉?韓文送溫處士序

推誠永究,"爰何"不臧?漢書外戚傳

所謂伊人,"于焉"逍遙?詩小雅白駒

所謂伊人,"于焉"嘉客?又

我視謀猶,伊"于胡"底?又小旻

"于以"采蘩?于沼于沚;"于以"采藻?于彼行潦。詩召南采蘩

"于以"采蘋?南澗之濱。又采蘋

"于以"湘之?惟錡及釜;"于以"盛之?惟筐及筥。同上

爰居爰處,爰喪其馬,"于以"求之?于林之下。又邶風擊鼓

2　句中以無指代名詞"莫"字爲主語時,代名詞爲賓語則居前。

子曰:"莫""我"知也夫!論語憲問

晉侯聞之,而後喜可知也,曰:"莫""余"毒也已!左傳僖二十八年

不患"莫""己"知,求爲可知也。論語

蝃蝀在東,"莫""之"敢指。詩蝃蝀

夫子愎,"莫""之"止,必不出。左傳襄二十四年

夫以信召人,而以僭濟之,必"莫""之"與也。又襄二十六年

會同難,嘖有煩言,"莫""之"治也又定四年

故天下諸侯既許桓公,"莫""之"敢背齊語

狂者傷人,"莫""之"怨也;嬰兒嘗老,莫之疾也。淮南子說林訓

雖使五尺之童適市,"莫""之"或欺。孟子

人皆曰予知,驅而納諸罟獲陷阱之中,而"莫""之"知避也。禮記中庸

福輕乎羽,"莫""之"知載;禍重乎地"莫""之"知避。莊子人間世

3 句中有否定副詞時,則為賓語之代名詞先置。

居,則曰:"不""吾"知也。如或知爾,則何以哉?論語

如有政,雖"不""吾"以,吾其與聞之。又子路

季子雖來,"不""吾"廢也。史記吳世家

子"不""我"思,豈無他人!詩鄭風褰裳

日月逝矣,歲"不""我"與。論語陽貨

今鄭人貪賴其田而"不""我"與,我若求之,其與我乎?左傳昭十二年

我留,匈奴必以我為大軍之誘,"不""我"擊,史記李廣傳

始吾貧時,昆弟不我衣食,賓客"不""我"內門。又主父偃傳

是區區者而"不""余"畀,余必自取之。左傳昭十三年

僂句"不""余"欺也。又昭二十五年

不患人之"不""己"知,患不知人也。論語學而

豈"不""爾"思,室是遠而!論語

先君之"不""爾"遂,可知矣。公羊傳隱三年

非吾力不能納也,義實"不""爾"克也。又文十五年

女專利而不厭,予取予求,"不""女"瑕疵也。左傳僖七年

無適小國,將"不""女"容焉又

余恐亂命以"不""女"違。又襄十年

余"不""女"忍殺,宥女以遠,勉速行乎!又昭元年

三代命祀,祭不越望,江漢睢漳,楚之望也。禍福之至,"不""是"過也。又哀六年

以上用"不"字之例

管子對曰:未可,鄰國未"吾"親也。齊語

晉國之命,未是有也,左傳襄十四年

蓋有之矣,我未"之"見也。論語

不好犯上而好作亂者,未"之"有也。又

望道而未"之"見。孟子

吾觀世俗之樂,舉羣趣者誙誙然,如將不得已而皆曰樂者,吾未"之"樂也,亦未不"之"樂也。莊子至樂

子路有聞,未"之"能行,惟恐有聞論語

以上用"未"字之例

爾無"我"詐,我無"爾"虞!左傳成元年

志輕理而重物者,無"之"有也;外重物而不內憂者,無"之"有也荀子正名

以上用"無"字之例

馬驚,敗績。公隊。佐車授綏,公曰:末"之"卜也。

禮記檀弓

以上用'末'字之例

或曰:१譊譊者天下皆說,奚其存? 曰:曼"是"爲也!

法言廣見

以上用"曼"字之例

4　雖無上述之原因,人稱或指示代名詞爲賓語亦間有先置者。

今命爾"予"翼,作股肱心膂!書君牙

詳乃視聽,罔以側言改厥度,則予一人"汝"嘉。

又蔡仲之命

爾貢包茅不入,王祭不共,無以縮酒,寡人"是"徵。昭王南征而不復,寡人是問。左傳僖四年

有渝此盟以相及也,明神先君是糾是殛。又僖二十八年

5　有二事爲比較時,則賓語雖爲名詞亦先置。

"飢""寒"之不恤,誰遑其後!左傳襄二十八年

"飢""寒"之不恤,誰能恤楚!又

上二例賓語與動詞之間有"之"字爲助

老夫,其"國家"不能恤,敢及王室?左傳昭二十四年

寡人,唯是"一二父兄"不能共億,其敢以許自爲功乎!又隱十一年

臣"死"且不避,卮酒安足辭!史記項羽本紀

上無字爲助者

6　語氣側重時,則爲賓語之名詞先置

陛下於淮南王,不可謂薄矣! 然而淮南王,"天子之法",咫蹂促而弗用也;"皇帝之令",咫批傾而不行也。賈子淮南

上例外動詞賓語先置

孝景時,每朝議大事,"條侯""魏其侯",諸列侯莫敢與亢禮。史記魏其侯傳

上例介詞賓語先置

7　賓語倒置在動介之前,以"之"字助之。

吾以子爲"異之問",曾"由與求之問!"論語先進

孟武伯問孝,子曰:父母唯其"疾之憂"。又爲政

"東略之不知",西則否矣。左傳僖九年

僑聞:爲國非"不能事大字小之難","無禮以定其位之患"。又

華則榮矣,實之不知。晉語

上爲外動詞賓語先置者

我之不共,"魯故之以。"左傳昭十三年

寡人之使吾子處此,不惟"許國之爲",亦聊以固吾圉也。又隱十一年

叔仲昭伯曰:我"楚國之爲",豈爲一人行也!又左傳襄二十八年

宋向戌曰:我"一人之爲",非爲楚也。又

非"夫人之爲"慟,而誰爲?論語

晉居深山,"戎狄之與"鄰。左傳昭十五年

吾先君固周室之不成子也,故濱於東海之陂,"黿鼉魚鼈之與"處,而"鼃黽之與"同者,越語

"擁腫之與"居,"鞅掌之爲"使。莊子庚桑楚

康公,"我之自"出左傳成十三年

右介詞賓語先置者

8　賓語倒置在動介之前,以"是"字助之。

除君之惡,唯"力是視"。又僖二十三年

率師以來,唯"敵是求"。又宣十二年

余雖與晉出入,余唯"利是視"。又成十三年

寡人帥以聽命,唯"好是求"。又

唯吾子"戎車是利",無顧土宜,其無乃非先王之命也乎!又成二年

荀偃令曰:鷄鳴而駕,塞井夷竈,唯余"馬首是瞻"!又襄十四年

自今日既盟之後,鄭國而不唯"有禮與彊可以庇民者是從"而敢有異志者,亦如之!又襄九年

以上有副詞"唯"字者

慶鄭曰:愎諫違卜,固"敗是求",又何逃焉?左傳僖十五年

寡人之從君而西也,亦晉之"妖夢是踐",豈敢以至!又

君亡之不恤,而"羣臣是憂",惠之至也。又

親我無成,"鄙我是欲",不可從也!又襄八年

今土數圻而"郢是城",不亦難乎!又昭二十五年

今"吳是懼"而城于郢,守已小矣。又

有君而"臣是助",無乃不可乎!又昭二十一年

王子相楚國,將"善是封殖",而虐之,是禍國也。

又襄三十年

將"虢是滅",何愛於虞!又僖四年

若未嘗登車射御,則"敗績厭覆是懼",何暇思獲!又襄三十一年

君人者,將禍是務去,而速之,無乃不可乎!又隱三年

子爲司寇,將盜是務去,若之何不能?又襄二十一年

以上無副詞"唯"字者

以上皆外動詞之例

齊侯曰:豈"不穀是爲",先君之好是繼,與不穀同好,何如?左傳僖四年

文武成康之建母弟以蕃屏周,亦其"廢墜是爲",豈如弁髦而因以敝之!又昭九年

以上皆介詞之例

9 外動詞之賓語先置,以"焉"字助之。

我周之東遷,"晉鄭焉依"。(按周語作'晉鄭是依')左傳隱六年

安定國家,必"大焉先"。又襄三十年

委蛇還旅,"二守焉依"。後漢書任李劉傳贊

10 外動詞之賓語先置,以"或"字助之。

如松柏之茂,無不爾或承。詩小雅天保

11 外動詞之賓語先置,以"來"字助之

顯允方叔,征伐玁狁,"荊蠻來威。"詩小雅采芑

匪安匪遊,"淮夷來求"。又大雅江漢

匪安匪舒,"淮夷來鋪"。又

匪疚匪棘,"王國來極"。又

是用作歌,將"母來諗"。又小雅四牡

不念昔者,伊"余來塈"。又邶風谷風

既之陰女,反"予來赫"。又大雅桑柔

12 外動詞之賓語先置,以"于"字助之。

赫赫南仲,"玁狁于襄"。詩小雅出車

赫赫南仲,"玁狁于夷"。又

"四國于蕃","四方于宣"。又大雅崧高

13 外動詞之賓語先置,以"斯"字助之。

"朋酒斯饗",曰殺羔羊。詩豳風七月

14 外動詞之賓語先置,以"爲"字助之。

女爲人臣子,不顧恩義,畔主背親,爲降虜於蠻夷,何以"女爲見"!漢書蘇武傳

15 外動詞之賓語先置,以"之爲"助之。

使奕秋誨二人奕,其一人專心致志,惟"奕秋之爲聽"。孟子告子上

故人苟"生之爲見",若者必死;苟"利之爲見",若者必害。荀子禮論

惟"行之爲守","唯義之爲行"。又不苟

16 外動詞之賓語先置,外動詞之下復補"之"字。

夏禮,吾能言之,杞不足徵也;殷禮,吾能言之,宋不足徵也。論語八佾

"聖人",吾不"得而見之"矣!論語

"百畝之田",匹夫"耕之"。孟子梁惠王上

"三里之城","七里之郭","環而攻之"而不勝。

又公孫丑下

"拱把之桐梓",人苟欲生之,皆知所以養之者。又告子上

子變子言,則"齊國"吾與子"共之"。呂氏春秋恃君知分

張廷尉,由此天下稱之。史記張釋之傳

校讀文章一貫後記

張　煦

友貽余以日本鈔本文章一貫,爲明人論作文法之書。中土向無傳本,清人著述,未見稱說,蓋其佚亡已久,一旦珠還合浦,欣幸何如! 題"山東武城丙戌進士高琦編集,同牕時菴吳守素同集"。考守素亦武城人。順治刋本及乾隆刋本武城縣志,載高琦中嘉靖乙酉科舉人,吳守素中嘉靖戊子科舉人。雍正刋本山東通志,乙酉科舉人共七十三名,高琦中第四十名,戊子科舉人共七十五名,吳守素中第三十六名。三書並載高琦以嘉靖五年丙戌科龔用卿榜成進士,余藏有明狀元策,載嘉靖丙戌科策題一道,則琦成進士之試題也。乾隆刋本,武城縣志又載琦爲歙縣知縣,剛正不阿,忤當道,謝病歸。琦字格庵,見本書後序。二人生平可見於今者,僅此而已。書之前後,各有序一篇,俱嘉靖丁亥六月程默撰。則是書成於嘉靖六年,其昨年琦已成進士,其明年守素始中舉人,故於同集者但列名而不列銜也。中土論文之書,以梁劉彥和文心雕龍,最爲傑出,此夫人而知之。唐宋以降諸作,學者每盛道宋陳騤之文則,元陳繹曾之文筌;然文則多比較字句而畧大體,文筌雖究大體,而於全帙未能十分組織。求其條貫義類,首尾有章,如今日敎本體裁,秩然不紊者,亘唐宋元明四代,未有善於此書者也。書分二卷,上卷六章,下卷九章,具錄於下,以見系統。

卷上

立意第一

氣象第二

篇法第三

章法第四

句法第五

字法第六

卷下

起端第一

敘事第二

議論第三

引用第四

譬喻第五

含蓄第六

形容第七

過接第八

繳結第九

細審編輯體製,一法元王構之脩辭鑑衡,殆皆採錄舊說,以己意參列者,皆不過數事,而取舍之間,此較王氏,尤爲豐富精審,彌足珍寶。王氏書收入四庫,此編佚在海外,致不得與彼同儲高閣,爲學人考鏡,亦有幸不幸歟! 其所徵引,有原書久佚不可復見者,如蒲氏漫齋語錄是。有原書雖佚,尙存於日本者,如文筌是。有原書雖佚,而四庫從永樂大典輯存者,如文章精義是。有原非論文之書,而擷采之者,如捫蝨新話是。有原爲論文之書,而擇取之者,如文則是。有爲一人之片言隻語,僅於此可考見者,如李福堂是。惟舊本錯訛,不可卒讀,逐句校讎,俾復舊觀。今取所引諸書各若干條,彙列於次,名稱次第,悉仍舊觀,亦目錄家臚列一書之徵引書目之意。

宋子京筆記	一條
林執善	一條
吳琮	一條
謝疊山	一條
魏文帝	一條
墨客揮犀	一條
麗澤文說	十一條
福堂李先生	三條
陳亮	一條
蒲氏漫齋語錄	一條
歐陽起鳴	六條
潛溪詩眼	一條
文筌	九條
后山詩話	一條
裴度	一條
皇朝類苑	一條
緯文瑣語	三條
文章精義	七條
捫蝨新話	三條
呂氏童蒙訓	五條
文則	二十一條
張文潛	一條
塢屋準繩	一條
步里客談	二條
陳止齋	二條

四六談塵	二條
朱文公	一條
沈存中筆談	一條
吳鎰	一條
唐子西語錄	一條
鄒道卿	一條
脩辭鑑衡	二條
山谷	一條
張橫浦日新	一條
陳同父	一條
呂居仁	一條
滕禹	一條

其中立意篇所引魏文帝語,係杜牧答莊光書語,魏文典論論文"文以氣爲主,"與之相類,豈因以致誤耶? 典論石本,唐時始亡,寫本至宋始亡,抑典論實有其文,杜牧特轉述之耶? 氣象篇所引裴度語,見與李習之書。此二條爲唐人外,餘皆宋元明三朝之文,以采取於文則及脩辭鑑衡者爲最多。所引宋子京筆記,潛溪詩眼,后山詩話,皇朝類苑,呂氏童蒙訓,張文潛步里客談,四六談塵,沈存中筆談,唐子西語錄,山谷張橫浦日新各條,皆自鑑衡出,以文字校之,此書多與鑑衡合,與原書不盡合也。又其稱名痕跡,皆可爲證,文繁條多,不贅於此。麗澤文說十一條中,有五條爲鑑衡已具者,餘非也。張文潛一條,亦童蒙訓語,一貫未註明之。呂居仁一條,不在鑑衡所引童蒙訓中,故別稱呂居仁以別之。童蒙訓意盡言止一條,文斷引之,而此書非從文斷引出也。別有載明脩辭鑑衡兩

條,此王構以己意論列之文,(書中此類共六條,四庫提要謂其‘皆采錄舊說’者非也。)非徵引他人者也。塵客揮犀一條,亦載鑑衡所引冷齋夜話中,昔人謂鑑衡書“中有數條與冷齋夜話一字不異”者,此其一也。文則共六十二條,此書已採二十一條,其精采者所取殆盡矣。又此書之存,不獨在國文法史上爲一重鎭,(唐人論文爲書牘式,宋人論文爲筆記式,詩話式,元人論文爲條解式,至此書之成,始有清晰系統。)而所引各書文字,亦猶唐宋類書之在今日,足以補訂舊籍之闕佚,其一即有裨於文則,其一則文章精義也。今先述文則,舊有台州叢書本,寶顏堂秘笈本,唐宋叢書本,格致叢書本,說郛本,三續百川學海本,詒經堂本,文學津梁本,及單行本,據此書以校台州本,足證原書多訛,分列十二條,以便增改。

(一)文則甲部中,“觀左氏傳晉敗於邲之事”,一貫本“敗於邲”下,有“先濟者賞”四字,始能將下文叙舟指可掬,以蓄意爲工之處,隱攝在內。原書漏脫,當據增。

(二)文則乙部中,“每句終用助讀之”句,文義不明。一貫本引“助”字下有一“字”字,讀之自順。原書漏脫,當據增。

(三)文則乙部凡六條,今悉數之,僅有五條。一貫本以“左氏傳曰以三軍軍其前”以下一節,別作一段引之,始知原書與前段連寫者誤。當據改。

(四)文則丙部中,“揚子曰仁宅也”,此揚用孟語,一貫本引作“仁安宅也”自是。當據增。

(五)文則丁部中,“莊子曰,有始也者,有未始有始也者,有未始有夫未始有始也者。又曰,以指喩指之非指,不若以非指喩指之非指也。”此莊子齊物論文,“以指”諸句,在

"有始"諸句前，何以徵引次序，恰相顛倒？一貫本即"以指"諸句在"有始"諸句前，證知原書傳誤，當據改。

(六)同部以左傳文與樂記文連書不分，與文則全篇引書之例不符，一貫本空一格分寫，是也。當據改。

(七)文則己部中，"或一章而再言，或三章而一發"句下，小注"采采芣苢賓之初筵"八字。此"采采芣苢"四字，爲上一句之例，乃總引於下，與上文所述各句，全例不符。一貫本"采采芣苢"四字，在"或一章而再言"句下，知傳本誤也。當據改。

(八)文則庚部"或法"下云："退之南山詩云，或連若相從，……或決若馬驟，皆廣北山或字法而用之也。"文中舉韓詩僅八"或"字，小雅北山詩末三章，已連用十二"或"字，何得遽謂之廣？考退之南山詩連用五十一"或"字，此僅舉其首用之八"或"字。一貫本"或決若馬驟"下，有"此句稍多不能備載"八字，始可以舉略指廣。原本漏脫，當據增。

(九)同部"謂之法"下，"之類"二字一貫本作"凡經子傳記，用此多矣，故不悉載。"義較長，當據改。

(十)同部"而法"下，"而宿之"句下，一貫本多"又一法也"四字，當據增。

(十一)同部"乎法"下，引祭義"洞洞乎其敬也"三句，此禮器文。祭義雖有兩處洞洞屬屬字，其文皆不同。一貫本即作禮器文，當據改。

(十二)同部"之以法"下，引禮記"慮之以大"六句，此禮記中文王世子文，一貫本即作文王世子，不言禮記，始與其他

各條舉篇名之例符。當據改。

所引文章精義,篇法篇論文字齊整一條,今本妄分兩條,辨體書中引之,雖作一條,而末二句"意對處文却不必對,文不對處意著對,"與今本文章精義大致相同,語意頗嫌重複,一貫本引作"意對處文却不必對,意不必對處文却著對,"讀者自無間言,信乎李耆卿之舊文也。又引子瞻表忠觀碑一條,與今本大異,可以對勘。形容篇一條:

禮記喪禮論悲哀之狀,與醫經論脈之狀,形容物理,模寫狀貌,纖悉盡矣。

全段爲今世輯本所無,洵足以補永樂大典之闕矣。餘條雖各有小歧,無關宏指,恐文繁廣,故不具論。又一貫引陳亮說二條,其一稱陳亮,其一稱陳同父。考陳同父一條,實自宋俞成螢雪叢說引出,故別稱字也。全篇引書,皆用原文,然亦有例外,宋陳善捫蝨新話云:

作文貴首尾相應。桓溫見八陣圖曰:"此常山蛇勢也,擊其首則尾應,擊其尾則首應,擊其中則首尾共應。"予謂此非特兵法,亦文章法也,文章亦要宛轉回復,首尾俱應,(按俱字或作"相"),乃爲盡善。山谷論詩文亦云:"每作一篇,先立大意,長篇須曲折三致意,乃成章耳。"此亦常山蛇勢也。

篇法篇引之,僅以'爲文要知常山蛇勢'一語,隱栝其意。並志於此。

蒹葭樓詩

近兩年作

黃　節

社園與林宰平話別

遠瀑峯高近可聞,蔪蔪湖上有林君。詩懷欲靜忘清濁,世眼無明及泯,棼束草低根留性在,寸稊寒柳帶春分。人生難別花時節,惜此須臾盡夕雲。

大連灣別胡子晉

渡遼無地託身難,慚愧生平慕幼安,强爲故人回別淚,眼中滄海有停瀾。

三月十七日登粵秀山

去鄉廿載闕登臨,不盡紅棉此日心,(紅棉草堂在鎭海樓右側,已夷爲山路;猶有數樹,未盡拔去。)文教滅亡何有地江山蕪亂又成林。馬行石牓三君冢,(三君祠在山麓祀虞仲翔韓昌黎蘇東坡祠址已廢,祠篆石牓陳蘭甫所篆,平置路旁,行人踐踏。)鳥囀蒼蜓百步陰。(百步石在三君祠前,石級猶存。)猶許老夫來弔望。(龍濟光據粵時,置礮臺其上,不許游人登覽,今已解禁。)舊蹤無意更追尋。菊坡精舍,學海堂,啓秀樓,沿山名勝,已拆毀無餘矣。)

游荔枝灣

東去珠江水復西,江波無改水西隄;畫船士女親操檝,晚粥魚蝦細斷虀。出樹亂禽忘雨後,到篷殘日與橋齊。重來三月灣頭路,蔽海遮天綠尙低,

九日沙河登高

絕田一逕夾修禾,積綠連林出澗阿。歷歷岡原無改景,岧岧沙路久遷河;山園封樹行楸地,日在衰楊野雀窠。引領

慕門腰脚健，登高吾敢謝蹉跎！

送王秋湄

南禽代馬各依依，不謂歸鄉客又歸。少爲井閭譚往刦，再沽魚蠏試初肥。冬來不減方秋味，（南方至冬始有北方秋味，久客歸來，不覺以爲異矣。）江合無如一鳥飛。祇此去留還莫共，有人能說不相違。

官廨梅花

丹葉黃英已後時，廿年歸客到冬知。尋常不見衙齋雪，多負梅花似雪枝。

送劉栽甫

古有饑驅樂去官，人生得性孰云難？西湖江國元無異，夜雪梅花一以寒。衆裡偶然隨墮落，萬方何處告平安？我懷莫遣家鄉計，苦欲從君黃浦灘。

鼎湖飛水潭同林宰平

魚網掛高崖，密疏可盈尺；忽爾修罟垂，千魚落籍籍。飛絲一翕張，秋山狹闊白；游作龍在淵，旁起虎蹲石；落日碎丸丸，穿篠戰格格，長流淨翠玉，歕沫濕玄翮。不待尋聲來，登山所莫逆。經行游士眼，若視尋常跡；雖陟磴百盤，未奪嶺一席。鼎湖豈難到，良朋乃易隔。（游山明日宰平北返矣。）寒光斂歸樹，佇立留過客。

二月十四日東山寓樓

坐覺春陰轉北風，換晴將雨去何從？栖遲一閣山相對，眇篠兩沙江更空。（樓居望見大沙二沙尾。）原野澤微纔點綠，嶺雲朝霽不成虹；桔槔許有回天力，百畝荒畦在屋東。

濠鏡寄廣州羅原覺

山翠當門且卜居，一年塵事了無餘。意多始覺泉明晚，跡近能令務觀疏。鄰樹鳥鳴同止止，海波鷗沒不徐徐，眼前物我俱難得，回首鄉邦獨累歔。

客居

三面山橫百畝塍，夏苗無雨長髯鬠；行雲暫作須臾陰，海氣將成次第層。近水樹榮招去榜，上街魚美出嚴罾；客廚尙有烹鮮計，不及鄉風鼓土鯪。

楊少勤胡蔭蓀兩生過謁寓樓別後寄

海角同攜犯雨尋，叩門驚起已宵深，遲明會見山相對，入夢方持日就沉。風轉樹間留去葉，灰成燭後盡餘心。老懷不爲英年語，地動天迴力儻任。

端陽

孥島不渡海，況復競舟人？投糉虛魚鼈，抽蒲榜里鄰。長沙始能弔，異地更無親。風起江湖遠，南灣一望津。

澳居雜詩

倚欄樹不到簷庭，白日初黃月淡青，樓外是山山後海，人生難得此居停。

一灣水弱不流花，寂寂連山長草芽。五月海風多帶雨，亂飄隨雨過前沙。

濕草低田旱亦枯，海州誰謂水都無？憬然中谷三章後，不是憂深獨老夫。

巢鳥因風落短簷，屢回頭處語詹詹。此情祇有卿能識，雨後闌干不上簾

洶河滂澤日啁啁，豈有飛魚更可求？三十六鱗初上水，却無人釣馬留洲。（澳門島名。）

雨

雨帶朝暾風又催，井泉枯竭未能回。海扶山氣行行去，鴨上枝陰默默哀；渾擾羊羣時亦鬥，（鄰居畜羊取渾羊忽驅忽鬥）書隨魚販日還來。地窮不負人求給，船載松江水一杯。（客書來言香港水荒遠自上海載水濟民食）

送客東南樓月中

山月出海白，晚雨收玄冥。登樓望故國，送客揚歸舲。中宵發南灣，平旦過新汀；水行不逾宿，心遠當逃溟。栖栖雲間鶴，苕苕風後萍；浩浩波上鷗，寥寥欄外星。攬裾思故好，携手傷軒軿。爲言異方客，來此得安寧！

十五夜無月

夜夜重陰世莫窺，今宵無月始驚奇。浮雲落與人爭渡，漁火明如海有涯。萬象至今仍彷彿，衆山纔隱復參差。高樓不待張鐙坐，天末波光白上眉。

南灣觀朝雨

暫輟書聲對遠山，平生好景不多閒。天逢一雨欣欣樂，海納羣峯故故彎。得水鵜鶘逾斗大，浸田稂莠與人頑。繁憂却在治詩日，又見朝陽轉北灣。

大雨登樓作

滄海無端飛上天，水浮山欲起中懸。大魚出樹時高下，渴馬收江直萬千；濕翼怱鶩窮歸所，涉波駭豕在人前。雷風不礙登高目，祇有滔滔是逝川。

殘月

殘月窺窗獨起望，近山樓火澹無光。欲留睡眼看朝日，却怪晨鷄上女桑。天際烏巢先地白，海邊魚薄有星黃。人生最爲

初陽樂,不解詩人兀更傷。

桑柔

卒讀桑柔十六章,廢書三日尙徬徨。驚心事事無今古,貪亂人人有肺腸。吾亦作歌哀不及,國猶靡止去何鄉?始知騷賦追三百,輕舉游仙乃變常。

中秋夜與小平綏方橋川子雍同飲祉園作

對月深知天地恩,(時議廢舊日節令,綏方云:今夜方是紀念造化。)物光人意大無垠。因緣哀樂相隨發,慰藉辛勤一少敦。問俗正虞成毁世,舉杯難得共名園。客懷未恝思前歲,不許詩長更覆翻。

寄越園

勞生竟闕修書暇,不向西湖問起居。飛鳥翠條俱寂寞,了無恩怨入冬餘。

同雲

同雲作雪先回暖,北候尋常不足奇。歎息鄰家方辦火,淒涼人語便爲詩。徒令翠羽梅花笑,坐失枯桑海水知。我欲忘懷忘未得,親交南望故傷離。

憶官廨梅花

正爲無知絕可憐,廢垣荒廨近河邊。到門立馬須臾看,憶得梅花似去年。